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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis is about three fascinating fields in economics: firm dynamics, economic 
geography and economic development. These topics caught the economists´ attention 
since the 19th century, or even before. Initially, industrial dynamics or firm demography 
played a crucial role in microeconomic models of market structure, since Marshall´s 
seminal contributions on perfect competition to modern models of strategic competence in 
the 1980s. In this kind of models, the entry of new firms into markets (or even the very 
possibility of an entry) lowers prices, carries profits to more competitive levels and forces 
the incumbents to perform more efficiently.  
However, new firms not only contribute to equilibrate the market by increasing the supply 
of existing goods, but rather serve as an agent of change. That is, both firm entry and exit 
play an important role in the evolution and adaptation of industry to change, creating new 
markets and stimulating innovation. As Schumpeter said, “the problem that is usually 
being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant 
problem is how it creates and destroys them. As long as this is not recognized, the 
investigator does a meaningless job” (Schumpeter, 1942: 84). 
Besides, at the macro level, following the turnover of individual units contributes to 
understand the consequences of major economic reforms, such as privatization or trade 
liberalization (Caves, 1998). Understanding firm dynamics is also relevant to promote 
economic growth and development, not only through the new jobs or the new production 
created by new units, but also because firm entry stimulates productivity and efficiency, 
accelerates structural change and help to destroy jobs in the least competitive incumbents.  
However, suitable datasets to empirically study firm turnover are available just recently. 
This data have attracted substantial economist´s attention on the empirical side of the 
literature and we now know much about some stylized facts on firm dynamics, as well as 
the factors that drive firm entry and exit. Particularly, substantial work has been done to 
explain the existence of the significant differences in regional entry and exit rates within 
countries. However, most of these studies have focused on developed countries, while the 
evidence on developing countries is still scarce. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to contribute 
to this empirical literature, by explaining regional firm entry and exit in a developing 
country, Argentina. 
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Thus, this research is also about economic geography, that is, the study of the location of 
activity in space. Despite the tradition in spatial economics is long, analyses of firm 
demography have typically neglected spatial issues as an explanatory element, assuming 
implicitly that geographical characteristics are neutral to entry and exit phenomena. It is 
only about 20 years ago that the New Economic Geography models integrated several 
spatial elements coming from previous theories to describe how population and economic 
activity are allocated within a country, between highly developed centers (the core) and 
less developed regions (the periphery). Thus, spatial analysis becomes a mainstream 
concern within economics. In addition, since those models are able to explain both 
regional inequalities within countries and between them, they have recently led to an 
increasing interest in the geographic aspects of development (Krugman, 1999). 
This brings us to our third field of interest: economic development. As Robert Lucas has 
commented, the consequences for human welfare involved in development issues are so 
staggering that “[o]nce one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything 
else” (Lucas, 1988:5). The impact of firm dynamics is particularly important in promoting 
economic development and allowing people to escape from poverty. Several studies argue 
that firm dynamics promotes growth and development by highlighting the role of new 
firms in enhancing regional job growth (Ghani et al., 2011), commercializing innovations 
(Audretsch et al., 2006), discovering the competitive advantages of a nation (Hausmann 
and Rodrik, 2003), increasing structural transformation by absorbing surplus labour from 
traditional sectors, providing innovative inputs, promoting specialization, raising 
productivity and employment in modern and traditional sectors (Gries and Naudé, 2010) 
and leading to gap-filling and input-completing activities (Acs and Amorós, 2008). 
Entrepreneurship also promotes human development, by offering positive changes in 
lifestyle and a sense of achievement. 
Consequently, leaders and governments in these countries are extremely interested in 
fostering entrepreneurship. However, when designing particular public polices they use to 
rely mainly on empirical evidence on developed countries, despite these findings may not 
be worldwide applicable. In fact, when the same studies are carried out in developed and 
developing countries, the results usually differ, and a greater share of variability is left 
unexplained in less developed areas (Fritsch et al., 2006; Ghani et al., 2014). In this 
respect, authors argue that firm demography in less developed countries or regions is 
subject to “erratic influences” to a greater extent than is true in more developed regions 
(Fritsch et al., 2006), or that some “distortions” in market structure and institutions might 
make entry and exit “less rational”, that is, less driven by market fundamentals but more 
by random factors (Bartelsman et al., 2004). However, an alternative explanation could 
simply be that firm dynamics in developing countries depend on different factors not 
included in the model specifications used to explain entry and exit in developed countries. 
This thesis points to make a contribution in this respect. We aim to identify the regional 
determinants of firm entry and exit in a developing country, Argentina, during the period 
2003 to 2008. We use annual provincial data on all manufacturing (formal and private) 
firms with at least one employee registered in the Argentinean Social Security files. This is 
the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term and spatially disaggregated 
data source currently available for firm demography studies in Argentina. We rely on 
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panel count data models to estimate the impact of entry and exit determinants, which 
constitutes a novelty, since previous studies on firm dynamics in this country are merely 
descriptive or explain new business ideas or rates of employment creation and destruction.  
This work focuses on two fundamental and relevant questions: a) are there any differences 
in the regional determinants of entry and exit between developed and developing 
economies?; b) are there any differences in the regional determinants of entry and exit 
between core and peripheral regions within a single country? To address these issues, we 
take as a starting point a set of determinants that are generally found to be statistically 
significant in regional entry and exit studies using data from developed countries (e.g., 
demand, education, density and industrial structure). Then, we add some factors that, 
while potentially important in developing countries, are never considered by studies on 
developed countries. This is the case, for example, of the size of the informal economy, 
the extent of poverty or the usage of idle capacity after an economic crisis. Finally, we 
explore the existing of a core-periphery pattern, that is, we test whether the same factors 
affect entry and exit in a similar way in central and peripheral provinces. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 begins with a discussion on the concepts of 
entry and exit and their measures in empirical research. The rest of the chapter is devoted 
to a broad review of the literature. The first part of such a review covers the most relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on firm entry and exit, and identifies the main factors 
used to explain firm dynamics at the regional level in developed countries. The second 
part argues why firm dynamics may acquire particular features depending on the degree of 
development of each country and analyzes the (scarce) empirical evidence on firm 
demography in developing countries. Next, chapter 3 describes the data sources and 
defines the explanatory variables (both region-specific and sector-specific) used in the 
econometric models. The fourth chapter is devoted to a general description of Argentina, 
as well as the main features of the period 2003-2008 and the former years. We argue that 
spatial structure in Argentina fits quite well with a core-periphery pattern, which means 
that entering firms face quite different conditions not only in terms of entry facilities (e.g., 
access to markets, skilled workers and infrastructure) but also in terms of the perspectives 
of survival and growth. Also, we suggest that the usage of idle capacity may act as a 
substitution of firm entry after 2001-2002 crisis. 
The quantitative empirical research consists of three chapters. Chapters 5 analyses the 
regional determinants of the annual number of (aggregated) entries in the Argentinean 
provinces, while chapter 6 is devoted to explain aggregated exit. We identify the main 
regional factors that drive firm entry and exit, in particular, we show that although most of 
the regional determinants used to explain firm dynamics in advanced countries are still 
relevant, there is a need for additional explanatory variables that proxy for the specificities 
of Argentina as a developing economy. We also find evidence of a core-periphery pattern 
in the spatial structure of entries and exits. However, as a result from the large size of the 
Argentinean provinces, a considerable amount of the variability is left unexplained if the 
sector dimension is not considered. Thus, chapter 7 extends the analysis to explore a 
sectorial breakdown that incorporates industry-specific variables. We wonder whether 
regional characteristics affect differently firm entry and exit in low-, medium- or high-tech 
industries. Our results for low tech activities are largely consistent with findings for the 
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whole manufacturing, while firm dynamics in medium- and high-tech sectors have some 
particular features. Besides, a core-periphery pattern emerges in all of the sectors 
considered both for entry and exit, which suggests that the effect of space on firm 
dynamics in developing countries cannot be adequately assessed without distinguishing 
among central and non central regions. Finally, the last chapter contains a discussion of 
the results obtained in this study, as well as several proposals for further research. 
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Chapter 2  
Theoretical Framework And Empirical 
Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Presentation  
The chapter begins with a discussion on the concepts of firm entry and exit, as well as the 
measures frequently used in the empirical literature to account for both phenomena. Next, 
we expose the main theories on firm entry and exit, as well as the relationship between both 
processes. In particular, we begin with the static models of entry, which were dominant forty 
years ago. They are based on the limit price theory and link entry rate to industry 
profitability, growth and structural barriers to entry. We continue with theories that 
recognize firm heterogeneity, imperfect knowledge and dynamic issues, such as the learning 
by doing models, the evolutionary approaches and the theory of industry life cycle. They take 
additionally into account firm size and age, the stage in the life industry cycle and the 
technological regime. Nevertheless, as previous theories presume an unlimited supply of 
entrepreneurs, we complement their arguments with the supply of entrepreneurial skills 
approach, which analyzes the motives that stimulate an individual to start a firm. Finally, we 
briefly review the eclectic theory, that considers both demand and supply factors in order to 
explain firm dynamics. 
We follow a similar outline in order to review theories about the exiting process. We describe 
both static and dynamic models to conclude that the main factors that explain firm exit are 
the level of profits, barriers to exit, firm age and size, industry growth, technological regime, 
stage of the industry life cycle, degree of industry concentration, gross entry and non-
economic factors. 
Then, as the latter theories do not explicitly address regional concerns, we review different 
approaches about the role of space on firm dynamics, from the initial contributions of the 
German school in the 19th century to modern new economic geography models. Next, we 
point out the regional determinants more frequently used in empirical research (in developed 
countries) and the main results are synthesized.  
Finally, we wonder whether firm dynamics may acquire particular features depending on the 
degree of development of each country. Thus, we summarize the main differences between 
developed and developing countries and we argue why they may result in different entry and 
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exit patterns. The chapter ends with a review of the (scarce) empirical research on firm 
demography in developing countries.  
 
2.2. Measurements and approaches  
There is no a unique concept of entry. It may refer to newly created firms, or to entry by an 
existing company that builds a new plant, purchases an existing plant or firm or alters the 
product mix (Audretsch, 1995a). There are different forms of exit as well: voluntarily exit, 
bankruptcy, merger or purchase by another firm. Besides, the intensity of entry and exit is 
measured in different ways, and results are not neutral to them.  
Usually, the number of entries and exits is normalized in order to make comparisons between 
different areas. Thus, three approaches are frequently used: a) the one related to the labour 
market, that computes the number of entering or exiting firms over the number of workers or 
active population; b) the one related to the population, that uses as denominator the total 
population; c) the ecological approach, that divides over the total number of firms. Although 
most researchers prefer the latter perspective, there is no agreement about the most 
appropriate one (Garofoli, 1992).  
According to the ecological approach, the gross entry (exit) rate is defined as the number of 
new (exiting) firms divided by the total number of incumbents in a year1. Besides, the net 
entry rate stands for the change in the number of firms over a given period. It equals the 
difference between the gross entry rate and gross exit rate. The sum of these two rates gives 
the rate of rotation or firm turnover.  
There are some critics against these indicators. First, when entries are normalized by the level 
of employment, the entry rate is largely shaped by the change in employment in the 
respective industry and region. Further, in longitudinal analyses the use of relative 
independent variables that take the number of employees as the denominator (such as in the 
share of employees in small establishments and the unemployment rate) may suffer from a 
positive pseudo-correlation with the start-up rate (Fritsch and Falck, 2007).  
Second, when entries are normalized by the stock of firms, the structural differences between 
new enterprises (generally small) and incumbents are wiped out, so that comparisons 
between these rates may provide misleading results (Garofoli, 1992). Using disaggregated 
rates by sectors, regions or size usually implies small denominators, which results in large 
entry rates even though the number of entries is low. In particular, at the regional level the 
inequality in the size distribution of firms across space may introduce a bias that gives rise to 
artificially high entry rates in regions characterised by large firm structures (Garofoli, 1994). 
In addition, current rates mirror previous rates, so that if a region had a low entry rate in the 
past, it would show an artificial rise in the current firm formation rate (Ashcroft et al., 1991). 
Finally, these indicators assume a casual relationship between the stock of firms, workers or 
population and firm dynamics (Garofoli, 1992). 
                                                 
1  A new establishment may be defined alternatively as an establishment younger than one, two or four 
years old, while incumbents are defined as those firms more than ten or fifteen years old, or alternatively 
as the total number of  firms in the current period (Audretsch, 1995a). 
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This is why some studies (i.e. Chappell et al., 1990; Mayer and Chappel, 1992; Ilmakunnas 
and Topi, 1999; Barbosa et al., 2004; Barbosa, 2007; Fritsch and Falck, 2007) use simply the 
absolute number of entries and/or exits within a region, an industry and/or a year. Despite 
comparisons among regions with different size may be misleading, it is possible to control for 
the size of the regions/sectors in econometric models, by including variables such as the 
surface, the population, the number of incumbents or the amount of incumbent employment. 
Finally, an alternative measure of entrepreneurship is the employment generated by new 
firms (Glaeser and Kerr, 2009) or by young firms (Ghani et al., 2014).  
 
2.3. Firm dynamics: literature review and empirical evidence 
In this section we expose a synthesis of the main theories and determinants that explain firm 
entry and exit processes, divided into: the static approaches -based on the limit price 
hypothesis and on the assumption of a representative firm- and the dynamic approaches -
which suppose heterogeneous agents and an imperfect knowledge of the environment-. 
Additionally, we describe the supply of entrepreneurial skills approach -that takes into 
account the motives to start a firm at the individual level- and the eclectic theory –which 
considers both demand and supply factors-. In every case, we expose the basic model, the 
main determinants of firm entry and exit and the empirical evidence. Finally, we review the 
relationship between entry and exit. 
 
2.3.1. Firm entry 
 
Static theories 
As seminal studies about entry are based on limit price theory, entry barriers are the main 
factors initially used to explain firm dynamics. However, attention focuses on potential 
rather to actual entry (Bain, 1956; Bhagwati, 1970; Baumol, 1982), and many studies aim to 
quantify cross sectional differences in the level of entry barriers, rather than measuring entry 
itself (Bain, 1949; Modigliani, 1958). Other indirect tests regress the profit rate, rather than 
entry, on barriers to entry (Comanor and Wilson, 1967; Miller, 1969). According to Caves 
and Porter (1977) the main entry barriers considered are:  
1. Product differentiation, which forces the entrant to make extra outlays in order to offset 
the “goodwill” assets of the incumbent firms. 
2. Absolute cost advantages: established firms may have advantages over potential entrants 
in terms of accessing to lower prices, purchasing or securing productive factors or investible 
funds, or having preferred access to productive techniques, for instance, through patents or 
know-how. 
3. Economies to scale: the larger the minimum effective size (MES), the more an entrant´s 
output will depress industry prices, and the higher the ability of incumbents to raise price 
without making entry profitable.  
4. Vertical integration, since the newcomer faces the dilemma of entering unintegrated (and 
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facing an extra uncertainty) or entering integrated (and facing a higher capital cost entry 
barrier). 
5. Strategic barriers, such as the strategy of limit pricing, that takes place when established 
firms threaten to fix a price so low that the entrant cannot afford the entry costs. Similarly, the 
strategy of predatory prices is carried out by an incumbent which reduces its prices in an 
attempt to destroy its rivals or to deter new entry. In particular, an existing firm can make a 
high entry-discouraging investment (excess capacity) which makes credible a threat of price 
warfare against entrants.  
6. Legal barriers, which are exogenous and block the entry of new firms.  
Despite the emphasis of static models is on potential rather than actual entry, some studies 
explain firm entry into a small number of industries (Mansfield, 1962; Carroll and Vogel, 
1987). On the other hand, other papers measure the intensity of entry for a cross-section of 
industries. The results given by these studies are rather imprecise since many of them (Orr, 
1974; Deutsch, 1975) rely on data generated for other purposes or cannot distinguish between 
gross entry and exit (Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991). 
Among these early studies that account for variations in entry in strict sense, one of the most 
relevant is Orr´s (1974). He presumes that entry is a positive function of the difference 
between observed and entry limiting profit rates, and a positive function of the expected rate 
of growth of industry output (Q): 
 
 ENTRY = f(πp – π*, Q)        [1]  
 
where πp is the past industry profit rate -proxy of observed profit rate- and π* is the long run 
profit rate predicted for this industry on the basis of the level of entry barriers. 
It is only 20 years ago that actual entry has been empirically studied within the industrial 
organization literature, and several studies based on national databases have emerged 
(Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991; Geroski, 1991; Geroski and Schwalbach, 1991). The main 
determinants of entry used in these models include: i) current, past or expected profit rate, ii) 
barriers to entry, iii) current, past or expected rate of growth of the industry output, iv) 
industry concentration and v) risk. From the empirical literature surveyed by Geroski (1995) 
emerges that: i) entry reacts slowly to high profit rates, ii) despite entry barriers are high, the 
response by incumbents to entry is selective; iii) the most effective barriers to entry are the 
strategic ones, such as signing long term contracts with buyers, advertising, R+D, patent 
protection or strategic use of distribution systems; iv) the impact of industry concentration 
level is mixed and imprecise.  
 
Dynamic theories 
Many of the questions about firm entry remained unanswered under the static framework, 
and the related empirical evidence is ambiguous and not conclusive (Audretsch, 1995a). In 
the 90s, jointly with the availability of better national data bases and the use of more 
sophisticated econometric tools -discrete choice, Poisson, panel data, etc.-, additional 
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theories are considered. Three groups of models enlarge the traditional framework by putting 
it into a dynamic setting with heterogeneous agents who has an imperfect knowledge of the 
environment: a) learning by doing models, b) evolutionary models, and c) theory of industry 
life cycle2. According to them, an entrant may employ a new technology or may offer a new 
product, which confers new firms an additional economic role: not just to equilibrate the 
market by increasing the supply of existing goods, but rather to serve as an agent of change. 
The new variables considered by these models are: i) firm size and age; ii) investment 
strategy; iii) technological regime; and iv) stage in the industry life cycle. 
Among the learning by doing models, Jovanovic´s model (1982) gives rise to entry, growth 
and exit behaviour that agrees with the empirical evidence, that is, smaller firms grow faster 
and are more likely to fail than large ones. The model deals with an industry which product 
is homogeneous and which costs are random. The potential entrant is assumed to know the 
mean and standard deviation of all firms´ costs but not its own mean expectation. Upon 
paying an entry fee, it starts to receive noisy information on its true cost level, which in every 
period might induce it to expand, contract or exit. Efficient firms grow and survive, while the 
inefficient ones decline and fail. Frank (1988) and Hopenhayn (1992) develop 
complementary models that account for entry, exit, and heterogeneity in the size and growth 
rate of firms. As firms learn about their efficiency just by operating in the industry, these 
models are known as passive learning models. In contrast, in the active learning models (Pakes 
and Ericson, 1989) firms can invest to improve the value of the parameter which determines 
the distribution of its profits, for example, by exploring and developing alternative market 
niches. The empirical evidence shows that U.S. manufacturing firms are more consistent 
with the active learning model whilst retailing firms are more consistent with the passive 
learning model (Pakes and Ericson, 1998). 
Among the evolutionary models, Nelson and Winter (1982) consider that firms´ decisions are 
not based on maximization calculus that lead to a state of equilibrium, but rather emphasize 
on firms´ capabilities and decision rules, which are modified as a result of deliberate problem-
solving efforts and random events. Over time, market selection mechanism determines which 
firms stay in the industry and which ones are pushed out by more profitable ones. 
Meanwhile, Audretsch (1995a and 1995b) explains why start up activity varies so greatly 
across industries. He argues that the propensity to start new firms is shaped by the underlying 
technological regime, that is, the knowledge conditions subjacent the industry (Nelson and 
Winter, 1974, 1982). In some industries, new economic knowledge tends to be relatively 
routinized and can be processed within the context of incumbent firms. This corresponds to 
the routinized regime, that is, one favourable to innovative activity by established firms and 
unfavourable to innovative entry (Winter, 1984). In industries with more information 
asymmetries, innovations tend to come from knowledge that is not of routine and therefore 
tend to be rejected by the hierarchical bureaucracies of incumbent firms. This corresponds to 
the entrepreneurial regime, where small firms have an innovative advantage. 
                                                 
2 We do not expose the characteristics of  models of  strategic competition, developed in the 70s and 80s, 
because of  their theoretical nature and the relatively less empirical studies related. These models, based 
on game theory, incorporate the dynamic dimension as well as informative asymmetries to explain 
decisions of  firms to enter, remain or exit a market (Tirole, 1990). 
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Finally, a group of studies link entry and exit with the stage of the industry life cycle of the 
product (Gort and Klepper, 1982; Klepper and Graddy, 1990; Agarwal and Gort, 1996; 
Klepper, 1996). They show that the type of firm that entries and exits out of an industry, is 
closely linked to the stage of the industry life cycle. While entries rise in the initial stage, 
reach a peak shortly afterwards, and then decrease, exits rise continuously until they reach 
the maximum in the mature phases, declining thereafter. 
 
The supply of entrepreneurial skills 
Despite the former models made some progress in terms of entry determinants and the role of 
new firms, they presume an unlimited supply of entrepreneurs, willing and able to enter those 
industries which offer the best prospects for profit (Hamilton and Harper, 1994). In contrast, 
the supply of entrepreneurial skills approach considers that the supply of people able to create 
new firms is limited in the short and medium term and it is not significantly affected by the 
economic incentives.  
Shapero (1983) distinguishes four main motives which can stimulate an individual to start a 
firm, from an entrepreneurial perspective: a) displacement factor, b) disposition to act, c) 
credibility, d) availability of resources. Except for the second one, more related to personal 
motivation, the other three may vary among regions and can explain regional differences in 
firm creation. The displacement factor explains the timing of the business formation and it may 
include negative or “push” factors –such as migration (Aldrich and Waldinger, 1990), 
unemployment or dissatisfaction with the present job (Storey, 1994)-, as well as positive or 
“pull” factors -new market opportunities, completion of a study, the challenge and the 
potential rewards, etc.-. The disposition to act refers to the appropriate personality to become 
an entrepreneur, and includes attributes such as need for achievement, risk taking propensity, 
tolerance for ambiguity or family background (McClelland, 1961; Hagen, 1962; Gilad, 1986). 
The third factor, credibility, refers to the social position and esteem enjoyed by businessmen in 
a particular society. It is related to the idea that in some “social climates” entrepreneurship 
flourishes more than in others. Finally, the availability of resources (such as human capital, 
financial and tax incentives or firm´s external services) can encourage entry by reducing risks 
and costs (Storey, 1994).  
 
The eclectic theory 
The eclectic theory explains firm dynamics by putting together various elements of the above 
mentioned approaches (Verheul et al., 2002). This theory has been widely used in explaining 
differences in entrepreneurship among countries (see for example Wennekers et al., 2005; 
Busenitz et al., 2005; van Stel et al., 2007; Freytrag and Thurik, 2007). According to these 
ideas, both demand and supply factors create conditions for entrepreneurial decisions at the 
individual level (Figure 2.1). On the one hand, the demand for entrepreneurship represents 
the opportunities for starting a firm and it can be viewed from a consumer’s perspective 
(demand characteristics such as size, stability, diversity or stage in the industry life cycle) and 
a firm’s perspective (barriers to entry and exit, firm size and age, technological regime, 
outsourcing or technological intensity). On the other hand, the supply of entrepreneurship is 
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determined by such characteristics of the population as age structure, resources and abilities 
of individuals, attitudes towards entrepreneurship, culture, individual skills, unemployment, 
income disparity, education, ethnic background, and the opportunity cost of starting a new 
firm.  
Taken into account both demand and supply factors, the individuals weight alternative types 
of employment (self employment versus wage employment or unemployment) in a process 
mediated by the individual´s risk-reward profile. This framework may be extended by 
including other areas of the business environment (Porter, 2003) which also affect firm entry, 
as for example, the quality of input conditions, the context of firm strategy and rivalry and 
the availability and quality of local suppliers and related industries. 
 
Figure 2.1. Determinants of firm dynamics according to the eclectic theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author based on Verheul et al. (2002) 
 
2.3.2. Firm exit 
The initial studies of firm exit under the static approach (Mansfield, 1962; Marcus, 1967) 
analyze exit across industries, linking exit rates at the sectoral level with some measure of 
current profits (the proportion of loss firms or the average rate of return), a proxy for barriers 
to exit (the capital-output ratio or the minimum efficient size of the firm) and a measure of 
profit expectations (the realized rate of return in t+1, rit+1):  
 
EXITit = f(PROFITit ; BARRIERSit ; rit+1)       [2] 
 
Similarly, Orr´s model (1974) has been also widely used in order to explain firm exit as well 
(see among others Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Austin and Rosenbaum, 1990). According to 
this framework, exits depend not only on the level of profits, but on barriers to exit and 
industry growth. The strength of exit barriers, such as scale economies or sunk costs, delays 
the exit from the market, while a higher rate of industry growth reduces the number of exits, 
since more firms are expected to cover their costs and realize profits3.  
                                                 
3 The effect of exit barriers is not homogeneous across firms of different size. In particular, some barriers 
(such as scale economies) affect specially small and young firms, because they are more vulnerable to the 
cost disadvantages (Audretsch, 1995b).  
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Later on, dynamic models of entry, such as Jovanovic´s (1982), Mac Donald´s (1986), 
Frank´s (1988) or Hopenhayn´s (1992), take into account the main findings of the previous 
studies, predicting that exits from the market occur when the profit (or the ratio 
expected/realized profit) falls below some threshold, and that the larger the sunk costs, the 
longer a series of bad results that will be required to induce exit. In addition, they provide 
theoretical evidence about the relevance of size and age in the exit process. Propensity to exit 
decreases with both variables, since larger and older establishments have got more resources 
and ability of learning, while small and young firms suffer from disadvantages imposed by 
scale economies or higher costs of capital, inputs or transaction costs (Nooteboom, 1998).  
The empirical fact that new and small firms are more likely to exit is known in the literature 
as the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liability of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 
1986), respectively. However, older firms may also face a relatively high likelihood of closing 
down, which is called the liability of aging. The main reason could be the inflexibility of 
established organizations (liability of senescence); an erosion of technology, products, business 
concepts, and management strategies over time (liability of obsolescence); or problems in finding 
a successor (Fritsch et al., 2006). 
Within the dynamic approach, the evolutionary theory also predicts that the propensity for 
new entrants to exit depends on a number of industry-specific characteristics, most notably 
the technological regime. In particular, chances of exit are higher in industries characterized 
by the entrepreneurial regime (Audretsch, 1995a). These models also emphasize on the 
(causal) relationships between entries and exits (see next section). 
At the aggregate level, exits have been shown to increase during downturns4 (Audretsch and 
Mahmood, 1995; see, however, Boeri and Bellman, 1995). High real interest rates may also 
encourage exit as well, unless new firms do not dependent on external capital. The time the 
start-up is found is also relevant: firms established closer to economic downturns are more 
likely to fail, probably because they face adverse market conditions with little experience 
(Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000b).  
Finally, a number of case studies have concentrated on the role of non-economic factors as 
drivers of firm exit. Harada (2007), for example, shows that reasons such as aging, illness or 
injury of the manager account for more than 60% of the (small firm) exits studied in Japan. 
However, according to Stam et al. (2010:1113), “[t]he few economic studies of firm exit that 
consider personal characteristics find ambiguous effects of age and a negative effect of several 
kinds of human capital, such as general education and industry experience”.  
 
2.3.3. Independence, symmetry or simultaneity? 
Entries and exits of the markets are interrelated processes. In fact, the correlation between 
both phenomena at the regional level is usually strong (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Reynolds 
et al., 1994), especially within manufacturing sectors (Dunne and Roberts, 1991). However, 
the first studies on firm dynamics implicitly assume that there is no link between entry and 
                                                 
4 The impact of economic growth also depends on firm size: new and smaller firms tend to be more 
positively/adversely affected by high/low growth. Besides, a higher rate of growth shifts the type of 
establishment exiting away from new entrants towards incumbents (Audretsch, 1995b). 
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exit (the independence hypothesis). This implies that entry and exit are function of, respectively, 
barriers to entry and exit (among other variables). Thus, each of the following expressions is 
estimated separately: 
 
ENTRYit = f(BAR.ENTRYit, OTHER VARIABLESit)      [3] 
EXITit     = f(BAR.EXITit, OTHER VARIABLESit)     [4] 
 
Nevertheless, this hypothesis is very restrictive and may be affected by several specification 
errors (Manjón, 2002). Thus, based on the fact that barriers to entry are also barriers to exit, 
Shapiro and Khemani (1987) examined the symmetry hypothesis, which states that the 
determinants of entry and exit are identical, or highly correlated. According to this 
specification, both equations for entry and exit should be the same: 
 
ENTRYit = f(BAR.ENTRYit, BAR.EXITit, OTHER VARIABLESit)    [5] 
EXITit     = f(BAR.EXITit, BAR.ENTRYit, OTHER VARIABLESit)   [6] 
 
Third, according to the simultaneity hypothesis, entry and exit in a given sector or region are 
simultaneously determined. On the one hand, entrances may influence exits by increasing the 
pressure of competition in the market (the so called displacement effect). On the other hand, 
firms that abandon the market leave behind niches of unsatisfied consumers that encourage 
new companies to enter (the replacement effect). In the general formulation, the endogenous 
variables appear as covariates: 
 
ENTRYit = f(BAR.ENTRYit, BAR.EXITit, EXITit, OTHER VARIABLESit)  [7] 
EXITit     = f(BAR.EXITit, BAR.ENTRYit, ENTRYit, OTHER VARIABLESit)  [8] 
 
In particular, the evolutionary process of entry and exit may be characterized by three 
alternative metaphors (Audretsch, 1995a):  
1. The forest metaphor, that is, the displacement of incumbent enterprises by new firms 
initially described by Marshall (1920). Similarly, Schumpeter (1911) refers to a process of 
creative destruction, where new firms with entrepreneurial spirit displace the tired old 
incumbents, leading to higher economic growth. Incumbent firms may be unable to fend off 
new entrants because of information asymmetries, principal-agent problems and difficulties 
in monitoring (Audretsch, 1995a). 
2. The metaphor of the revolving door: the bulk of exiting firms is accounted for by new 
entrants. That is, the majority of new entrants will not survive past the very short run, so that 
there is considerable exit and very little permanent penetration. 
3. The metaphor of the conical revolving door, where the top part -representing the largest 
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enterprises- revolves much more slowly than the lower part -representing the small firms-. 
This view is consistent with the findings that the likelihood of survival is positively related to 
firm size and age (Audretsch, 1995a). Barriers to survival determine the speed of the door, so 
that the greater the degree of technological change and the extent of scale economies in the 
industry, the faster this conical door revolves. 
The evidence about which hypothesis is correct is not conclusive. The initial studies aim to 
reject the independence hypothesis and find evidence that supports symmetry hypothesis (see 
Shapiro and Khemani, 1987 for Canada and Caves and Porter, 1976; Eaton and Lipsey, 1980 
and 1981; Evans and Siegfried, 1992 for the U.S.). More recent studies test symmetry 
hypothesis versus simultaneity hypothesis. On the one hand, Austin and Rosembaum (1990) 
and Rosembaum and Lamort (1992) for the U.S. and Fotopoulos and Spence (1998) for 
Greece, reject simultaneity. On the other hand, Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter (1991), 
Evans and Siegfried (1992), Kleijweg and Lever (1996), Segarra et al. (2002) and Arauzo et al. 
(2007) support the existence of displacement-replacement effects for Belgium, U.S., 
Netherlands and Spain respectively. 
In regard to the three metaphors, Love (1996b) detects a revolving door effect in British 
manufacturing and Manjón (2010) finds evidence of a conical revolving door phenomenon in 
Spain. According to Audretsch (1995a) the type of establishment exiting depends 
considerably on the technological and demand characteristics of the industry. The revolving 
door metaphor seems more appropriate in markets where scale economies play an important 
role and where innovative activity is dominated by larger enterprises. By contrast, the forest 
metaphor is more applicable in industries under the entrepreneurial regime. 
 
2.4. The role of space on firm dynamics 
The aforementioned theories provide some elements that, indirectly, explain different entry 
and exit patterns at the regional level. For example, regional economic growth may impact 
directly on firms´ profits, higher unemployment may push individuals to start a new firm or 
previous entry and exit may impact on current firm dynamics. However,  these theories do 
not address in particular the role of space on firm demography. Several separate strands in 
the economic literature provide some contributions that explain firm entry and exit across a 
territory, and they can be grouped into three traditions: a) Germanic location theory; b) 
models of cumulative causation; c) the idea of local external economies. Recently, the major 
elements of these traditions were integrated in a unique theoretical framework, the so called 
new economic geography.  
 
2.4.1. Germanic location theory 
The German School develops a location theory which describes the locational pattern of 
industries at an aggregated level. Von Thünen (1826) explains the location of crops around 
an isolated central city, according to the model of concentric rings of production. In this 
model, larger leases are established for pieces of ground near by the market, so that farmers 
choose between paying more for the land or in terms of transport costs. Later, the least cost 
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theory (Weber, 1909) explains that the optimal location is a result of firms´ decision of 
minimizing transport costs, either to the market or to sources of raw materials. Thereafter, 
Weber includes into the location decision the proximity to labour market, provided that the 
additional transport costs may be offset by savings related to labour concentration. Thus, he 
introduces the concept of agglomeration economies as a factor that compensates for higher 
costs of transport and justifies the establishment of a firm near other ones belonging to the 
same industry. Finally, the central-place theory analyzes the location and roles of 
manufacturing centers that serve an evenly spread rural population. Within this tradition, 
Chistaller (1933) argues that cities should form a hierarchy of central places, while Lösch 
(1940) predicts that market areas should be hexagonal. 
 
2.4.2. Models of cumulative causation 
The basic idea of these models (Harris, 1954; Myrdal; 1957), is that firms tend to locate 
where market access is high, while markets are large where many firms locate. This circular 
and cumulative causation process leads to an unequal regional development within a 
country, in which most developed areas benefit in detriment of less developed ones. The 
circular relationship works in the following way: an initial economic growth of a given area 
expands regional employment and induces internal migration, which increases the size of the 
domestic market and stimulates new investments as well as the entry of firms that exploit 
internal scale economies.  
There is also an element of circular causality in the innovative activity, since firms are prone 
to adopt modern techniques only in large markets, but markets enlarge if enough firms adopt 
modern techniques. Furthermore, there is a circular relationship between market size and the 
level of industrial diversification. In this case, the growth of a region may induce import 
substitution of goods subject to scale economies (Pred, 1966), or the location of related 
industries, as a result of forward and backward linkages (Hirschman, 1958). 
 
2.4.3. Local external economies 
Marshall (1890) is the first author to identify the concept of economies of scale external to the 
firm, which consist of a decrease in the average cost as the industry (and not the individual 
firms) increases its output. He distinguishes three sources of local external economies: 
specialized labour market, availability of suppliers and technological spillovers, that is, the 
transmission of information among agents located in the same area. These external 
economies may be in turn classified into two types: localization economies and urbanization 
economies (Hoover, 1936; 1937). The former are internal to the sector to which the company 
belongs and occur when a firm obtains profits from locating close to other firms in the same 
industrial activity. The latter result from the concentration of overall economic activity and 
benefit all firms located in the same area, as the result of specialized commercial and 
financial services, the nearby presence of diverse suppliers, the access to public services, to 
infrastructure and to transport services, the existence of a business climate, a creative 
atmosphere and knowledge spillovers. However, there are also agglomeration diseconomies or 
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problems associated with excessive concentration, such as congestion, higher input prices, 
social problems or pollution, which limit the advantages of agglomeration (Townroe, 1969). 
The concepts of urbanization and localization economies may be adapted to a dynamic 
context, so that the history of a region becomes relevant in order to explain current firm 
dynamics (Glaeser et al., 1992). The dynamic equivalent of the localization economies is 
called MAR economies, since they come from the contributions of Marshall (1890), Arrow 
(1962) and Romer (1986). These external economies arise from a history of interactions 
among geographically concentrated firms specialized in the same activity. These long-term 
relationships lead to a build-up of knowledge (“local trade secrets”) that is available to firms 
just in a particular region. In contrast, Jacob economies are the dynamic equivalent of the 
urbanization economies5. They state that a build-up of knowledge associated with historical 
diversity favours current firm birth and growth. The influence of these dynamic externalities 
depends on the level of technological maturity of each sector (Henderson et al., 1995). Thus, 
for mature capital goods sectors, there is evidence of MAR externalities, while for new high-
tech sectors, there is evidence on both Jacobs as well as MAR externalities, although the 
former are more important.  
Remarkably, the benefits of agglomeration economies depend on the age of the firm and the 
stage of industry life cycle of the product. On the one hand, the incubator hypothesis states that 
new businesses are located in large cities, where they can enjoy the environment they need in 
the initial years and, later, they move towards peripheral locations (Vernon and Hoover, 
1959). Similarly, external economies are more important the smaller the size of the firm. This 
is because small firms generally have limited resources, which makes them more dependent 
on the facilities offered by the local environment. On the other hand, according to the theory 
of industry life cycle, different costs of production -capital, R+D, management, unskilled 
labour, etc.- have different relative importance depending on the phase of the product life 
cycle6 (Duranton and Puga, 2001). Thus, new industries prosper in large, diverse 
metropolitan areas, with innovative environments plenty of qualified human capital. 
However, with maturity, production decentralizes to smaller, more specialized cities with 
lower costs. 
 
2.4.4. New economic geography (NEG) 
NEG models analyze how population and economic activity are allocated within a country, 
between highly developed urban centers (the core) and less developed agricultural regions (the 
periphery). This approach integrates the aforementioned spatial elements (the market 
potential, the relevance of transport costs, the ideas of circular and cumulative causation, 
local externalities and internal economies to scale) into a set of fully general-equilibrium 
models that derive aggregate behaviour from individual maximization (Krugman, 1998 and 
1995b). 
                                                 
5 The name owes to the studies of this authoress based on the assumption that the city is the way in which 
knowledge transfer is more viable (Jacobs, 1969). 
6 For empirical evidence on Germany, Spain and France see Bade and Nerlinger (2000); Arauzo and 
Viladecans (2009); Duranton and Puga (2001); Autant-Bernard (2006) and Autant-Bernard et al. (2006). 
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The seminal core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991) explains geographical concentration of 
manufacturing based on the interaction of economies of scale, transportation costs and the 
share of manufacturing in national income7. Firms have incentives to locate in large markets 
in order to exploit internal scale economies and minimize transport costs. Workers have 
incentives to move to the larger region, since it offers higher real wages and larger variety of 
goods. This increases the difference in size between markets and reinforces the incentive to 
migrate for firms and individuals. However, manufacturing is not concentrated only in one 
point of the space because the agricultural sector is immobile and disperse.  
Thus, geographical concentration is affected by two opposed forces (Krugman, 1999). On the 
one hand, centripetal forces benefits the agents located in a certain region and provokes the 
attraction of more agents. These are the three Marshallian sources of external economies: 
market size effects (with backward and forward linkages8); thick labour market and pure 
external economies such as technological spillovers. On the other hand, centrifugal forces 
generate costs associated with the proximity, which restrict the location of new firms and 
lead to the expulsion of the existing ones. These include immobile factors (land and natural 
resources); land rents and pure external diseconomies such as congestion effects. 
NEG models can also explain the inequality among developed and developing countries. 
According to Venables (1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995), nations may be self-
sufficient at high transport costs, but when these costs fall below a critical level, a core-
periphery pattern emerges. In this pattern manufacturing is concentrated in a core while the 
periphery is relegated to primary production with lower real wages9. Finally, at still lower 
transport costs, industry finds profitable to move to low-wage locations and the process is 
expected to reverse.  
In particular, Krugman (1999) explains regional inequalities within developing countries, by 
considering as mobile factors the capital and skilled labour, and presuming unskilled labour a 
(relatively) immobile factor. Besides, transportation networks are an additional source of 
inequalities, since they provide self reinforcing advantages of market access. Finally, the 
primacy of the capital city in these countries is explained within this framework by the size of 
the urban population and the level of political centralization. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Krugman (1995a) provides an integrated centre-periphery model, in which Krugman (1991) Krugman 
(1993a) and Krugman (1993b) can be seen as special cases.  
8 The entry of new firms in a region both increases the demand for upstream industries to be established at a 
minumum economic scale (backward linkages) and reduces costs of potential downstream users of its 
products (foward linkages) (Krugman and Venables, 1995; Venables, 1996). 
9 This part of  the argument agrees with those approaches that explain the emergence of  rich and poor 
countries as part of  a common process of  uneven development (Prebisch, 1949; Sunkel and Paz, 1981). 
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2.5. Empirical research on firm dynamics in developed countries  
Since 90s, a number of studies have shown the existence of substantial differences in regional 
entry and exit rates within developed countries10, most of which arise from differences in 
regional characteristics (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1997; Fritsch and Schmude, 2006). This 
gives rise to a boost in the number of empirical studies investigating the impact of regional 
characteristics on firm dynamics. However, as regional variation in start-up rates is consistent 
with different theoretical frameworks (Spilling, 1996), most empirical studies tend to use 
econometric specifications that are derived ad hoc (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2010).  
In particular, following Bosma et al. (2008), region-specific determinants of firm entry can be 
grouped into three categories: i) demand of goods and supply of factors; agglomeration 
effects; iii) cultural attitudes and policies towards entrepreneurship.  
First, proxies for demand include variables that affect firm’s profits, such as the size of local 
markets (typically using population measures) and consumers’ purchase power (measured by 
income, (un)employment and output measures such as regional GDP). All these variables 
may appear in the models in levels and/or in growth rates. As for the supply of factors, the 
focus is on labour and capital. Labour refers to the amount of people endowed with the 
ability to start new firms, usually proxied by the composition of the labour force (age, gender, 
ethnic and geographical origin, etc.) and human capital characteristic (education, skills, etc.). 
Also, wages is the usual proxy for the price of this factor. Capital refers to infrastructures (e.g. 
accessibility) and financial resources (both in terms of the extent of financing, e.g. bank 
loans, and the constraints that may exist to access credit, particularly on SMEs). In addition, 
it is common to consider proxies for the industrial structure such as the weight of SMEs, the 
number of incumbents and the number of exits/entries (lagged one or two periods). 
Notice that the definition of the demand and supply categories is not self-excluding, for some 
variables may affect both demand and supply. Higher real wages, for example, mean more 
purchase power but also higher costs of labour and higher opportunity costs for self-
employment. Similarly, unemployment can push individuals to start their own business. 
However, it may also reflect the poor economic situation of the region.  
Second, having other firms close by may increase market opportunities and firms’ efficiency. 
The aforementioned agglomeration and disagglomeration effects may result from a 
concentration of population and firms in a region. Density and its square have been widely 
used as proxies for agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, respectively, as well as 
the number of firms. In particular, the number of companies in the same sector proxy the 
effects of localisation economies, while the total number of firms proxy the impact of 
urbanisation economies.  
                                                 
10 These include, among others, Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) and Fritsch and Falck (2007) in Germany; 
Davidsson et al. (1994) in Sweden; Garofoli (1994), Carree et al. (2008) and Santarelli et al. (2009) in 
Italy; Guesnier (1994) in France; Keeble and Walker (1994) and Fotopoulos and Spence (2001) in the 
UK; Hart and Gudgin (1994) in Ireland; Campbell (1996), Rigby and Essletzbichler (2000) and 
Armington and Acs (2002) in the US; Spilling (1996) in Norway; Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) in 
Greece; Kangasharju (2000) in Finland; Arauzo-Carod et al. (2008) in Spain; and Tamásy and Le Heron 
(2008) in New Zealand.  
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Third, the empirical inclusion of factors related to cultural attitudes and policies towards 
entrepreneurship has not been fully successful. This owes to the difficulty in finding good 
proxies. Since data on specific entry-promoting policies is generally not available, for 
example, Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Reynolds et al. (1994) advocate for using the amount 
of public spending. Cultural attitudes are even more difficult to measure. Garofoli (1994), for 
example, argues that start ups are higher in areas with higher social mobility, and Tamásy 
and Le Heron (2008) and Lee et al. (2004) show that more entries are expected in 
communities with higher inflows of migrants. Also, a high share of employees in the public 
sector may proxy for a lack of entrepreneurial spirit and consequently leads to a low firm 
formation rate (Spilling, 1996). 
Next, we briefly review the main empirical findings on regional firm entry and exit. They 
come from studies that focus on the manufacturing sector, as we do11. In particular, empirical 
evidence on firm entry (Table 2.1) can be summarised in the following way:  
1. Demand: population and GDP growth have a positive effect on entry, while the effect 
of income levels is ambiguous (both positive and negative estimates have been 
reported). 
2. Supply: the unemployment rate has an ambiguous effect on entry, while the change in 
the unemployment rate and the level of wages negatively affect entry; bank deposits, 
the proportion of small firms and the level of industry specialisation have a positive 
effect on entries, while the impact of the mean establishment size tends to be negative; 
exit rates have a positive effect on entries.  
3. Agglomeration: population density, localisation economies and population living in 
urban areas affect entries positively; dwelling prizes and the share of owners also have 
a positive effect on entries. 
4. Cultural attitudes and public policy: the share of self employed, immigrants or 
autonomous workers tends to affect entries positively, while public policies and 
political ethos have non-significant or ambiguous effects. 
 
                                                 
11 Audretsch and Fritsch (1994); Armington and Acs (2002); Carree et al. (2008); Davidsson et al. (1994); 
Fotopoulos and Spence (1999); Fritsch and Falck (2007); Garofoli (1994); Hart and Gudgin (1994); 
Keeble and Walker (1994); Reynolds (1994); Reynolds et al. (1994); Santarelli et al. (2009); Spilling 
(1996), Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Tamásy and Le Heron (2008).  
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Table 2.1. Determinants of firm entry in manufacturing. Developed countries 
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Table 2.1. Determinants of firm entry in manufacturing. Developed countries (cont.) 
 
Source: author 
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Regional firm exit has received comparatively less attention. The greatest impediment is the 
lack of longitudinal datasets that identify the actual closure date. The empirical evidence on 
developed countries (Table 2.2) shows that demand factors such as the growth of income, 
population or output prevents exits, while income per capita has ambiguous effects. As for 
supply factors, exits are higher (ceteris paribus) in regions with low unemployment, higher 
share of small plants and large proportion of skilled workers. The effect of the industrial 
specialization is not clear, since exits seem to be lower in specialized provinces but rise in 
highly specialized areas such as industrial districts. The impact of agglomeration economies 
is also ambiguous, while cultural attitudes and public policies have been rarely included.  
The ambiguous impact of agglomeration economies is consistent with findings coming from 
the survival literature12. In particular, Brixy and Grotz (2007), Fritsch et al. (2006), Strotmann 
(2007), Huiban (2011) and Littunen et al. (1998) (for Germany, France and Finland, 
respectively) show that survival rates are higher in rural areas or small cities, as a result of 
less competition or higher entry barriers that induce the selective entry of firms with higher 
chances of living. However, location near the capital city positively affects survival in 
Greece, and it is especially so for smaller firms (Fotopoulos and Louri, 2000a). A plausible 
interpretation is that differences in economic development, institutions and infrastructure 
between Greece and the other developed countries may change the impact of locating near 
urban areas. Likewise, the effect of urban density may be also non-linear, as an inverted U-
shape (Fertala, 2008). 
 
 
                                                 
12 Survival or duration analysis estimates the probability that a firm exits in a time period, conditional on 
that it has survived up to that time and on several firm-, sector- or region- specific variables, as well as 
macroeconomic determinants. A detailed analysis of survival is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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Table 2.2. Determinants of firm exit in manufacturing. Developed countries. 
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Interestingly, the impact of regional characteristics is likely to differ between industries. For 
example, according to the product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) new innovative firms in 
the early stages take more advantage from agglomeration economies, while new firms in 
mature sectors compete on the base of lower prices. Besides, the impact of regional factors 
such as the income level or the unemployment rate may depend on the elasticity of demand 
or on the level of capital intensity, respectively (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999). Ignoring this 
kind of differences among industries may be the cause of the mixed and partly contradictory 
results found in the aforementioned empirical literature (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999; Fritsch 
and Falck, 2007). 
Only a handful of studies overcome this shortcoming13, by considering –additionally to 
regional variables- the following industry-specific factors: a) barriers to entry/exit, b) 
incentives to enter/exit the market, c) number of incumbents and d) interdependence of firm 
births and deaths over time. First, the relative importance of location-specific factors is 
expected to be greater in industries with low barriers to entry, that is, industries with a small 
minimum efficient scale, where the existence of market niches is relevant, which are less 
concentrated or have a low level of capital intensity (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2007; Fotopoulos 
and Spence, 1998; Fitsch and Falck, 2007; Nurmi, 2006). Second, a growing demand or 
higher profits encourage entries and discourage exits. However, while for some industries it is 
more important the demand for the products of that industry, other activities depend more on 
the evolution of the overall (regional or national) economic activity. Third, the impact of the 
number of incumbents in the same industry is ambiguous (Carree et al., 2011). On the one 
hand, they may foster the attraction of similar ventures that benefit from positive externalities 
(localization economies); on the other hand, they may exert a competition effect, which 
prevents entry and increases exit. At last, the interdependence of firm entry and exit refers to 
the aforementioned displacement and replacement effects, which are more easily 
recognizable among disaggregated industries (Arauzo-Carod et al., 2007; Carree et al., 2011). 
 
2.6. What do we know about firm dynamics and the role played by economic 
development? 
In this section we point out the differences between developed and developing countries that 
may affect firm dynamics, both in terms of entry and exit rates and the type of establishment 
that enters or exits the market. In particular, we analyze the industrial composition and 
firms´ characteristics, the income and funding levels, the process of knowledge generation 
and educational levels, some macroeconomic issues and the size of the informal sector.14 
 
                                                 
13 Arauzo-Carod et al. (2007) for Spain; Cainelli et al. (2014) and Carree et al. (2011) for Italy; Fotopoulos 
and Spence (1998) for Greece; Fritsch and Falck (2007) for Germany; Nurmi (2006) for Finland and 
Nyström (2007a) for Sweden. 
14 We do not address cultural factors because they can hardly be included in empirical analysis (Verhuel et 
al., 2002). 
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2.6.1. Industrial composition and firm characteristics 
The industrial structure in developing countries is usually less diversified, less sophisticated 
and more fragmented than in developed economies, and it is also less dense and specialized 
in natural resource-intensive goods and scale-intensive industrial commodities. This not only 
conditions the professional experience of future entrepreneurs, their skills and the networks 
of relationships (Kantis et al., 2005), but also constrains entries in some industries, in which 
potential start-ups may act as clients, suppliers or competitors.  
Besides, the industrial profile may limit the benefits that emerge from agglomeration. In 
developing countries, there are usually not enough related firms to create the conditions 
required for external economies in some sectors. In addition, geographical proximity among 
competitors may stimulate the appearance of co-operative agreements to a lesser extent than 
it does in developed countries. That is, advantages derived from inter-firm cooperation do 
not seem to emerge in industries with relatively low technological and organizational 
complexity, where opportunities for technological innovation are scarce or supply driven, 
sectoral specialization is low, productive knowledge is easily transferable and does not 
involve long learning periods, and competitiveness is based on price or cost efficiency 
(Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999).  
A more incomplete economic structure also raises higher barriers to entry. For example, 
many suppliers are not willing to take the risk of specializing in specific inputs for a small 
number of customers, which forces firms to rely on foreign suppliers or to enter more 
integrated into the market. Barriers to exit may also be higher, since chances of reselling 
specific assets in case of failure are lower. Likewise, the ability to reallocate resources to new 
activities is lower in less diversified environments, which can impact on both entry and exit 
decisions. 
Finally, developing countries show marked differences in productivity levels among sectors, 
firms and regions within countries, a phenomenon called structural heterogeneity (Cassiolato et 
al., 2009). This implies that some firms, sectors or regions have levels of capitalization, 
technology, productivity, organization and human capital requirements similar to their 
counterparts in advanced countries, while, at the other extreme, there are firms, sectors or 
regions with very low productivity and capitalization, as well as high shares of informal 
labour (Sunkel, 1978; Infante and Sunkel, 2009). A direct implication of this structural 
heterogeneity is that firm entry and exit determinants may differ across the regions of a 
country. 
 
2.6.2. Income levels and funding 
A lower GDP and a regressive distribution of income may influence both the demand and 
the supply of entrepreneurship. On the one hand, in poorer countries there are fewer business 
opportunities and the demand for goods and services is smaller, unstable and less diverse, so 
entry rate is expected to be lower. On the other hand, the supply of entrepreneurs is lower, 
since the share of people with access to information, education, business networks and 
financial resources is limited. Moreover, although entrepreneurship may allow individuals to 
escape from poverty, low-income people are less able to create formal and dynamic firms. 
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Business projects are conceived in less fertile environments (family, education system and 
work experience) and contact with the business world is limited (Kantis et al., 2005). Besides, 
long-term unemployed individuals may not have the ability, financial resources or social 
capital to start a new business (Fritsch and Falck, 2007). Finally, lower income not only 
discourages entry but also forces new ventures to be less complex, less knowledge intensive 
and less export-oriented (Kantis et al., 2005). 
Lower income levels are usually accompanied by lack of funding (both due to lack of 
personal savings or reduced access to external capital). In particular, firms in developing 
countries have less access to credit and have to deal with a more limited financial system.15 
Remarkably, there is usually a dualistic structure in which a sub-set of large firms makes a 
high use of international and equity financing, while SMEs suffer from insufficient funding 
opportunities. In particular, formal financial systems generally fail to help most enterprises 
because of widespread informality, and a heavy dependence on commercial bank financing 
of those firms that have access to formal finance. Bank financing is very short-term in nature 
and therefore not of great use to longer-term investment projects (Peachey and Roe, 2004). In 
addition, the banking sector may occasionally find it more attractive to finance public deficits 
instead of private firms (Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Kantis et al., 2005). In brief, financing 
constraints will either deter entry or cause new firms to enter at suboptimal scales, affecting 
survival and post entry performance. They also limit the creative destruction process16 and 
encourage entries in more conservative sectors. In addition, within regions of a single 
country, credit conditions may influence entry and exit to a lesser extent than in developed 
countries.  
 
2.6.3. Knowledge and education 
Innovation systems in developing countries usually have acute deficiencies that restrict 
chances of birth and survival of technology-based firms (Alcorta and Peres, 1998). Innovative 
entry may also be limited by the industrial structure. For example, in low- and middle-
income countries, industry concentrates on activities characterized by routinized 
technological regimes, in which technical knowledge is carried by incumbent firms. 
Moreover, in Latin America, incumbents tend to enjoy advantages to incorporate technical 
progress regardless of whether the relevant knowledge is external or internal to the firm 
(Burachik, 2000). This contrasts with advanced countries, where small, new firms enjoy an 
innovative advantage if the relevant knowledge is codified and external to incumbent firms. 
Thus, Latin American firms mainly perform incremental innovations, by imitating or 
incorporating knowledge developed by other organizations, while innovative entry is an 
infrequent phenomenon (Lall, 1982).  
An implication of the referred structural heterogeneity is that innovations are restricted to the 
modern sectors and the central regions of the country, while lagged sectors and regions are 
excluded from the benefits of technical progress (Cimoli and Porcile, 2014; Furtado, 1972). 
                                                 
15 In developed countries, each adult has an average of  3.2 accounts and 81% of  adults are banked, versus 
0.9 accounts per adult and 28% adults banked in developing countries (Kendall et al., 2010). 
16 For example, without adequate financial development talented individuals may not be able to become 
entrepreneurs, leaving entrepreneurship for the untalented wealthy (Bianchi, 2010). 
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In particular, the model by Aghion et al. (2005) predicts that innovation will be increasingly 
concentrated in regions that are initially better positioned and closer to the technological 
frontier. One explanation of this clusterization of knowledge generation is that most 
innovations tend to be generated abroad, and then transferred to multinational firms located 
in the capital cities of these countries. 
Finally, low educational levels and the erosion of human capital after long recessions may 
discourage start ups that require skilled workers. To sum up, in developing countries, higher 
education or innovation institutions may explain entry to a lesser extent than they do in 
advanced countries, especially in small and medium-sized cities. However, given the large 
differences in development level among regions within a country, the educational level 
required in central regions may be similar to the one required in developed countries. 
 
2.6.4. Macroeconomic issues 
Macroeconomic instability and the intense cyclical variations that characterize many 
developing countries (Stiglitz, 1998) might induce patterns of entry and exit that are different 
from the ones observed in developed countries. In this regard, macroeconomic volatility 
adversely affects investment projects due to the imprecision of anticipating the evolution of 
key context variables (Katz and Bernat, 2011). Besides, when uncertainty is high, decisions 
are taken on a short-term basis and the return rate that firms demand on their projects 
increases. Caballero and Hammour (2001) point out that recurrent crises are an obstacle to 
creative destruction, especially because of the following tight financial-market conditions. 
Economic downturns also have long-term consequences both in terms of the attrition of 
human capital (Stiglitz, 1998), which inhibit new firm formation in the following years, and 
the lower average firm age, which may reduce survival.  
High macroeconomic volatility also undermines the institutionalization of industrial policies 
and prevents the consolidation of national firms, as profitability depends on the exchange 
rate, credit conditions, tax policy, etc. In addition, volatility impacts tax compliance, so the 
government cannot have a stable base of resources to develop public programs or provide 
public services. 
Furthermore, external shocks such as tariff reductions may have different impacts on 
developed and developing countries. For example, as firms in poorer countries have fewer 
capabilities and resources, they derive less benefit from trade liberalization and are less able 
to capture the benefits of network operation. Moreover, liberalization measures have unequal 
effects on regions and industries in a single country. In an analysis of Indian reforms in 1991, 
Aghion et al. (2005) show, from a theoretical and empirical standpoint, that regions and 
industries that are closer to the technological frontier or initially more productive experience 
larger increases in manufacturing output, labour productivity and profits. At the same time, 
more backward industries and regions experienced a smaller, or even a negative, growth-
enhancing effect. 
To sum up, in a volatile macroeconomic environment, fewer entries are expected, and they 
are initially smaller and restricted to low-tech activities or to activities that are highly 
profitable in the short term. Because of the difficulties of establishing a long-term industrial 
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policy, entries are expected to reflect the comparative advantage of the country (linked to 
natural resources or labour intensive industries).  
 
2.6.5. Informal sector 
The informal sector is a considerably higher percentage of GDP in developing countries1718 
where it is mainly a marginal activity with low income and little accumulation and 
characterized by labour intensity and low technology (Schneider, 2005). However, due to its 
potential for accumulation and its lower barriers to entry, it could be enhanced by public 
policies (Gërxhani, 2004).  
In this regard, Bennett (2010) derives a theoretical model in which the informal sector 
encourages entry by acting as a “stepping stone”. Thus, entrepreneurs may first enter the 
informal sector to “test the water” before deciding whether or not to enter the formal sector.19 
The model is restricted to price taker firms in all markets and might be applicable to different 
sectors but there is no empirical evidence about this phenomenon yet. Besides, the informal 
sector may encourage entrepreneurial activity because its labour market is usually unstable 
and insecure. As exit costs are lower, more entries are expected in developing countries, even 
if survival rates are also smaller. Nevertheless, research is usually restricted to the formal 
sector due to the difficulty of gathering data on informal firms. In this case, the relationship 
between the size of the shadow economy and the entry rate may be either positive (as in the 
stepping stone argument or if there are complementarities via sub-contracting activities) or 
negative, if informal companies compete with formal firms on the basis of lower prices. 
Finally, theoretical core-periphery models (Gerritse and Moreno-Monroy, 2012) show that 
the competitive effects between formal and informal firms may differ in central and 
peripheral regions and that, under certain circumstances, a competitive informal sector may 
enhance formal manufacturing agglomeration. 
In terms of survival, the informal sector may also have positive or negative effects. On the 
one hand, informal firms may acquire experience that will foster survival rates once they are 
in the formal economy. On the other hand, in countries with greater legal enforcement, a 
selection bias may occur, and consequently only firms with higher chances of survival 
assume the costs of entry.  
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Several criteria can be used to define the informal sector: a) political (activities beyond government 
regulation, illegal or that are not captured in national statistics); b) economic (income generated by 
undeclared labour, the self-employed, family workers and domestic servants); c) social (activities related 
to needs for survival) (Gërxhani, 2004). 
18 In 1999-2000 the informal sector was about 16.8% for OECD countries; 26.3% for Asia; 37.9% for East 
and Central Europe and former Soviet Union countries; 41.5% for Latin America and 41.2% for Africa 
(Schneider, 2005). 
19 The informal sector may also be a “consolation prize” for unsuccessful entrepreneurs in the formal 
sector. However, according to Bennett´s model (Bennett, 2010: 55): “this result is obtained for a range of 
parameter values so narrow as to be of no practical significance”.  
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2.7. Empirical research about firm dynamics in developing countries 
In this section we review the empirical evidence on firm dynamics in developing countries, 
focusing on studies about formal firms that employ paid workers20. We do not address papers 
on self employment, those that adopt a business approach (based mainly on case studies), 
those based on entrepreneurs’ surveys, or those that are mainly descriptive. This is because 
we are interested in firms that are potentially able to increase employment levels and 
promote economic growth. Finally, we do not mention studies of high-growth firms or 
venture capital markets, since the sectors in which these entries occur are only a small part of 
the economy of developing countries.21 
It should be pointed out that the comparison of data on firm dynamics and empirical 
evidence across countries has several limitations. Firstly, data are not easily comparable, and 
no agreement has been reached even about what constitutes a new business. As a 
consequence, different papers provide different economic, statistical and legal definitions. 
Secondly, there are significant differences in the quality of information records across 
countries, mainly on firm exit. Thirdly, since figures usually only take the formal sector into 
account, they may not be comparable among countries in which the importance of the 
informal sector can vary quite considerably. Finally, developing countries are highly 
heterogeneous. 
Despite these limitations, several sources provide (roughly) comparable data on firm 
dynamics around the world: a) the World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey (WBGES) 
(Klapper et al., 2010); b) the Amadeus Database – for European countries –; c) the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) (Reynolds et al., 2005); and d) the distributed micro-data 
base built by the World Bank from business registers and surveys from different countries 
(Bartelsman et al., 2004). Despite measures of entrepreneurship usually differ (see Table 2.3), 
and the same nomenclature is often used to refer to different phenomena, some stylized facts 
arise: 
1. According to the World Bank micro-data base, firm churning is on average higher in 
emerging economies, but in some firm turnover is similar to that in continental 
European countries22 (Bartelsman et al., 2004). This is also true for firm entry and exit 
across firm size. Similarly, GEM data (that also capture informality) report even higher 
levels of entrepreneurship in developing economies (Acs et al., 2008). 
                                                 
20 We consider as developing countries those ones included in the factor and efficiency-driven stages 
(according to Xavier et al., 2012). We have additionally include Taiwan, since studies on this country 
classify it as such (Lay, 2003) or highlight distinctive features that differentiate it from advanced 
countries (Wang, 2006). We have also explicitly excluded transition countries, because their specific 
features separate them from other developing countries. For an analysis of firm dynamics in transition 
countries, see Alexandrova (2004) for Bulgaria, Roberts and Thompson (2003) for Poland, and Rinaldi 
(2008) and Yang and Temple (2012) for selected industries in Russia and China, respectively. 
21 The special issue of Small Business Economics (issue 34 (1), 2010) about entrepreneurship in developing 
countries provides theoretical studies and a more detailed analysis of some specific cases (Naudé, 2010). 
Besides, the special issue of Entrepreneurship, Theory and Practice in 2008 provides useful insights into 
business literature. 
22 Similarly, within developed countries, entrepreneurship as a percentage of the labour force is higher in 
countries with relatively lower per capita income and a traditional industrial structure (Spain, Greece, 
Portugal) while entrepreneurship is lower in Scandinavian countries (Verhuel et al., 2002). 
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2. In turn, the WBGE Survey shows that firm entry declines with the level of 
development (Klapper and Love, 2011a; 2011b). Developed countries have higher 
entry density and entry rates (ratio of new firms to working age population or existing 
firms, respectively), although differences among countries in terms of entry rates are 
lower, due to the higher business density in industrialized countries (Klapper et al., 
2010). Differences between this source and the World Bank data may be explained 
because one of them is a survey, while the other one is built up from business registers. 
3. In both developed and developing countries, firm turnover is largely driven by small 
and medium-sized businesses, so entry and exit have only modest effects on 
employment (5-10% according to World Bank data). Likewise, turnover rates vary 
significantly across industries in each country.  
4. Both groups of countries show positive correlations between entry and exit rates across 
industries. However, on average, these correlations are higher in developing countries, 
which could reflect a greater role of sectoral profitability shocks, less market saturation 
and/or measurement errors. 
 
Table 2.3. Measures of firm dynamics 
Measure Definition Source 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship 
Percentage of adult population that has taken action to 
create a new business in the past year but have not paid 
any salaries for more than 3 months.  
GEM 
New business start-
ups 
Percentage of adult population that owns or manages a 
new business from 3 to 42 months old. 
Total entrepreneurial 
activity (TEA) 
Nascent entrepreneurship + New business start-ups. Also 
called “Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity Index” (EA). 
Opportunity-based 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs who have taken action to create a new 
venture in pursuit of perceived business opportunities. 
Necessity-based 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs who have taken action to create a new 
venture because of the lack of better employment 
alternatives  
Entry density 
Number of newly registered limited-liability firms per 1000 
working age population.  WB Group 
Entrepreneur
ship Survey 
(WBGES) 
Entry rate 
New firms over the total number of lagged registered 
businesses.  
Business density 
Number of registered businesses as a ratio of the active 
population (age 15-64) in the same year. 
Entry rate 
Number of new firms as a ratio of the total number of 
incumbent and entrant firms in a given year. 
Distributed 
micro-data 
analysis 
(Bartelsman 
et al. 2004) 
Exit rate 
Number of firms exiting the market in a given year as a 
ratio of the population of origin (i.e. incumbents in the 
previous year). 
Complex 
Entrepreneurship 
Context index   
Based on 26 variables that measure entrepreneurial 
activity, strategy and attitudes for 54 countries across 
2003–2006. 
Acs et al.  
(2008) 
 
Source: author 
 
Next, we review several studies that explore the determinants of new firm formation at the 
industry, regional and firm level. Most of them focus on medium/large developing countries 
with medium-high income and usually take as their starting point a set of determinants that 
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are generally found to be statistically significant in developed countries. The determinants 
used may vary depending on data availability and data disaggregation (by city, region and 
sector) and sometimes variables are adapted to the characteristics of the developing 
economies.23 There are also two interesting groups of empirical studies that compare firm 
dynamics in developed and developing countries using cross-country data, which are 
described in Appendix A. One of them analyzes the impact of business environment on 
entrepreneurship and the other one assesses the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
the level of economic development. 
 
2.7.1. Determinants at the industry level 
These studies usually use the same set of explanatory variables to explain entry and exit, and 
employ an Orr-Shapiro/Khemani type model. That is, entry and exit to an industry depend 
on barriers to entry, industry opportunities and control variables. The unit of analysis is the 
manufacturing industry and the results are similar to the ones found for developed countries, 
although less consistent (Table 2.4). Profit rates and industry growth rate impact positively 
on entries and negatively on exits, even though sometimes they are not significant. Besides, 
industries that export a higher share of their output are more attractive to entrants (Campos 
and Iootty, 2005; Ozturk and Kilic, 2012), especially when exports are sent to protected 
markets, as in the case of Brazilian exports to Mercosur countries, and in low-tech sectors. 
However, as it is harder to remain in international markets, the exit rate is also higher. 
Regarding entry and exit barriers, concentration levels deter both entry and exit, thus 
enabling incumbent firms to collude and erect strategic entry barriers, while capital intensity 
and scale economies provide mixed results. In just a few cases, sunk costs and advertisement 
intensity act as an exit barrier, keeping firms in the industry when the macroeconomic 
environment is adverse. 
Typically, estimations do not find that wages have any significant impact as an input price 
indicator, because many entrepreneurs do not have paid employees (Wang, 2006). Besides, 
due to the limitations of the financial system, many entrepreneurs use their savings to provide 
the necessary initial capital.  
The relationship between entry and exit deserves further attention. Remarkably, exit in the 
previous period has no significant impact on current entry in Taiwan and Turkey, which 
means that exit does not make room for new entrants, thus rejecting the replacement effect 
(Lay, 2003; Günalp and Cilasun, 2006). Similar results are obtained for Argentina at the 
regional level (see next section). This result is different from what has generally been found 
for developed countries and it is consistent with a smaller and less developed industrial 
structure. However, evidence on the displacement effect is found for Turkey and Taiwan 
(entries in former periods push incumbents out of the market). Persistence effects are more 
rarely included, and they are usually positive for entry (past entry increases current entry) but 
inconclusive for exit.  
 
                                                 
23 For example, in more turbulent business environments, Santarelli and Tran (2012) define incumbent 
firms as those operating for more than 3 years (in comparison to the 6 years in developed countries).  
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Table 2.4. Determinants of firm entry/exit at the industry level. Developing countries   
 
  
Ozturk and Kilic 
(2012) 
Campos and 
Iootty (2005) 
Kaya and 
Uçdogrük 
(2002) Lay (2003) 
Günalp 
and 
Cilasun 
(2006) 
Wang 
(2006) 
 
Tobit model 
GLS (Panel 
data) 
Dynamic 
panel data 
SUR; 3SLS; 
FIML; GLS 
(Panel data) 
Dynamic 
panel 
data 
(GMM) 
OLS; 
Panel 
data 
(Pooled) 
 Turkey Brazil Turkey Taiwan Turkey Taiwan 
 Variable Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Exit Entry Entry 
O
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
y
 Profit rate + ns     + - ns ns +  
Industry growth rate ns ns ns - + - ns ns + + 
Export rate - + + -         ns   
Import rate + +                
B
a
rr
ie
rs
 
Concentration ns ns ns ns - -     -  
Sunk costs ns -             ns  
Capital intensity   ns ns - + +/- -/ns ns  
Advertisement intensity         ns ns     ns  
Scale economies/MES     ns ns     - + +  
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Wages         ns ns ns +   ns 
Entry/Exit - -             ns  
Industry employment          + 
Labour productivity + ns     - +     
Productivity differentials         + -        
 Past entry         - +   + +  
Past exit           - ns   ns  
Note: ns: non significant 
 
Source: author   
 
 
2.7.2. Determinants at the regional level 
Although most studies do not take the regional dimension into account, those that do show a 
noticeable variation in firm entries and firm stocks across regions (as well as in developed 
countries) and a large concentration in the capital city. Regarding entry determinants, 
demand variables are usually significant and have the expected sign (Table 2.5). Profits and 
economic growth rate encourage entry, while wages (which can proxy demand as well as 
input prices) have either a positive or insignificant effect on entries. Industrial structure 
variables provide mixed results. The evidence about the role of SMEs as seedbeds for future 
start ups is weak, particularly in studies that focus on net entry, where the revolving door 
effect may offset new entries with subsequent exits (Santarelli and Tran, 2012).  
Socioeconomic variables have a positive effect on the supply of potential entrepreneurs (e.g., 
age, population and availability of skilled workers), while the share of immigrants is not 
relevant. In particular, Ghani et al. (2014) conclude that the effect of the education of the 
workforce on entry rates in India is stronger than in comparable studies in developed 
countries. In South Africa, both education and financial intermediation have a positive effect, 
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but their combined impact is only half that of profits, which means that structural factors 
behind profit rates (such as economic resources, worker productivity or infrastructure) 
explain and reinforce the uneven distribution of start ups across the territory (Naudé et al., 
2008). The unemployment rate is non significant, probably because unemployed may start a 
new firm in the informal sector, which is not reflected in official firm entry registers. 
 
Table 2.5. Determinants of firm entry at the regional level. Developing countries 
 
 
Ghani et al. (2014) 
Calá et al. 
(2014a)24 
Santarelli and 
Tran (2012) 
Naudé et 
al. (2008) 
Weighted linear 
regression (Panel data) 
Panel count 
data models 
Panel data   
(FE;GMM) 
OLS; 
Tobit 
India 
Argentina Vietnam 
South 
Africa organized unorganized 
D
e
m
a
n
d
 
Population  +  +       
Economic growth rate      + +  
Profits     + 
Wages     ns +  
Share of SME     + ns   
Incumbents/ Incumb. 
Employment ns - -     
Industrial tradition     -    
S
o
ci
o
 
e
co
n
o
m
ic
 Education + ns ns + + 
Age profile ns +     
Immigration/Migration     ns    
Population + +     ns 
Unemployment     ns ns ns 
U
rb
a
n
iz
a
t.
/
 
A
g
g
lo
m
. 
Population density - ns + ns ns 
Population density2     -    
Share of urban 
population       +  
Economic size (GVA)     - 
A
g
g
lo
m
. 
e
co
n
o
m
ie
s Labour market effect   +      
Input/supplier strength + +      
Output/customer 
strength + +      
Small suppliers +        
C
re
d
it
 
Banking environment ns +      
Number of banks     + 
O
th
e
r 
Infrastructure ns +      
Labour laws - ns      
Distance to big cities - ns    
Informal sector    +/-    
Note: ns: non significant 
 
Source: author   
                                                 
24 This contribution comes from chapter 5 of  this thesis and has recently been accepted in Papers in 
Regional Science. 
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Several estimations support the urban incubator theory, which maintains that urban centers 
are nurseries for new firms, since the density or the share of urban population is usually 
positively significant. However, in highly populated countries like India, manufacturers 
avoid the high costs of urban areas (as well as remote areas) preferring settings near large 
population centers. Congestion effects are also significant in South Africa, where increased 
competition and tougher barriers to entry discourage new start-ups from growing (Naudé et 
al., 2008). However, Marshallian agglomeration economies are relevant in India, not only 
because they provide a suitable labour force and proximity to suppliers and customers, but 
also because of the higher availability of small suppliers.  
The size of the informal sector has a considerable explanatory power in Argentina, in 
particular, a small informal economy encourages (formal) entry, but it becomes a barrier 
when it grows too much. Similarly, in India, the variables that explain firm entry in the 
organized manufacturing sector are not relevant to the unorganized sector and vice versa. 
For example, in the unorganized sector, population and agglomeration effects have a much 
greater role whilst strict labour regulations negatively impacts entrepreneurship only in 
registered manufacturing. 
As well as analyzing the determinants of firm formation, some papers deal with other topics. 
For example, Ghani et al. (2014), make a distinction by size and find that input cost factors 
have a greater influence on the entry of small firms, while output conditions and labour 
markets are more important for large firms. Santarelli and Tran (2012) explore the 
relationship between the performance of incumbent firms and (net) entry. They conclude that 
the growth of incumbent firms in a region stimulates start-up activities by creating new profit 
opportunities and new knowledge that leak out of the firm and can be captured by new 
ventures.  
Finally, in view of the heterogeneity of most approaches, Ghani et al. (2014) compare their 
results to similar estimations for the U.S. They found that agglomeration economies are even 
more important in the Indian case. Additionally, for the U.S., existing city population levels, 
city-industry employment, and industry-fixed effects can explain 80% of the spatial variation 
in entry rates, while the comparable explanatory power for India is only about 30%. This 
result shows that estimation procedures for developed economies can explain just a small 
part of firm dynamics in a developing country. 
 
2.7.3. Determinants at the firm level 
The studies at the firm level focus on the determinants of exit. They estimate the probability 
of exit or survival using firm and industry characteristics as explanatory variables. Results are 
consistent and similar to those in developed countries: older, larger and more productive 
plants are less likely to exit. In some cases, capital intensive firms are more likely to survive. 
Although evidence is far less conclusive than at the industry level, firms belonging to growing 
sectors or to industries with higher average plant size, more concentrated and less capital 
intensive are more likely to survive. In Colombia, for example, Eslava et al. (2006) find that 
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higher physical productivity, higher demand and lower input costs reduce the probability of 
exit. 
One important topic in developing countries is whether multinationals (MNC) are less rooted 
in the local economy and thus more likely to close down than domestic firms if they face 
adverse economic conditions. Rough empirical evidence suggests that foreign-owned plants 
are less likely to close down, but after controlling for plant size, productivity and industry 
characteristics, they are significantly more likely to exit than comparable local firms in such 
developing countries as Indonesia (Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003) and Chile (only in recessive 
periods) (Alvarez and Görg, 2009). However, export-oriented MNC are more capable of 
absorbing negative shocks and have no differences with domestic firms.  
Another common concern is the impact of MNC on firm dynamics in the same industry. 
Contrary to expectations, MNC do not increase the probability of exit of other firms in Chile 
(Alvarez and Görg, 2009), but they have a positive effect on the survival of other Chilean 
firms, although this effect is fully captured by productivity improvements (attributable to 
MNC).  
 
2.7.4. Macroeconomic determinants 
When they are included, macroeconomic factors usually help to explain firm dynamics. In 
Turkey, the real interest rate has a strong effect on deterring entrants (Günalp and Cilasun, 
2006), while the inflation rate hampers entry and promotes firm exit (Ozturk and Kilic, 2012) 
and, in Taiwan, the unemployment rate enhances entries (Wang, 2006). Interestingly, 
Günalp and Cilasun (2006) show that results concerning microeconomic variables are robust 
to the inclusion of macroeconomic variables. 
Several developing countries have undergone such economic reforms as trade liberalization, 
privatization and deregulation of economic activity. According to Alvarez and Vergara (2010 
and 2013), higher international competition has not had a disproportionately negative effect 
on the survival of smaller firms in Chile, which is consistent with the idea that SME have 
some advantages in terms of higher flexibility or niche filling capacities. In fact, higher 
protection reduces the probability of exit for all firms, but proportionately more for the large 
ones. Besides, tariff changes do not generate a differential effect in exporting industries, but 
plants producing in import-competing industries are significantly affected.  
In contrast, trade liberalization increased the likelihood of exit in Colombia, since it fosters 
competition in the product market, while other reforms (privatization, capital and labour 
market deregulation, tax cuts) decreased the likelihood of exit, by reducing credit constraints 
and tax burdens (Eslava et al., 2006). Market fundamentals (physical productivity, demand 
shocks and input prices) became more important in determining plant survival after the 
reforms. For example, trade liberalization means that high demand and low input prices have 
a more important role in determining survival. Finally, reforms of financial intermediation 
make it possible to finance the most productive projects and, therefore, increase the 
importance of physical efficiency and reduce the role of demand and input prices.  
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2.8. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we review the most relevant theoretical and empirical literature, identifying 
the determinants of firm dynamics at the regional level that are used in the following 
chapters. In particular, according to the static approach, we find relevant to consider the 
height of entry and exit barriers and the rate of growth of the industry. From the dynamic 
theories we highlight the importance of firm size and age (at the regional level, the share 
small-sized firms), previous entries and exits and the evolution of the overall economic 
activity. The supply of entrepreneurial skills approach focuses on the unemployment rate and 
the dissatisfaction with the current job -as factors that push individuals towards 
entrepreneurship-, the availability of resources in the region -such as human capital or firm´s 
external services- and cultural factors as the esteem enjoyed by businessmen in a particular 
region.  
In addition, the theories that take explicitly into account the role of the space on firm 
dynamics stress the importance of agglomeration economies and diseconomies both for 
(current and past) individuals and firms, as well as the emergence of a core-periphery pattern. 
Finally, we argue that there are factors that, while potentially important in explaining firm 
dynamics in developing countries, are never considered by studies on developed countries. 
They are related to the income levels and funding (poverty), the industrial composition, the 
educational levels and the innovation system, the macroeconomic instability and the size of 
the informal sector. We show that empirical evidence on firm dynamics in developing 
countries is scarce and, particularly at the regional level, evidence is not conclusive, so that 
further research is needed in order to shed light on this topic. In the next chapter, we describe 
the data set and we explain how the former determinants of entry and exit are 
operationalized in order to be used as explanatory variables in econometric models.  
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Chapter 3 
Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Presentation 
The first part of this chapter describes the two main data sources used: a) the Database for 
the Study of Firm and Employment Dynamics and b) the National Household Survey. In 
both cases, we detail the available information, the temporal and regional scope of the 
databases and their limitations. Next, we define the explanatory variables to be used in the 
rest of the thesis, both region-specific and sector-specific.  
 
3.2. Data Sources 
3.2.1 Database for the Study of Firm and Employment Dynamics 
The Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (EBDO) of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security of Argentina elaborates an annual database on firm demography since 
1996. This database includes information about the number of entries, exits and 
incumbents based on all manufacturing (formal and private) firms with at least one 
employee, generated from administrative records of social security system (Sistema 
Integrado Previsional Argentino, SIPA). This means that public and informal firms and 
employees, as well as self employed, employers and family work, are not included25.  
The unit of observation is the firm (with one or more plants), that is, an independent 
economic unit identified from its tax identification code. Moreover, the EBDO handles 
changes in firm codes that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In particular, 
spurious entries and exits caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s workforce from 
firms that “exit” to become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the database. It 
represents the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term and spatially 
disaggregated data source currently available for firm demography studies (MTEySS, 
2005). 
The year of birth of a firm is identified from its entry into the SIPA register and its 
employees declaration to the social security system. The year of exit is identified following 
                                                 
25 In fact, no statistical source in Argentina allows to distinguish informal from formal entries/exits/ 
incumbents. Still, according to the National Household Survey unregistered work in the 
manufacturing industry was 26.9% in the 4th quarter of 2008. 
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an empirical approach: a firm is considered closed when it does not declare employees in 
the last six months. Information is expressed in the form of inter-annual variations, ie. a 
quarter compared with the same quarter last year. It is agreed that registrations and de-
registrations do not necessarily correspond to actual firm births and deaths, but to its 
registration as a formal entity in the social security system (MTEySS, 2005). For a more 
detailed explanation of these concepts see Appendix B. 
Data is available for the 23 Argentinean provinces and the Capital Federal city. However, 
Buenos Aires Province is further divided into Gran Buenos Aires (GBA) and the rest of 
the province (Bs. As. Rest). This is why there are 25 jurisdictions in the database. We 
restrict the analysis to firms that declare that the major part of their workforce is located in 
the assigned jurisdiction. This means that we concentrate on “local firms” (about 90% of 
the total firms in 2008), while branch offices or subsidiaries located in other jurisdictions 
are excluded from our data set26. Data on entry, exit and incumbents is also divided into 
23 two-digit manufacturing industries (summarized at Table 3.1) and 4 sizes -big, 
medium, small and micro-.  
Industries are grouped according to the level of technological intensity by using the 
taxonomy suggested by Katz and Stumpo (2001) and adapted to a two-digit 
disaggregation by Katz and Bernat (2011). This classification has been adopted by the 
ECLAC and it is largely used in Latin-American studies (UN and ECLAC, 2007). It is 
based on the resource which is intensively used in the production of goods: natural 
resources, labour or engineering. It slightly differs from the one defined by OCDE, in 
order to suit it better to Argentinean industrial structure27.  
Stratification by size is made from the average firm employment in two quarters taken as 
reference. Size is a property of the firm as a whole rather than each plant. So, every 
company is classified into size levels, according to the total employment in the firm, as it 
is shown in Table 3.2. Employment ranges used in each stratum of size vary according to 
the sector, and they take into account sectoral differences in average labour productivity as 
well as maximum sales levels established in Argentinean law for small and medium 
enterprises (MTEySS, 2005).  
We start our analysis in 2003 to avoid the structural break caused by the economic and 
political crisis of the end of 2001 that lead to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in 
January 2002. Including these years of turmoil would completely distort results. We end 
up our analysis in 2008 because this was the last available year in the EBDO dataset when 
this investigation was initiated. 
 
 
                                                 
26 This constraint was suggested by the EBDO staff to avoid considering as new entries new offices or 
branches of large firms that are opened in another province with only one or two people. Moreover, 
new branch offices may be driven by factors that are different from the ones influencing the creation 
of “local” firms. This approach also allows to better estimate the evolution of genuine local 
economic structure, especially in provinces with less industrial tradition. 
27 The original classification used in Katz and Bernat (2011) refers “Medium tech” as “Medium-low 
tech” and “High tech” as “Medium-high tech”. 
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Table 3.1. Industry classification 
 Year 2008 
Group Code Industry % firms %employees 
Low 
tech 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 22,6% 26,6% 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 0,0% 0,4% 
17 Manufacture of textiles 4,9% 5,5% 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of 
fur 6,8% 4,5% 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 3,0% 3,3% 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 5,9% 3,2% 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 6,9% 4,8% 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 3,3% 3,4% 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 5,7% 3,4% 
37 Recycling 0,3% 0,3% 
                              Total Low Tech 59,4% 55,4% 
Medium 
tech 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1,5% 2,5% 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 0,1% 0,5% 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 5,3% 5,4% 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 2,1% 3,5% 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 14,4% 8,7% 
                              Total Medium Tech 23,4% 20,6% 
High 
tech 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4,1% 7,0% 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5,8% 5,9% 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 0,3% 0,3% 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 1,9% 1,9% 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 0,2% 0,4% 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 1,0% 0,7% 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2,8% 6,7% 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 0,8% 1,0% 
                               Total High Tech 16,9% 23,9% 
Note: Data = Entry + Incumbent – Exit.  
 
Source: author from ISIC, rev. 3; EBDO data and Katz and Bernat (2011). 
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Table 3.2. Upper levels of employment for firm size classification, by industry. Number of workers. 
 
Code Industry 
Firm Size 
Micro Small Medium 
15 Manufacture of food products and beverages 6 34 128 
16 Manufacture of tobacco products 5 30 118 
17 Manufacture of textiles 5 25 122 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 4 21 202 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
4 30 125 
20 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
5 18 108 
21 Manufacture of paper and paper products 5 26 74 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 4 20 69 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
3 28 68 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 4 23 100 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 5 22 82 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 7 28 96 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 5 24 111 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
5 23 84 
29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5 21 96 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing 
machinery 
3 16 50 
31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 4 23 63 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
4 18 87 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, 
watches and clocks 
6 23 84 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 7 28 82 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 4 19 56 
36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 5 26 96 
37 Recycling 5 27 108 
 
Source: MTEySS (2005) 
 
3.2.2. National Household Survey 
The National Household Survey (NHS) is performed by the National Institute of Statistics 
and Census (INDEC) to families located in urban areas in order to measure demographic 
and socioeconomic characteristics (occupational, migration, housing, education and 
income) of the population (INDEC, 2003a). Since 2003 it is an ongoing survey that 
produces data quarterly. The NHS is based on a probability sample stratified in a two-
stage selection process, that takes place in 31 urban areas called aglomerados, that is, 
groups of cities (summarized in Table 3.3). In particular, data from the more populated 
provinces (Capital Federal city, Rest of Buenos Aires, Gran Buenos Aires, Córdoba, 
Chubut, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe) comes from a set of aglomerados. For the rest of 
provinces, however, data refers essentially to the capital of the province (small close by 
towns are added in some cases, like “Gran Mendoza”, “Gran Salta”, etc.). Data for Río 
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Negro is only available since 2006 and the aglomerados surveyed actually cover both urban 
and rural areas (that, in addition, are partly in the Buenos Aires province). Consequently, 
this province was dropped from the original sample of 25 provinces, so that the final 
number of provinces considered is 24. 
 
Table 3.3. Aglomerados and weights according to population. Year 2008. 
 
Province Aglomerado Population  Weight 
Capital Federal city Buenos Aires City 2.981.217 1,000 
Greater Buenos Aires (GBA)  GBA Departments 9.880.294 1,000 
Buenos Aires Rest 
Bahía Blanca – Cerri 305.561 0,186 
Gran La Plata 732.375 0,445 
Mar del Plata – Batán 608.112 0,369 
San Nicolás - V. Constitución (a) 177.886 (a) 
Catamarca Greater Catamarca 197.903 1,000 
Córdoba 
  
Greater Córdoba 1.382.266 0,895 
Río Cuarto 161.760 0,105 
Corrientes  Corrientes 348.326 1,000 
Chaco Greater Resistencia 379.519 1,000 
Chubut (b) 
Comodoro Rivadavia- Rada Tilly 141.194 0,529 
Rawson-Trelew 125.955 0,471 
Entre Ríos  
Greater Paraná 270.144 0,645 
Concordia 148.840 0,355 
Formosa Formosa 231.564 1,000 
Jujuy S.S. de Jujuy – Palpalá 300.239 1,000 
La Pampa Santa Rosa – Toay 117.287 1,000 
La Rioja La Rioja 174.434 1,000 
Mendoza Greater Mendoza 888.602 1,000 
Misiones Posadas 289.736 1,000 
Neuquén Neuquén – Plottier 257.339 1,000 
Rio Negro Viedma-Carmen de Patagones (c) 74.378 1,000 
Salta Salta 520.773 1,000 
San Juan Gran San Juan 456.836 1,000 
San Luis San Luis - El Chorrillo 194.606 1,000 
Santa Cruz Río Gallegos 88.727 1,000 
Santa Fe 
Greater Rosario 1.246.386 0,715 
Greater Santa Fe  496.388 0,285 
Santiago del Estero Sgo. del Estero – La Banda 359.859 1,000 
Tierra del Fuego Ushuaia - Río Grande 116.708 1,000 
Tucumán G.S.M.de Tucumán - Tafí Viejo 796.117 1,000 
Note: (a) not included in the thesis since it refers to two different cities of different provinces and is 
available from 2006; (b) Rawson-Trelew is included from 2006, so until that year only Comodoro 
Rivadavia- Rada Tilly is considered; (c) not included in the thesis because it covers both urban and 
rural areas (that, in addition, are partly in the Buenos Aires province). 
 
Source: author based on NHS 
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From 2003 to 2005, the NHS produces valid quarterly estimates for each aglomerado with 
500.000 or more inhabitants and valid semi-annual estimates for each aglomerado with less 
than 500.000 inhabitants. From 2006, however, the sample of households in the latter 
aglomerados is expanded, so quarterly estimates are valid for all aglomerados. Consequently, 
from 2003 to 2005, data refer to the second semester of every year, and from 2006 to 2008, 
data refer to the third quarter28. 
The variables poverty and indigence are included in the NHS databases from 2003 to 
2005, and from 2006 both data are included only in the press reports. Consequently, 
reported data were used for all years, and for Rest of Bs. As., Córdoba, Chubut, Entre 
Ríos and Santa Fe, in which several aglomerados are surveyed, weights based on 
population are calculated, so that each aglomerado is weighted in order to obtain a variable 
for the whole province. Table 3.3 shows the aglomerados of each province and their weights 
according to population in 2008. 
As the NHS statistics are actually estimates, the NHS staff recommends using only 
variables with a variation coefficient of less than 10% (INDEC, 2003b). Table A3.1 in 
Appendix C displays these values for each aglomerado. All the variables used in this thesis 
have variation coefficients below the 10% value. When variables refer to an absolute 
number of people, data from the aglomerados were expanded to the whole province, 
according to the share of the population of the aglomerado for the stock of the population 
of the province. 
Despite its apparent limitations, we are bound to use these data because there is no 
statistical source providing yearly information on demographic and/or socioeconomic 
characteristics of the Argentinean provinces (population census are performed every 10 
years). Thus, we impute the estimates from the aglomerados to the whole province. This 
means that we are assuming that (most of the) entries and exits in a province are 
essentially driven by the characteristics of the aglomerados. This may seem a strong 
assumption, but it is less so if one considers that the concentration of government 
agencies, specialised services and suppliers in the aglomerados is likely to influence not only 
the location of firms within aglomerados but also outside the aglomerados. In addition, Table 
3.4 shows that on the one hand, the share of population surveyed is very high in some 
provinces and on the other hand, even where the aglomerados only represent a smaller part 
of total population, there are only very few cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. The 
location of industrial activity outside these cities is limited, given the infrastructure needs 
and the provision of network services that are only possible in larger urban centers. In fact, 
the robustness tests performed in the next chapters indicate that the main conclusions of 
this thesis are not affected by using data from aglomerados. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Semi-annual estimates are not available since 2007. Additionally, for 2007 data refer to 4th quarter 
because during 3rd quarter 2007, GBA, Mar del Plata-Batán, Bahía Blanca-Cerri and Greater La 
Plata were not surveyed due to administrative reasons. 
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Table 3.4. Population of the aglomerado over total population. Number of cities and number of 
aglomerados by province. 
 
 Province 
Population of the 
aglomerado over 
total population 
Number of cities 
with more than  
30,000 inhab. 
Number of 
aglomerados 
surveyed by NHS 
Capital Federal city 112%* 1 1 
GBA (a) 108%* -- 1 
Buenos Aires (Rest) 33% 24 3 
Catamarca 51% 1 1 
Córdoba 47% 12 2 
Corrientes 34% 5 1 
Chaco 35% 3 1 
Chubut 59% 3 3 
Entre Ríos 33% 5 2 
Formosa 42% 2 1 
Jujuy 44% 4 1 
La Pampa 36% 2 1 
La Rioja 51% 1 1 
Mendoza 52% 3 1 
Misiones 26% 4 1 
Neuquén 48% 3 1 
Salta 42% 3 1 
San Juan 67% 1 1 
San Luis 45% 2 1 
Santa Cruz 39% 2 1 
Santa Fe 56% 8 2 
Santiago del Estero 40% 1 1 
Tierra del Fuego 91% 2 2 
Tucumán 54% 4 2 
Argentina (total) 63% 97 33 
Note: cities that belong to two provinces were not considered. (a) GBA 
includes 24 departments, all of them are surveyed by NHS in one aglomerado; 
(b) Río Negro province was not included in the thesis; (c) the aglomerados 
surveyed in Chubut, Tierra del Fuego and Tucumán include two cities with 
more than 30,000 inhabitants. 
*In Capital Federal and GBA the aglomerado matches the province. Figures are 
over 100% because data comes from different sources, so expanded sample 
figures from NHS may be higher than forecasted data from INDEC. 
 
Source: author from NHS and INDEC (National Population Census) 
 
3.3. Explanatory Variables 
The explanatory variables were constructed by using data from the EBDO and the NHS 
(the size of the provinces in km2 comes from the Military Geographical Institute and the 
number of estimated population in the whole province comes from INDEC). Three 
groups of explanatory variables can be identified: a) region-specific factors typically used 
in studies on developed countries; b) region-specific variables that proxy some features of 
Argentina as a developing country; c) sector-specific determinants.  
The first group of variables varies among years and provinces. They are related to the 
evolution of economic activity, the labour market, the level of education, input prices, the 
industrial structure, the industrial tradition, the existence of agglomeration economies and 
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cultural attitudes. Table 3.5 reports their definition and the statistical sources, the concept 
that each of them proxies and the specific chapter in which they are used. 
 
Table 3.5. Explanatory variables: concepts, definition and sources.  
Region-specific variables used in developed countries. 
 
Concept Variable Definition Source Chapter 
     
Demand of 
goods 
EMPLOYMENT 
VARIATION it 
Change in employment in all 
formal firms 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
V, VI, 
VII 
UNEMP. 
VARIATION it 
Rate of variation in 
unemployment rate  
Own 
calculations 
from 
National 
Household 
Survey 
(NHS) 
V, VI 
Supply of factors 
(labour) 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
RATE it 
Unemployment rate  
V, VI, 
VII 
Supply of factors 
(education) 
PRIMARY 
EDUCATIONit 
Active individuals with 
primary education (in 
thousands) 
V, VII 
SECONDARY 
EDUCATION it 
Active individuals with 
secondary education  (in 
thousands) 
V, VII 
UNIVERSITY 
EDUCATION it 
Active individuals with 
university-level education (in 
thousands) 
V, VII 
Agglomeration 
DENSITY it 
Ln of (Population/Area)  (in 
thousands) 
Own 
calculations 
from 
Military 
Geographical 
Institute and 
INDEC 
V, VI, 
VII 
DENSITY2 it 
Ln of (Population/Area)2  (in 
thousands) 
V, VI, 
VII 
Supply of factors 
(input prices) 
WAGES it 
Average monthly wage of 
private registered workers 
EBDO 
V, VI, 
VII 
Industrial 
structure 
MICRO  it 
Industrial micro firms over 
total industrial firms (formal) 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
V 
SMEs it 
Industrial small and medium 
firms over total industrial 
firms (formal) 
V, VII 
HH INDEX it Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
V, VI, 
VII 
TRADITION it 
Incumbent firms 7 years ago 
(3-years moving average) 
V, VI, 
VII 
EXIT i t-1 
Number of exits in the 
previous year 
V, VII 
ENTRY i t-1 
Number of entries in the 
previous year 
VI, VII 
ENTRY i t-2 
Number of entries two years 
lagged 
VI, VII 
Agglomeration INCUMBENTS it Incumbent firms 
V, VI, 
VII 
Agglomeration 
URBAN 
POPULATION it 
Population in aglomerados 
over province population 
Own 
calculations 
from NHS 
and INDEC 
V, VI 
 
Source: author 
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The second group of variables also varies among years and provinces. They are related to 
the level of poverty, the informal economy, the rate of private/public employment and the 
idle capacity (Table 3.6). In particular, two variables were used in order to measure the 
level of poverty: i) indigence refers to the percentage of households below the indigence 
line, that is, those households that cannot afford a basic food basket, which is estimated to 
be about 38 USD per adult in 2003; ii) poverty refers to the percentage of households that 
cannot afford a total basic basket (a basic food basket plus the value of basic household 
expenditures such as housing, dressing, transportation and education), which is about 83 
USD per adult in 2003.  
The size of the informal economy is measured through the ratio of non-registered workers 
to registered workers29. Non-registered workers are defined as those salaried employees 
that do not make contributions to the Social Security System. They may be employed 
either in a registered or non registered firm, but not in illegal activities. Lastly, the 
existence of a core-periphery pattern is explored by including the products of a dummy 
that identifies the richest provinces (the Capital Federal city, Gran Buenos Aires, the rest 
of Buenos Aires province, Santa Fe and Córdoba) with some of the determinants 
mentioned in this section. 
Table 3.6. Explanatory variables: concepts, definition and sources. 
Region-specific variables for Argentina. 
 
Concept Variable Definition Source Chapter 
Idle capacity IDLE CAPACITY it 
Rate of variation in 
employment in all formal 
manufacturing firms 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
V 
Informal 
economy 
NON REGISTERED/ 
REGISTERED it 
Non registered workers over 
registered workers 
Own 
calculations 
from National 
Household 
Survey (NHS) 
V, VI, 
VII 
Poverty 
INDIGENCE it 
% of households below the 
indigence line 
V, VII 
POVERTY it 
% of households below the 
poverty line 
V 
Cultural 
attitudes 
PRIVATE-TO-PUBLIC it 
Private employees/Public 
employees 
V, VII 
MIGRANTS it 
Migration from other 
provinces (number of 
individuals) 
V, VII 
Core-
periphery 
pattern 
RICH i 
Dummy for the five richest 
provinces 
Author 
V, VI, 
VII 
 
Source: author 
 
 
                                                 
29 In a strict sense, informality refers to some firms´ characteristics (such as low productivity, small size 
of establishments, low capital endowment per worker, little labour division, preminence of unskilled 
workers or family work) that differentiate them from the modern sector of the economy. As 
informality can hardly be measured by conventional surveys, we proxy the size of the informal 
sector with a measure of the regional importance of non registered workers. Both phenomena are 
closely related since non registered jobs are largely generated (although not exclusively) by informal 
firms (Labrunée and Gallo, 2005; ILO, 2006). 
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The third group of variables varies among provinces, years and sectors (low- medium- 
high- tech). They account for the economic conditions that the three sectors face in the 
different regions, such as market growth, input prices, barriers to entry and exit, industrial 
tradition and agglomeration effects. 
 
Table 3.7. Explanatory variables: concepts, definition and sources. 
Sector-specific variables. 
 
Concept Variable Definition Source Chapter 
Demand of 
goods/idle 
capacity 
EMPLOYMENT 
VARIATION_G ijt 
Change in employment in 
formal firms in each group 
of industries 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
VII 
Supply of 
factors (input 
prices) 
WAGES_G ijt 
Average monthly wage of 
private registered workers in 
each group of industries30 
VII 
Industrial 
structure 
TRADITION_G ijt 
Incumbent firms 7 years ago 
in each group of industries 
(3-years moving average) 
VII 
EXIT_G ij t-1 
Number of exits in each 
previous year in the group of 
industries 
VII 
ENTRY_G ij t-1 
Number of entries in the 
previous year in each group 
of industries 
VII 
ENTRY_G ij t-2 
Number of entries two years 
lagged in each group of 
industries 
VII 
EXIT_OTHER_G ij t-1 
Number of exits in the 
previous year in the other 
groups of industries 
VII 
ENTRY_OTHER_G ij t-1 
Number of entries in the 
previous year in the other 
groups of industries 
VII 
ENTRY_OTHER_G ij t-2 
Number of entries two years 
lagged in the other groups of 
industries 
VII 
Agglomeration 
INCUMBENTS_G ijt 
Incumbent firms in each 
group of industries 
VII 
INC. OTHER_G ijt 
Incumbent firms in the other 
groups of industries 
VII 
 
Source: author 
 
Finally, we include year dummy variables to control for macroeconomic factors. These 
are preferred to macroeconomic variables such as e.g. the GDP growth because of the 
measurement problems involved in these aggregates. The GDP growth in local currency is 
inaccurate because official inflation figures are not reliable since 2007 and the GDP 
growth in US dollars is similarly misleading because of the severe devaluation of the 
Argentinean peso in 2002 (more than 200%) and the consequent gradual appreciation. 
                                                 
30 They correspond to the average monthly wage of private registered workers, in nominal terms 
because official inflation rates in Argentina are not reliable since 2007. Wages in each group of 
industries were constructed as a weighted average of the nominal wages in each two-digit industry, 
using as weights the share of each two-digit industry in the total number of incumbents in the group. 
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Chapter 4 
Argentina Over The Last 20 Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Presentation 
In this chapter we expose, on the one hand, some general features of Argentina, which are 
also common in other developing countries, in particular: the high level of regional 
concentration and the territorial inequalities, the scarce industrial diversification of less 
developed regions and the high specialization of some provinces in certain sectors, related 
to natural advantages, as well as internal and external scale economies. On the other 
hand, we describe the period analyzed in this thesis (2003-2008), in particular, the 
macroeconomic environment and the pattern of firm dynamics both at the national and 
regional level. Additionally, we briefly describe the convertibility period (1991-2002), 
because current entry and exit and their profile depend on firm dynamics in the previous 
years, especially on the conditions that emerge from the economic and political crisis of 
2001-2002. 
 
4.2. Argentina and the regional dimension 
Argentina is located in southeastern South America. With a mainland area of 2,780,400 
km2, it is the eighth-largest country in the world and the second largest in Latin America. 
According to the GDP, Argentina is Latin America's third-largest country. It is classified 
as an upper middle-income economy by the Wold Bank, with a "very high" rating on 
Human Development Index and a relatively high GDP per capita. Its population, of over 
40,000,000 inhabitants, is highly urbanized and concentrated in big cities.  
The Argentinean case has a number of features that are worth noting. First, Argentina 
covers a vast territory that is accordingly organised in large administrative units 
(provinces). Second, there are important regional differences in terms of labour skills, 
economic development, labour conditions, wages and natural resources (Table 4.1)31. 
Third, firms and people are highly concentrated around the main cities and, especially, the 
capital32. Finally, manufacturing is also concentrated in a few industries at the regional 
                                                 
31 Despite all welfare indicators improved between 2003 and 2008, the most developed regions are still 
the central ones and the Patagonian provinces. 
32 The persistence of large cities primacy in developing countries may be attributed to a lower quality of 
transport infrastructure (Henderson 2000) or to historical reasons (Puga, 1998). 
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level and some provinces are highly specialized in certain sectors, usually related to 
natural advantages of the region, internal and external scale economies and historical 
reasons. Interestingly, many other developing countries (e.g. South Africa, Brazil, Russia, 
Mexico and Vietnam) share these features to some extent. This means that although the 
results of this thesis may not be generalised to all developing countries, they are likely to 
hold for a number of them.  
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The high level of regional concentration may be explained in terms of new economic 
geography models: internal and external scale economies and decreasing transport costs 
(Donato, 2003; Gorenstein et al., 2005; Vaca and Cao, 2005; Cao and Vaca, 2006). 
From early 19
th
 century, firms located in Capital Federal city and Gran Buenos Aires 
(GBA) benefited both from geographical advantages (such as the international port) and 
from the regional demand size and the availability of imports and foreign skilled labour. 
Thus, in a cumulative agglomeration process, firm location and a better quality of life 
and infrastructures also induced population location. Besides, transport costs also 
encouraged several secondary centres around some cities in Santa Fe and Córdoba, and 
a more distant one located in the west of the country, in Mendoza and Tucumán (Figure 
4.1). 
From 1940 import substitution policies focused on light manufacturing encouraged 
firm location near the largest markets and, consequently, promoted industrial 
development in core areas. Thus, a large demand, a higher stock of human capital and 
a good public services network and infrastructure attracted new firms in an extended 
core region of Capital Federal-GBA-Santa Fe. In the 60s, other industrialized regions 
emerged -some cities in Buenos Aires Province, Mendoza, Córdoba, Santa Fe and Río 
Negro-, not as a result of a diffusion process from the Capital city but due to specific 
industrial activities promoted during the later stages of the import substitution process: 
basic metals, non-metallic minerals and manufacturing of food products (Donato, 
2003).  
In the 90s, trade liberalization did not change the tendency towards spatial 
concentration, since it encouraged the production of non-tradable goods (services) 
linked to population, and promoted firm location in large urban agglomerations. The 
free trade area of Mercosur, created in 1991, also granted advantages for the core 
region of the country, which is close to Uruguay and Brazil. Additionally, profitable 
activities linked to natural resources and located in lagged regions -such as mining, 
petroleum or soybean- acted as “enclaves” with scarce regional linkages. Finally, 
macroeconomic reforms also reinforced geographical concentration, by increasing 
competition for local firms, especially in cities of intermediate size. In the past, these 
cities were protected by geographical market segmentation and high distribution and 
transportation costs, but later they became supplied by (national and foreign) large 
firms located at the central areas (Gorenstein et al., 2005). 
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Figure 4.1. Political division and central regions in Argentina 
 
 
Nowadays, about 80% of workers and firms are located in 5 of the 25 jurisdictions 
considered: GBA and Rest of Buenos Aires Province, Capital Federal city, Santa Fe and 
Córdoba. Despite these territories represent only 22% of the surface of the country, they 
produce 80% of manufacturing value added and 80% of manufacturing exports and they 
have around 80% of registered manufacturing firms and employees, 77% of total graduates, 
75% of R&D expenditures and 62% of universities (Table 4.2).  
 
 
 
 
Note: shaded areas indicate main and secondary centres 
Source: author 
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Table 4.2. Regional concentration in Argentina. Year 2003. 
 Variable 
Capital 
Federal 
Buenos Aires 
(GBA+Rest) 
Córdoba Santa Fe Sub total 
Rest of 
country TOTAL 
Area 0% 11% 6% 5% 22% 78% 100% 
Population 7% 38% 8% 8% 62% 38% 100% 
Value Added 21% 34% 8% 8% 71% 29% 100% 
Industrial Value Added 19% 47% 6% 7% 80% 20% 100% 
Exports of manufacturing 19% 47% 6% 7% 80% 20% 100% 
Exports of primary 
products and energy 0% 28% 11% 9% 48% 52% 100% 
Number of firms (a) 20% 40% 9% 11% 81% 19% 100% 
Number of manufacturing 
employees (a) 18% 41% 8% 12% 79% 21% 100% 
Graduates 35% 21% 14% 7% 77% 23% 100% 
R&D expenditures 28% 32% 8% 7% 75% 25% 100% 
Universities 27% 20% 6% 9% 62% 38% 100% 
 
(a) It refers to private and formal firms from the EBDO database. 
 
Source: author from EBDO, INDEC (2005) and data from ECLAC. 
 
The high level of spatial concentration is also evident in terms of the number of firm 
entries and exits (Table 4.3). However, central provinces are not necessarily the most 
dynamic ones in terms of entry rates. In fact, they have a just modest performance 
regarding the growth of the stock of industrial firms, in relative terms (except for 
Córdoba). Provinces that are highly above the entry rate national mean (which is 4.6%) 
are Patagonian provinces, lagged regions and some provinces with an intermediate 
level of development (Tucumán, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, Río Negro, Misiones and Salta). 
Provinces well below the national mean are Capital Federal city, San Luis, La Rioja, 
Catamarca and San Juan.  
This pattern of firm dynamics may be explained by several reasons: 
a) The lower level of competition between firms in non-central regions, which 
yields higher returns and compensates for the restrictions and limitations of 
these provinces; 
b) The decreasing impact of the industrial promotion policy33 in San Luis, La 
Rioja, Catamarca and San Juan, because most projects have finished and the 
promoted provinces have not developed other location advantages beyond tax 
incentives (Donato, 2003; CENDA, 2007). Besides, industrial promotion 
policies in Argentina tend to protect existing companies, rather than planning 
strategies for new entries (Aspiazu and Schorr, 2011); 
c) The deindustrialization of Capital Federal city, which is observed since the 70s 
and it is related to disagglomeration economies (Aspiazu and Schorr, 2011); 
                                                 
33 The industrial promotion policy began in 1973. It granted benefits to companies that settle in the 
provinces of Catamarca, La Rioja, San Luis, San Juan and Tierra del Fuego. However, despite 
these policies, territorial inequalities, as well as the pattern distribution of firms, have not 
significantly changed until today (Gatto, 2007). 
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d) The profile of firm entries, because in non-central provinces the share of entries 
that belongs to growing sectors or to industries with low barriers to entry is 
higher. On the contrary, central provinces tend to attract firms in industries that 
require economies of scale or higher investment in R&D (medium and high-
tech activities) (Rotta, 2013). 
e) At last, rates may also be higher in less industrialized provinces due to the 
scarce amount of incumbents.  
 
Table 4.3. Entry, exit and incumbent firms by province. 
Gross Entry Rate (GEnR), Gross Exit Rate (GExR) and Net Entry Rate (NER) by province. 
Average 2003-2008. 
 Province Entry Exit Incumbents GEnR GExR NER 
Central provinces 
Capital Federal 1,190 805 9,852 12.1% 8.2% 3.9% 
GBA 1,468 875 13,993 10.5% 6.3% 4.2% 
Bs. As. (Rest) 669 405 5,548 12.1% 7.3% 4.8% 
Córdoba 579 332 4,433 13.1% 7.5% 5.6% 
Santa Fe 596 334 5,471 10.9% 6.1% 4.8% 
Intermediate 
development 
Catamarca 18 12 161 11.2% 7.5% 3.7% 
Entre Ríos 148 80 1,100 13.5% 7.3% 6.2% 
Jujuy 24 13 183 13.1% 7.1% 6.0% 
La Pampa 30 18 271 11.1% 6.6% 4.4% 
Mendoza 235 147 2,107 11.2% 7.0% 4.2% 
Misiones 125 75 948 13.2% 7.9% 5.3% 
Río Negro 60 36 439 13.7% 8.2% 5.5% 
Salta 50 31 364 13.7% 8.5% 5.2% 
San Juan 55 33 555 9.9% 5.9% 4.0% 
San Luis 39 31 389 10.0% 8.0% 2.1% 
Tucumán 84 40 531 15.8% 7.5% 8.3% 
Lagged provinces 
Chaco 54 30 422 12.8% 7.1% 5.7% 
Corrientes 52 28 286 18.2% 9.8% 8.4% 
Formosa 19 12 111 17.1% 10.8% 6.3% 
La Rioja 12 8 125 9.6% 6.4% 3.2% 
Santiago 29 17 224 12.9% 7.6% 5.4% 
Patagonian 
provinces 
Chubut 52 34 358 14.5% 9.5% 5.0% 
Neuquén 47 24 294 16.0% 8.2% 7.8% 
Santa Cruz 19 11 116 16.4% 9.5% 6.9% 
T. del Fuego 18 11 138 13.0% 8.0% 5.1% 
 TOTAL 5,668 3,445 48,418 11.7% 7.1% 4.6% 
GEnR: Number of entries / (incumbents+entries+exits);  GExR: Number of exits / 
(incumbents+entries+exits); NER: GEnR - GExR  
 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
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Another feature typical of developing countries is that most industries are concentrated in 
certain regions, due to the location of raw material and several historical reasons34 (Carlevari 
and Carlevari, 2003). In particular, concentration of manufacturing employees is higher in 
provinces with lower industrial intensity, and it is a relatively stable feature (Table 4.4). This 
is a sign of a weak industrial structure, because the less industrial diversification, the lower 
the ability to quickly reallocate resources to new activities after an external shock (Kosacoff 
and Ramos, 1999). On the contrary, central provinces are highly diversified, along with the 
group of provinces benefited from industrial promotion policies (San Luis, San Juan, La 
Rioja, Tierra del Fuego and Catamarca) and some Patagonian provinces (such as Neuquén 
or Chubut). 
 
Table 4.4. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index35 (manufacturing employees). Year 2003 and 2008. Coefficient 
of variation (CV) for 2003-2008. 
 Province 2003 2008 CV 2003-2008 
Central provinces 
Capital Federal 0,105 0,098 0,033 
GBA 0,083 0,082 0,012 
Rest of Bs. As. 0,147 0,142 0,026 
Córdoba 0,188 0,154 0,079 
Santa Fe 0,153 0,151 0,036 
Intermediate 
development 
Catamarca 0,223 0,229 0,020 
Entre Ríos 0,369 0,316 0,064 
Jujuy 0,629 0,600 0,022 
La Pampa 0,406 0,445 0,085 
Mendoza 0,457 0,353 0,101 
Misiones 0,314 0,279 0,045 
Río Negro 0,310 0,340 0,080 
Salta 0,352 0,344 0,035 
San Juan 0,186 0,169 0,048 
San Luis 0,096 0,099 0,082 
Tucumán 0,255 0,267 0,023 
Lagged provinces 
Chaco 0,163 0,152 0,029 
Corrientes 0,335 0,331 0,029 
Formosa 0,311 0,300 0,065 
La Rioja 0,207 0,187 0,033 
Santiago 0,265 0,257 0,023 
Patagonian 
provinces 
Chubut 0,181 0,162 0,054 
Neuquén 0,142 0,151 0,041 
Santa Cruz 0,369 0,253 0,174 
Tierra del Fuego 0,219 0,216 0,046 
Source: author from EBDO data 
                                                 
34 It is also remarkable that some provinces do not have any kind of industrial activity in whole 
manufacturing sectors. For example, Formosa has no firms in 8 of the 23 sectors considered. Something 
similar happens in Catamarca (where there are no firms in 7 sectors); La Pampa and Santa Cruz (6); 
Río Negro; Jujuy; Misiones and Tierra del Fuego (5); Chubut and La Rioja (4), among others.  
35 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HH) is a measure of concentration. In order to describe industrial 
concentration at the regional level, an HH index based on employment was prefered to an HH index 
based on number of firms. The formula is 
2
1
jJ
i
i
j i
E
HH
E
 
  
 
  where Eij is the number of employees in 
sector j in province i and Ei is the number of total manufacturing employees in province i. A HH 
between 0.15 and 0.25 indicates moderate concentration, while a HH above 0.25 indicates high 
concentration. 
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Besides, provinces are highly specialized in some sectors, usually related to a) natural 
advantages of the region: Wood and of products of wood in Corrientes, Chaco, Entre Ríos, 
Formosa and Río Negro; Tobacco in Corrientes, Misiones and Jujuy; Petroleum products in 
Neuquén and Salta; Non-metallic mineral products in San Juan and Santiago del Estero; Food 
products and beverages in Entre Ríos, Jujuy and Mendoza; b) internal scale economies 
encouraged by industrial policy measures: Basic metals in Rest of Buenos Aires, Chubut and 
Santa Fe; Motor vehicles in Córdoba, or c) external scale economies (in some food products 
such as poultry industry or dressing) (Table 4.5). Remarkably, central provinces are 
specialized in industries which are more technology intensive. 
 
Table 4.5. First and second specialization by province. Year 2008. 
Province 1º specialization Coef36. 2º specialization Coef. 
Capital Federal 
30. Office and computing 
machinery 3.82 18. Wearing apparel and dressing 3.11 
GBA 16. Tobacco 1.82 25. Rubber and plastics products 1.76 
Rest of Bs. As. 27. Basic metals 2.87 23. Petroleum products 2.81 
Catamarca 17. Textiles 4.97 18. Wearing apparel and dressing 3.34 
Córdoba 34. Motor vehicles 2.32 35. Other transport equipment 1.92 
Corrientes 20. Wood and of products of wood 9.78 16. Tobacco 4.94 
Chaco 20. Wood and of products of wood 4.08 17. Textiles 3.99 
Chubut 27. Basic metals 4.80 17. Textiles 4.28 
Entre Ríos 20. Wood and of products of wood 4.55 15. Food products and beverages 2.01 
Formosa 36. Furniture 4.27 20. Wood and of products of wood 3.02 
Jujuy 16. Tobacco 9.59 15. Food products and beverages 2.89 
La Pampa 15. Food products and beverages 2.47 22. Printing 1.61 
La Rioja 19. Leather manufacturing 5.11 17. Textiles 5.10 
Mendoza 31. Electrical machinery 2.70 15. Food products and beverages 2.18 
Misiones 20. Wood and of products of wood 12.47 16. Tobacco 8.83 
Neuquén 23. Petroleum products 6.36 26. Non-metallic mineral products 4.26 
Río Negro 15. Food products and beverages 2.13 20. Wood and of products of wood 2.02 
Salta 16. Tobacco 14.70 23. Petroleum products 6.10 
San Juan 26. Non-metallic mineral products 3.18 18. Wearing apparel and dressing 1.72 
San Luis 37. Recycling 3.33 25. Rubber and plastics products 2.32 
Santa Cruz 37. Recycling 20.21 35. Other transport equipment 7.68 
Santa Fe 29. Machinery and equipment 2.02 27. Basic metals 1.56 
Santiago del 
Estero 
26. Other non-metallic mineral 
products 9.44 22. Printing 1.91 
Tierra del 
Fuego 32. Radio and television equipment 83.92 17. Textiles 3.73 
Tucumán 19. Leather manufacturing 2.22 15. Food products and beverages 1.84 
Source: author from EBDO data 
                                                 
36 The specialization index for each sector in every province (SIij) is defined as / 1,2...
j j
i N
ii
i N
E E
SI j j
E E
  
 
where Ei
j is the number of employees in sector j in province i; Ei is the number of total manufacturing 
employees in province i; EN
j
 
is the number of employees in sector j in the whole country and EN
 
is the 
number of total manufacturing employees in the country. An index higher than 1 means that the 
province i is specialized in sector j. 
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4.3. Argentina Over the Last 20 Years 
In this section we briefly describe the economic conditions prevailing in two distinctive 
periods of the recent history: the convertibility period, which starts in 1991 and ends up with 
the economic and political crisis of 2001-2002, and the subsequent period of economic 
growth (2003-2008), which is analysed in this thesis.  
The convertibility period is characterized by several structural reforms in the institutional and 
regulatory framework, which involved a radical reduction of tariff protection, a massive 
privatization of services and a process of market deregulation. Besides, the Convertibility 
Program established a system of fixed exchange rates between local currency and the U.S. 
Dollar that appreciated local currency and biased the structure of relative prices in favour of 
non-tradable activities. Furthermore, price stabilization represented a significant 
improvement over the previous decade, providing predictability to the economy and building 
confidence to financial markets.  
 
Figure 4.2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in millions of AR$ of 1993 and  
Unemployment rate. (1991-1999) 
 
Source: author from INDEC data 
 
During the initial year of this period, there is a significant growth in GDP, along with a 
steady increase in unemployment (Figure 4.2). However, by the end of 1998 a deep recession 
began, and it led to the breakdown of the convertibility regime in late 2001 and the 
devaluation of local currency -more than 200%- in 2002. GDP contracted more than 20% 
between 1999 and 2002, the unemployment rate rose above 20% in early 2002 and the 
poverty and indigence levels increased. The internal factors that explain this outcome are the 
lack of competitiveness, the overexposure to volatile international markets and the 
weakening of fiscal accounts (Fernández Bugna and Porta, 2007). The external conditions 
were also unfavourable, eg. falling in commodity prices, reduction of private capital flows, 
appreciation of U.S. dollar and depreciation of the Brazilian real (Kosacoff, 2010).  
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During the convertibility period, the above mentioned reforms, along with a significant 
labour flexibility process, caused the exit of many manufacturing firms -especially the smaller 
ones, which could not afford the new economic conditions- as well as the entry of other ones 
(Figure 4.3). Notably, the adaptability of firms to this scenario does not necessarily have to 
do with the sector in which they operate, but rather with their individual characteristics and 
strategies. Castillo et al. (2002) find that, in the same sector at the same time, many firms 
created jobs and many others destroyed them. Thus, the overall productivity increased, as a 
result of the coexistence of two different situations: the offensive strategies of some firms -
strong investments in machinery and equipment and deep organizational changes-, along 
with the defensive restructuring of other ones -expulsion of employment and realization of 
particular investments- (Kosacoff, 1998). In particular, during the crisis, the shrinkage of 
domestic demand and the lack of credit resulted in a significant increase in the levels of firm 
indebtedness and a great number of closures. At the same time, the level of investment 
collapsed and many projects were delayed, which reduced steadily the stock of 
manufacturing firms.  
 
Figure 4.3. Number of entries, exits and net entry in manufacturing.  
Argentina. (1996 – 2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data begins in 1996 because it is the first year available in EBDO database 
Source: author from data in EBDO 
 
After the crisis, the economic recovery was intense. The abandonment of the convertibility 
regime led to the adoption of a flexible exchange rate that changed the relative prices in 
favour of tradable goods and labour intensive activities. Macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
surplus and import substitution stimulated the expansion of domestic demand, while the 
international context was also favourable: sustained foreign demand, high prices for primary 
commodities and low interest rates. As a result, GDP grew at an average rate of 8.42% 
between 2003 and 2008 (Figure 4.4) and unemployment rate fell from 21.5% in 2002 to 7.3% 
in 2008.  
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Figure 4.4. Gross Domestic Product in millions of AR$ of 1993. (1991-2008) 
 
Source: author from INDEC 
 
Unlike the previous decade, manufacturing is one of the most dynamic sectors in terms of 
generation of new jobs and absorption of existing unemployment (Fernández Bugna and 
Porta, 2007). Figure 4.5 shows an insight into firm dynamics in manufacturing during 2003-
2008. In post convertibility years, firm entries have maintained around 5,500 new start-ups 
per year, which means an annual average gross entry rate of 11.7%. In contrast, exiting firms 
have doubled from 2,330 in 2003 to more than 5,000 in 2008. This is an expected result in 
years with high GDP growth after a deep crisis: in the expansive period there is a flood of 
new entrants (whose entry was delayed by the crisis) as well as new start-ups which are 
favoured by the new macroeconomic environment. Afterwards, it is expected that market 
selection mechanisms produce an adjustment in the stock of firms (MTEySS, 2007). 
Additionally, the international financial crisis, the gradual appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and some internal conflicts explain the slowdown in the net entry in 2008 (Katz and 
Bernat, 2011). All in all, the net balance between entry and exit results in the addition of 
almost 13,400 manufacturing firms from 2003 to 2008, equivalent to an annual net entry rate 
of 3.9%. At the regional level, the process of firm entry in manufacturing is also very intense 
in all provinces (as it is shown in Table 4.3).  
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Figure 4.5. Number of entries, exits and net entry in manufacturing.  
Argentina. (2003-2008) 
 
Note: Data begins in 1996 because it is the first year available in EBDO database 
Source: author from data in EBDO  
 
Along post-convertibility years, two sub-periods may be distinguished: 2003-2005, when 
economic growth was based on the usage of idle capacity, and 2005-2008, when a larger part 
of manufacturing growth is related to expansion in productive capacity, that is, new firms 
and new investments by incumbent firms (Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.6. Share of increase in installed capacity utilization and installed capacity expansion in the 
Manufacturing Monthly Estimator growth. (2003-2008). In %. 
 
 
Source: author from Monthly Industrial Survey (INDEC) and CEP (Centro de Estudios para la Producción). 
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At the sectoral level, low- medium- and high- tech industries show a similar evolution along 
the 2003-2008 period, although entries are less volatile and exits grow at a lower rate as 
technological intensity increases. The outstanding economic growth and the new relative 
prices were not enough to modify the traditional structure of births, which is according to the 
short-term period analyzed. In particular, according to MTEySS (2007), firms kept entering 
into sectors with lower barriers more than in sectors favoured by changes in relative prices.  
 
Figure 4.7. Number of entries and exits in low- medium- and high- tech industries 
Total Argentina. (2003-2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
 
At the regional level, there are marked differences in the composition of incumbents, entries 
and exits between central and peripheral provinces (Table 4.6). For instance, while 62.2% of 
entries in central regions belong to low tech industries, this percentage rises up to 76.4% in 
peripheral regions. Similarly, 15.2% of entries in central regions belong to high tech 
industries, while only 6.8% of entries are classified as high tech in the periphery. This is 
explained by the advantages that central provinces offer to medium and high tech activities, 
as for example the availability of skilled labour, agglomeration economies, infrastructure, 
universities, etc. 
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Table 4.6. Incumbent firms, entries and exits by group of manufacturing industries  
in central and peripheral regions (2003-2008) 
 
a. Incumbents by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. Average 
2003-2008  
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 6,534 22,102 74.8% 56.0% 
Medium tech 1,420 9,849 16.3% 24.9% 
High tech 776 7,548 8.9% 19.1% 
Total 8,730 39,500 100.0% 100.0% 
 
b. Firm entry by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. Sum 2003-
2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 5,071 16,805 76.4% 62.2% 
Medium tech 1,113 6,107 16.8% 22.6% 
High tech 454 4,098 6.8% 15.2% 
Total 6,638 27,010 100.0% 100.0% 
     
c. Firm exit by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. Sum 2003-
2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 3,088 10,754 78.3% 65.1% 
Medium tech 576 3,421 14.6% 20.7% 
High tech 279 2,336 7.1% 14.1% 
Total 3,943 16,511 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: figures are population data. 
    
 Source: author from EBDO data 
 
 
4.4. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we describe some general characteristics of Argentina, as well as the main 
features of the period analyzed (2003-2008) and the former years. On the one hand, we argue 
that spatial structure in Argentina fits quite well with a core-periphery pattern. The main 
centrifugal forces are the agglomeration of firms and population, along with a better quality 
of life and infrastructures, while the main centripetal forces are the location of raw materials,  
as well as disagglomeration economies. This core-periphery situation means that entering 
firms face quite different conditions not only in terms of entry facilities (e.g., access to 
markets, skilled workers and infrastructure) but also in terms of survival and growth. 
Furthermore, Argentina’s big geography increases peripherally problems as lagging regions 
are far away from the (economically) central areas of the country.  
Besides, we provide some explanations for the pattern of regional firm dynamics that are 
tested in the following chapters: a) firm entry seems to be more intense (in relative terms) in 
less developed regions, which may be related to the lower level of competition among firms; 
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b) Capital Federal city is going through a process of deindustrialization, due to 
disagglomeration economies; and c) both barriers to entry and sectoral growth are relevant in 
order to explain entry.  
Finally, we show that the economic recovery, the new macroeconomic incentives and the 
start up of delayed projects are the main determinants that help to explain the intense firm 
entry observed in the initial years of the period (2003-2004), whereas the usage of idle 
capacity may have acted as a substitution of firm entry. Additionally, we argue that it is 
reasonable to expect a high number of exits in the following years, due to both the market 
selection mechanisms and the adverse external and internal environment since 2008.  
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Chapter 5 
Regional Determinants Of Firm Entry 
In A Developing Country37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The entry of new firms, while varying considerably across regions (Fritsch and Mueller, 
2004; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005), contributes to the growth and welfare of nations 
(Powell, 2008). Moreover, the creation of new firms is an important mechanism for 
economic development that may help to reduce inequalities between poor and rich countries 
(Acs and Amorós, 2008; Acs et al., 2011; Naudé, 2011). However, there is very limited 
evidence on what determines firm entry in developing countries and on whether these 
determinants differ from the ones typically found in developed countries.38 This study aims to 
contribute to this literature by analysing the determinants of firm entry in the Argentinean 
provinces during the period 2003 to 2008.39 
In particular, we analyse annual provincial data on the number of new manufacturing firms 
with employees registered with the Social Security to find that most variables that typically 
determine entry in developed countries (such as the evolution of economic activity, 
population density and industrial structure) are of similar importance here. However, we also 
find that some explanatory factors that are never considered when developed countries are 
studied (such as the extent of poverty, the size of the informal economy and the existence of 
idle capacity) turn out to be statistically significant. Lastly, we show that the spatial structure 
of entry fits quite well a core-periphery pattern in which firms in central areas benefit from a 
number of advantages (e.g., better access to markets, more skilled workers, and more and 
better external services). In the Argentinean case, this centre-periphery structure seems to 
                                                 
37 Calá, C.D.; Manjón-Antolín, M. and Arauzo-Carod, J.M. (2014a): “Regional Determinants of  Firm 
Entry in a Developing Country”, Papers in Regional Science (forthcoming). 
38 Evidence from developing countries can be found in Lay (2003) and Wang (2006) for Taiwan and 
Günalp and Cilasun (2006) and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey, all of whom used industry level 
data; see also Naudé et al. (2008) for South Africa and Santarelli and Tran (2012) for Vietnam, who 
used regional level data. 
39 Previous studies of firm entry in Argentina are merely descriptive (Bartelsman et al., 2004; MTEYSS, 
2007; Katz and Bernat, 2011; Calá and Rotondo, 2012 [the only one to adopt a regional perspective]). 
Regression analyses can be found in Castillo et al. (2002) and Gennero et al. (2004), but the former 
studies the rates of employment creation and destruction using firm-level data and the latter new 
business ideas using regional-level data.  
Chapter 5: Regional Determinants of  Firm Entry in a Developing Country 
Carla Daniela Calá 
 
- 74 - 
 
result in differences in the impact of the agglomeration economies but not in the impact of 
idle capacity. 
Of the developing countries, Argentina has a number of features that are worth noting. First, 
it is a country with important regional differences in terms of wages, labour skills, growth 
rates and natural resources. Second, firms and people are highly concentrated around the 
main cities, particularly the capital. Third, Argentina covers a vast territory that is organised 
in large administrative units. Interestingly, many other developing countries (e.g. South 
Africa, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and Vietnam) share these features to some extent. This means 
that although it may not be possible to generalise our results to all developing countries, they 
are likely to hold for a number of them.40  
With this in mind, our results suggest that entry-promoting policies in developed countries 
cannot be automatically transposed to developing countries. Rather, the design of such 
policies should be based on studies that take into account the specificities of the data (e.g., 
certain variables may not be available and others may be defined in a non-standard way, as 
pointed out by e.g. Thompson, 2010) and the institutional setting (e.g., macroeconomic 
instability and financial crises, as argued by e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 2000). There is, 
hence, a risk that regional policies aiming to attract new firms in developing countries will 
fail to accomplish their goals if they are based only on evidence from developed countries. 
Our empirical strategy is similar to that of Fritsch et al. (2006) in their study of the 
determinants of firm survival in East and West Germany. This means that we do not make 
any a priori about the existence of differences in the determinants of entry between developed 
and developing countries. Rather, we will argue that these differences may exist and 
(indirectly) test this hypothesis by comparing results from Argentina with those typically 
found in studies on developed countries. In the case of Fritsch et al. (2006), they find that 
only a few of the factors that have a statistically significant effect on survival in West 
Germany are also statistically significant in East Germany.41 They then interpret this result as 
evidence that the survival of new businesses in East Germany is subject to more erratic 
influences than in West Germany and associate this to distortions in the market structure and 
institutional setting. However, an alternative explanation might simply be that survival 
depends on factors that are not included in their model specification. This criticism may also 
apply to our study, since the omission of relevant variables might alter our conclusions. Still, 
it is worth noting that our set of explanatory variables is fairly comprehensive and that our 
estimates are largely robust across different variable definitions (e.g. demand for goods, 
urbanisation economies and poverty) and model specifications (Poisson and Negative 
                                                 
40 The size of the administrative units, as well as the degree of heterogeneity and urban concentration, are 
all considerably smaller in developed countries. To illustrate, Argentina’s surface is roughly four times 
the surface of France (the largest EU country) and the smallest province (Tierra del Fuego) is roughly 
two-thirds the surface area of Belgium. Likewise, while in the U.S. 40% of the employment is located in 
counties constituting around 15% of the land area (Scott and Storper, 2007), in Argentina more than 
65% of the employment is located in a similar share of the land area. This kind of “macrocephalic” 
urban systems, consisting of a few abnormally large cities, is typical of developing countries (Lipton, 
1977). 
41 See also Ghani et al. (2014) for an analogous result when comparing the effects of incumbents’ 
employment on the spatial distribution of entrepreneurship in India and the U.S. 
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Binomial Fixed and Random Effects models, with and without including centre-periphery 
differences in the impact of the agglomeration economies).   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the empirical literature on 
firm entry in developed and developing countries. It also discusses the empirical strategy. 
Section 5.3 describes the data set. Section 5.4 discusses the econometric model and the main 
results. Section 5.5 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
5.2. Regional determinants of entry: an overview 
5.2.1. Evidence from developed countries 
A number of studies have shown substantial differences in regional entry rates.42 Also, most 
of the observed regional differences in entry rates arise from differences in regional 
characteristics (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1997; Fritsch and Schmude, 2006). However, this 
regional variation in start-up rates is consistent with different (and often competing) 
theoretical frameworks (Spilling 1996). This probably explains that most empirical studies 
tend to use econometric specifications that are derived ad hoc (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). In 
particular, following Bosma et al. (2008), we can group region-specific determinants of firm 
entry into three categories: i) demand for goods and supply of factors; ii) agglomeration 
effects; and iii) cultural attitudes and policies towards entrepreneurship.  
First, proxies for demand include variables that affect firm’s profits, such as the size of local 
markets (typically using population measures) and consumers’ purchasing power (measured 
by income, (un)employment and output measures such as regional GDP). All these variables 
can appear in the models in levels and/or in growth rates. As for the supply of factors, the 
focus is on labour and capital. Labour refers to the number of people endowed with the 
ability to start new firms, usually proxied by the composition of the labour force (age, gender, 
ethnic and geographical origin, etc.) and human capital characteristics (education, skills, 
etc.). Also, wages are the usual proxy for the price of this factor. Capital refers to 
infrastructures (e.g. accessibility) and financial resources (both in terms of the extent of 
financing, e.g. bank loans, and the constraints that may exist to access credit, particularly on 
SMEs). In addition, it is common to consider proxies for the industrial structure such as the 
weight of SMEs, the number of incumbents and the number of exits (lagged one or two 
periods to avoid endogeneity concerns). 
Notice that the definition of the supply and demand categories is not self-excluding, for some 
variables may affect both supply and demand. Higher real wages, for example, mean more 
purchasing power but also higher labour costs and higher opportunity costs for self-
                                                 
42 As far as we know, these include Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) and Fritsch and Falck (2007) in 
Germany; Davidsson et al. (1994) in Sweden; Garofoli (1994), Carree et al. (2008) and Santarelli et al. 
(2009) in Italy; Guesnier (1994) in France; Keeble and Walker (1994) and Fotopoulos and Spence 
(2001) in the UK; Hart and Gudgin (1994) in Ireland; Reynolds (1994). Campbell (1996), Rigby and 
Essletzbichler (2000), Armington and Acs (2002), Sutaria and Hicks (2004) in the US; Spilling (1996) in 
Norway; Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) in Greece; Kangasharju (2000) in Finland; Arauzo-Carod et al. 
(2008) in Spain; and Tamásy and Le Heron (2008) in New Zealand.  
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employment. Similarly, unemployment can push individuals to start their own business. 
However, it may also reflect the poor economic situation of the region.  
Second, having other firms close by may increase market opportunities and firms’ efficiency. 
However, there is no general agreement on what is the ultimate driver of agglomeration. 
While some claim that it is the location of firms operating in similar industries (i.e., 
localisation economies), others argue that it is the location of firms operating in different 
industries (i.e., urbanisation economies). Whatever the case may be, it is important to stress 
that there are potential diseconomies in the agglomeration process. Congestion and the rise 
of input prices (e.g. land and wages, but also housing) can make a region much less attractive 
for new ventures.  
Third, although it has been widely acknowledged that it is important to include proxies for 
cultural attitudes and policies towards entrepreneurship in the analysis of regional entry (see, 
however, Davidsson and Wiklund, 1997), its empirical implementation has not been a 
complete success. The problem, of course, is that it is very difficult to find good proxies. 
Since data on specific entry-promoting policies is generally not available, for example, 
Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Reynolds et al. (1994) advocate using public spending. Cultural 
attitudes are even more difficult to measure, so the proposed solutions are even more 
debatable. Garofoli (1994, p. 388), for example, argues that “areas exhibiting social mobility 
(...) will have higher rates of new firm formation”. He also tries to capture the “political 
climate” by using the percentage of votes obtained by communist and socialist parties.  
As for the empirical evidence, the main findings can be summarised in the following way43:  
1. Demand: population and GDP growth have a positive effect on entry, while the effect 
of income levels is ambiguous (both positive and negative estimates have been 
reported). 
2. Supply: the unemployment rate has an ambiguous effect on entry, while the change in 
the unemployment rate and the level of wages negatively affect entry; capital and 
bank deposits have a positive effect on entries: likewise, the proportion of small firms 
has a positive effect on entries, the effect of establishment size tends to be negative, 
and the effects of the industry specialisation levels are unclear (both positive and 
negative estimates have been reported); exit rates have a positive effect on entries.  
3. Agglomeration: population density, localisation economies and population living in 
urban areas affect entries positively; dwelling prizes and the share of owners also have 
a positive effect on entries. 
4. Cultural attitudes and public policy: immigration tends to affect entries positively, 
while public policies and political ethos have non-significant or ambiguous effects. 
 
                                                 
43 It is important to stress that these findings come from the studies listed in footnote 42 that focus on the 
manufacturing sector (as we do). Namely, Audretsch and Fritsch (1994); Armington and Acs (2002); 
Carree et al. (2008); Davidsson et al. (1994); Fotopoulos and Spence (1999); Fritsch and Falck (2007); 
Garofoli (1994); Hart and Gudgin (1994); Keeble and Walker (1994); Reynolds (1994); Reynolds et al. 
(1994); Santarelli et al. (2009); Spilling (1996), Sutaria and Hicks (2004) and Tamásy and Le Heron 
(2008).  
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5.2.2. Evidence from developing countries 
The entry process exhibits certain regularities (see Geroski, 1995). However, the intensity of 
entry differs with the level of development of the country, being higher/lower in less/more 
developed economies (see Wennekers et al. (2005) for a thorough discussion on this topic and 
empirical evidence). In fact, there seems to be a U-shaped relationship between 
entrepreneurship and development (Acs et al., 1994; Acs et al., 2008b). Acs et al. (2008b) also 
show that developing countries generally exhibit higher turnover rates ―especially when the 
informal economy is included.  
Several factors may explain the differences in the patterns of entry (and exit) between 
developed and developing countries. First, developing economies are generally characterised 
by macroeconomic instability and intense cyclical variations. The recurrent crises inevitably 
result in obstacles to the creative destruction process: human capital attrition (Stiglitz, 1998), 
tighter conditions in the financial market (Caballero and Hammour, 2000) and higher 
expected rates of return on the firms’ projects due to the shortening of planning horizons 
(Katz and Bernat, 2011). Second, innovation systems in these countries suffer from important 
deficiencies. This makes innovative entry less frequent, regardless of the technological regime 
(Burachik, 2000). Third, underdeveloped factor markets may restrict access to the resources 
needed to start a business (financing, skilled labour, raw materials, technology, infrastructure, 
etc.). They can also negatively affect the supply of entrepreneurs by reducing the share of 
people with access to information, education, business networks and/or financial resources. 
Fourth, the political economy of developing countries may cause distortions in the allocation 
of resources. Bartelsman et al. (2004), for example, argue that governments may give 
incumbents preferential treatment, artificially increase barriers to entry and/or make exits for 
some type of businesses more frequent (e.g. SMEs). In addition, government programs are 
usually inefficient at promoting entrepreneurship and supportive institutions are largely 
underdeveloped (Carbonell, 2005).  
Moreover, these differences not only arise in the intensity of entry but in the profile of the 
entering firms. For example, the underdevelopment of factor markets may reduce not only 
firm entry but also their initial size (Kantis et al., 2005), thus decreasing the likelihood of 
survival (Audretsch, 1995a). Also, the number of nascent ventures under the model of 
“entrepreneurial economy” tends to be smaller in developing economies (Amorós and Cristi, 
2008). Similarly, the weight of the necessity-based entrepreneurs is usually higher because of 
the difficult economic conditions (Acs et al., 2008a). Lastly, Acs et al. (2011, 2008a) argue 
that the number and type of public institutions influence the allocation of entrepreneurs 
between formal and informal activities. 
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5.2.3. Empirical strategy 
The question here, however, is whether there are also differences in the regional determinants 
of entry between developed and developing economies. The answer is not obvious. Although 
there is extensive empirical literature on regional firm entry (see footnote 42), the evidence 
from developing countries is scarce (see footnote 38). Moreover, the heterogeneity of cases 
(databases, institutional settings, etc.) makes it very difficult to compare results across 
countries.
 
Lastly, there is no well-established theory that can provide guidelines on what the 
expected differential effects of a particular determinant of entry are.  
The empirical approach we propose is both motivated and limited by these issues. We take as 
the starting point a set of determinants that are generally found to be statistically significant 
in regional entry studies using data from developed countries (e.g., demand, education, 
density and industrial structure). This provides our first (admittedly, indirect) test on the 
differences between developed and developing countries (see e.g. Fritsch et. al., 2006 and 
Ghani et al., 2014). However, we also acknowledge that there are factors that, while 
potentially important in developing countries, are never considered by studies on developed 
countries (Bruton et al., 2008). This is the case, for example, of the size of the informal 
economy and the extent of poverty (Gërxhani, 2004; Schneider, 2005; Acs et al., 2008b). This 
provides our second test on the differences between developed and developing countries.44 
In light of the aforementioned differences in the patterns of entry, we expect our first test to 
show that (most) variables that explain firm entry in advanced countries have either weak 
statistical significance or show the opposite sign to that typically found in developed 
countries. We also expect the second test to show that (most) variables that are meant to 
incorporate some of the specificities of developing countries have substantial explanatory 
power. We discuss these expectations in more detail in the next section, where we provide a 
description of the data and the variables we use.  
 
5.3. The data  
5.3.1. Entry 
The Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (EBDO) of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security of Argentina has drawn up an annual database on firm demography since 
1996. Data is available for the 23 Argentinean provinces and the Capital Federal city. 
However, the Buenos Aires Province is further divided into Gran Buenos Aires and the rest 
of the province. This is why there are 25 jurisdictions in the database, which we take as our 
units of observation.  
                                                 
44 One limitation of our approach is that the econometric specification is not directly derived from a set of 
theories explaining firm entry (in developing/developed countries). This means that we cannot 
discriminate among conflicting theories and/or test whether one of these theories has empirical support. 
Notice, however, that this is not the goal of the paper and that this limitation does not invalid our 
empirical strategy. 
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The database includes information about the number of entries, exits and incumbents based 
on all manufacturing (formal and private) firms with at least one employee.45 Moreover, the 
EBDO handles changes in firm codes that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In 
particular, spurious entries and exits caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s 
workforce from firms that “exit” to become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the 
database. Lastly, we restrict the analysis to firms that declare that most of their workforce is 
located in the assigned jurisdiction. This means that we concentrate on “local firms” (about 
90% of the total firms in 2008), while branch offices or subsidiaries located in other 
jurisdictions are excluded.46 We report the resulting number of entries, exits and incumbents 
in Argentina in the years 2003 to 2008 in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Number of entries, exits and incumbents in Argentina (2003 – 2008) 
 
Year Entry Exit Incumbents 
2003 4,986 2,330 42,754 
2004 5,994 2,326 45,234 
2005 5,486 2,929 48,317 
2006 6,264 3,623 49,987 
2007 5,886 4,358 51,796 
2008 5,389 5,103 52,417 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
 
According to the MTEYSS (2007), in 2003-2005 entry rates reached the highest values in a 
decade. Of course, this was closely related to the recovery of the Argentinean economy after 
the severe crisis of 2001-2002. Table 5.1 shows that the high entry rates (around 11%) 
persisted the following years (2006-2008), although the increase was not so sharp because 
entry rates dropped in the last two years of our sample (to values of about 7%). As for the 
exits, after the first two years of stability (2003-2004), they followed the opposite trend, with 
an average yearly-variation rate of 21%. All these figures indicate that our period of analysis 
roughly covers a cycle of the Argentinean economy: from recovery (with net entry rates 
above 5% in the period 2003 to 2006) to progressive decline (with net entry rates of 3% and 
0.5% in 2007 and 2008, respectively). 
In particular, our dependent variable is the number of annual entries in each of the 25 
jurisdictions previously described over the period 2003 to 2008. We start our analysis in 2003 
to avoid the structural break caused by the economic and political crisis of the end of 2001 
that led to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in January 2002. Including these years of 
                                                 
45 This means that our data set does not contain information on either public or informal employment. In 
fact, no statistical source in Argentina can distinguish between informal and formal entries, exits or 
incumbents. At the aggregate level, the National Household Survey reports that the unregistered 
workforce in the manufacturing industry was 26.9% in the last quarter of 2008. 
46 This constraint was suggested by the EBDO staff so that new offices or branches of large firms that are 
opened in another province with only one or two people were not regarded as new entries. Moreover, 
new branch offices may be driven by factors that are different from the ones that influence the creation 
of “local” firms.  
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turmoil would completely distort results. We finish our analysis in 2008 because this was the 
last available year in the EBDO dataset when this investigation was initiated. 
Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of our dependent variable over the period of analysis in 
Argentina and each of the jurisdictions considered.47 In developed countries, this evolution 
closely follows the upswings and downswings of the business cycle. That is, entries tend to be 
pro-cyclical and exits tend to be anti-cyclical. In developing countries, however, Figure 5.1 
shows how macroeconomic instability, financial crisis and/or changes in the prices of raw 
materials make economic cycles more pronounced. By including the number of entries in 
Argentina, Figure 5.1 also shows the extent of heterogeneity in the provinces considered. 
First, although entries in each province follow the same evolution, some provinces seem to 
start the cycle later. Second, there are substantial differences in the number of entries across 
provinces. In particular, the Capital Federal city, the provinces of Gran Buenos Aires, the 
rest of Buenos Aires Province, Santa Fe and Córdoba stand out as the most attractive 
provinces in which to create new firms. 
 
                                                 
47 It is important to notice that the interest of this figure is not to identify regional patterns but to show that 
there are important differences between the provinces with high/medium/low levels of entry. 
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Figure 5.1. Firm entry in Argentina and provinces with high/medium/low entry levels (2003-2008) 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
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Figure 5.2. Number of entries by province (average 2003-2008) 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
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Figure 5.2 displays the spatial distribution of entries and shows that differences in the number 
of entries across provinces cannot simply be explained by the size of the regions. What is 
most striking about this figure is the high spatial concentration of manufacturing in 
Argentina. Notice that most activity clusters in the capital of the country and the surrounding 
provinces. In fact, according to the EBDO database about 80% of workers and firms in 
manufacturing are located in the Capital Federal city and the provinces of Gran Buenos 
Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires Province, Santa Fe and Córdoba. However, these five 
jurisdictions cover just 22% of the surface of the country. This uneven spatial distribution of 
the economic activity is quite characteristic of a developing economy (Scott and Storper, 
2007).48 
 
5.3.2. Explanatory variables 
We used data from the EBDO and the National Household Survey (NHS) to construct our 
vector of explanatory variables (the size of the provinces in km2 comes from the Military 
Geographical Institute). The distinction is important because the information contained in 
the EBDO database refers to the whole province, while the NHS is performed by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) on samples of families in 31 urban areas. 
Nevertheless, we were obliged to use the NHS data because there is no statistical source 
providing yearly information on demographic and/or socioeconomic characteristics of the 
Argentinean provinces (population censuses, for example, are performed every 10 years).  
In particular, we were able to construct variables related to the evolution of economic 
activity, the labour market, the level of education, input prices, the industrial structure, the 
industrial tradition, the existence of agglomeration economies and cultural attitudes. As 
discussed in the previous section, these factors are widely used in studies on developed 
countries.49 Moreover, we were able to construct variables related to the level of poverty, the 
informal economy and idle capacity. As pointed out in Section 5.2, these variables are 
usually not included in studies on developed countries. They are included here in an attempt 
to capture the economic and structural singularities of a developing country. We have also 
included the square of these variables to account for possible non-linear effects. 
Table 5.2 reports the definition, statistical sources and descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
variables used in this study. It also contains a column with the expected sign of the associated 
coefficient. In this respect, it is important to stress that the reported sign correspond to the 
one commonly found in the empirical literature. This means that, as pointed out above, the 
inclusion of some of the explanatory variables may be justified on different grounds. That is, 
                                                 
48 These five provinces also concentrated 62% of the population, 75% of expenditure on science and 
technology activities, 77% of university degrees, 62% of universities, 85% of the exports of 
manufactured products, 71% of the GDP and 80% of the manufacturing added value in 2003. 
49 Notice that we have not included variables related to the capital factor. Unfortunately, there is no 
reliable information about public and private spending in infrastructure in Argentina. As for measures 
of credit access, we have explored the amount of loans granted i) to manufacturing, ii) per firm and iii) 
per employee. However, these variables showed a negative and statistically significant coefficient that 
became statistically non-significant when covariates that are characteristic of the developing countries 
were included. In any case, these results did not differ substantially from the ones reported in Table 5.3. 
We consequently decided not to include these variables in our final specifications. 
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in some cases the expected sign may be consistent with alternative or conflicting theories. 
With this in mind, below we briefly review the arguments and evidence supporting these 
expected signs.50  
Demand for goods. We use the rate of variation in employment in all formal firms 
(alternatively, the rate of variation in unemployment) to proxy for the evolution of economic 
activity. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive (negative for the rate of 
variation in unemployment), thus reflecting the procyclicality of entries. As previously 
pointed out, however, its statistical significance in developing countries may be hampered by 
the shape of the business cycle and/or the heterogeneity of the geographical units used. 
 
Supply of factors 
1. Labour. We use the unemployment rate to assess the impact of the labour market on 
firm entry. In developed countries, the impact of the unemployment rates on entry is 
ambiguous (Delmar and Davidsson 2000; Hamilton 1999; Ritsilä and Tervo 2002; 
Spilling 1996; Storey 1991; Tervo and Niittykangas 1994). According to the so-called 
push hypothesis the impact should be positive: the unemployed are more likely to become 
self-employed and unemployment should push down the cost of labour in the 
jurisdiction. However, in developing countries the informal sector provides a less costly 
option to the unemployed and is not reflected in official firm entry registers (like the one 
we use here). On the other hand, the pull hypothesis suggests that the impact should be 
negative because the unemployed lack entrepreneurial abilities and capital. In developing 
countries, the negative impact may be higher because of the attrition of human capital in 
economic downturns (Stiglitz, 1998). 
2. Education. Our proxies for education include the active population with primary, 
secondary and university-level education. In developed countries, the evidence is mixed 
and both negative and positive effects have been found (Garofoli, 1994; Reynolds, 1994 
and Reynolds et al., 1994, e.g., find a negative impact, while Fotopoulos and Spence, 
1999 and Davidsson et al., 1994, e.g., find a positive effect). This ambiguous impact may 
be explained by the regional specialization in industries that require different shares of 
skilled labour (Spilling, 1996). Thus, one should expect that in developing countries, 
where firms typically operate in earlier life-cycle stages and tend to specialise in natural 
resource-intensive goods and scale-intensive industrial commodities, the entry of 
manufacturing firms show no relation with high educational levels.  
 
                                                 
50 The descriptive statistics reported in Table 5.2 do not include data from the Río Negro province because 
the NHS data for this province has only been available since 2006 and the aglomerados surveyed actually 
cover both urban and rural areas (which are also partly in the Buenos Aires province). This is why the 
final number of provinces considered in this study is 24 and the total number of observations is 144. 
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Table 5.2. Main explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics  
        
Variable Definition Source Expected sign Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Employment variation Rate of variation in employment in all formal firms 
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
+ 9.22 5.20 -6.97 22.75 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate  
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+/- 8.19 3.81 1.01 18.20 
Primary education Active individuals with primary education (in thousands) +/- 191.36 297.19 7.68 1554.53 
Secondary education 
Active individuals with secondary education  (in 
thousands) 
+/- 281.69 384.37 21.80 1897.59 
University education 
Active individuals with university-level education (in 
thousands) 
+/- 220.44 279.55 12.34 1032.11 
Wages 
Average monthly wage of private registered workers in 
manufacturing 
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
- 1,891.40 864.87 676.17 5,414.11 
HH index Hirschman-Herfindahl Index - 24.36 12.00 8.06 62.90 
SMEs 
Ratio of small and medium industrial firms to total 
industrial firms (formal) 
+ 39.92 5.77 27.27 57.03 
Exit ratet-1 Number of exits in the previous year +/- 135.74 238.87 4 1112 
Industrial tradition Incumbent firms 7 years ago (3-years moving average) +/- 1,916.31 3,396.97 91.00 14,550.00 
Density Log (population/area)  (in thousands) 
Own calculations from  
Military Geographical 
Institute  
and INDEC 
+ 676.91 2,732.61 0.83 13,739.75 
Incumbents Incumbent firms 
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
+ 1,999.11 3,472.29 88.00 15,107.00 
Private-to-public Private employees/public employees 
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+ 3.32 1.64 1.22 9.14 
Migrants 
Migration from other provinces (number of individuals, 
in thousands) 
+ 206.16 294.16 29.93 1,506.10 
Poverty % of households below the indigence line - 8.87 6.15 0.40 29.80 
Non-
registered/registered 
Ratio of non-registered workers to registered workers +/- 0.81 0.31 0.16 1.51 
Idle capacity 
Rate of variation in employment in all formal 
manufacturing firms 
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
- 7.40 6.79 -15.75 31.96 
        
* Data refer to 3rd quarter of  every year, except for 2007 (4th quarter). 
 
Source: author 
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3. Input prices. Wages correspond to the average monthly wage of private registered 
workers in manufacturing, in nominal terms because official inflation rates in 
Argentina have not been reliable since 2007. We expect a negative sign for this 
variable, in line with what is typically found in developed countries (Santarelli et 
al., 2009; Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999; Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999).  
4. Industrial structure. The industrial structure of the province is approximated using 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, the share of micro firms, the share of small and 
medium firms and the number of exiting firms in the previous year.51 All these 
variables should impact positively on entry, except for the Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index, which measures lack of diversity. First, businesses are more likely to be 
started in a more diversified environment (Guesnier, 1994; Reynolds et al., 1994). 
Second, entry costs may be lower in areas with a dense network of small and 
medium-size firms, because these firms pay lower wages (thus reducing the 
opportunity cost of self-employment). Also, SMES may serve as role models for 
new entrepreneurs and help their workers to develop the skills required to create a 
new business (Audretsch, 1995b; Ashcroft et al., 1991). Third, exits in previous 
periods may leave room for newcomers (Arauzo-Carod and Segarra-Blasco, 2005; 
Sutaria and Hicks, 2004). Still, studies by Lay (2003) and Günalp and Cilasun 
(2006) on Taiwan and Turkey do not support this, which indicates that there is no 
displacement effect in the (largely) unsaturated markets of developing economies.  
5. Industrial tradition. We control for the previous industrial activities carried out in a 
province using the average number of incumbents 7, 6 and 5 years before (i.e. a 3-
year centered moving average). Following Rocha and Sternberg (2005), we expect 
past incumbents to boost current entrepreneurial activities. However, the high 
macroeconomic volatility of developing countries may mitigate this effect. 
Changes in the conditions that determine profitability (exchange rate, credit 
conditions, tax policy, etc.) and the lack of continuity in the industrial policies 
prevent the consolidation of national firms from which new entrepreneurs can 
emerge. 
 
Agglomeration. Density and its square have been widely used as proxies for 
agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, respectively (see e.g. Tamásy and Le 
Heron, 2008; Nyström, 2007a; Davidsson et al., 1994). Thus, a positive sign for the 
density coefficient and a negative sign for its square are the expected outcomes in our 
models. The number of incumbent firms is also included as an additional measure of 
the agglomeration of economic activity (and as such its impact on entry is expected to 
be positive). Lastly, we explored the existence of a core-periphery structure by 
including the products of a dummy that identifies the richest provinces (the Capital 
Federal city, Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires Province, Santa Fe and 
Córdoba) with the variables of density and incumbents. We expect these products to 
have a positive effect on entry (Krugman, 1991), since this unbalanced geographical 
                                                 
51 Firms are distributed by the EBDO in four size levels depending on total employment: micro, 
small, medium and big. These roughly correspond to the following intervals: micro: 1-5 
employees; small: 6-25; medium: 26-100; big: more than 100. However, these intervals vary by 
industry taking into account sectoral differences in average labour productivity (MTEYSS, 2005). 
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pattern means that entering firms in the core and the periphery face quite different 
conditions (e.g., access to markets, skilled workers and services to the firm). That is, 
positive agglomeration effects are expected to arise only in the “central” areas. 
 
Private-to-public sector. Cultural attitudes towards entrepreneurship may be captured 
by the ratio of private-to-public employees. In particular, we expect entries to be higher 
in jurisdictions with a higher private/public rate (Spilling, 1996).  
 
Migrants. As Tamásy and Le Heron (2008) and Lee et al. (2004) show, there are more 
entries in communities with higher inflows of migrants. We have consequently 
included among the regressors the number of individuals from other provinces.52  
  
Poverty. We proxy the extent of poverty with the percentage of households below the 
indigence line. This threshold is given by the capacity to afford a basic food basket, 
which is estimated to be about 38 USD per adult in 2003.  We expect this variable to 
show a negative coefficient in our models for two reasons. First, low income markets 
do not attract the entry of new firms. Second, the proportion of entrepreneurs who have 
access to resources for backing up their business decisions should be lower in low-
income areas (Casson, 1982; Hamilton and Harper, 1994). 
  
Informal economy. The instability and insecurity of informal jobs are factors that may 
push individuals to start their own business (Storey, 1994). Likewise, the informal 
sector may encourage entry by acting as a “stepping stone” (Bennet, 2010). That is, 
entrepreneurs may first enter the informal sector to “test the water” before deciding on 
whether or not to enter the formal sector. Lastly, informal suppliers can offer lower 
prices, thus making formal entries cheaper.  We use the ratio of non-registered workers 
to registered workers to incorporate this positive effect on entry. However, this variable 
may also reflect the productive structure (e.g. the seasonality and/or low productivity 
of certain activities may facilitate the growth of the informal sector) and/or the lack of 
government controls on the informal economy in certain provinces, and thus have a 
negative or non-significant effect on formal entry.  
 
Idle capacity. The idle capacity caused by the economic recession of 2001-2002 may 
have slowed new firm creation to the extent that the subsequent demand for new goods 
(from 2003) may have been satisfied by existing firms rather than by new firms. In this 
respect, Calá and Rotondo (2012) show that during the period of analysis provinces 
with higher (lower) industrial intensity had lower (higher) net entry rates. This suggests 
that the impact of idle capacity may have been more intense in more developed 
provinces. We seek to capture this effect by including the rate of variation in 
employment in all formal manufacturing firms and the product of this rate by a dummy 
for the five most developed provinces (see footnote 48).  
 
                                                 
52 Notice, however, that these studies refer to international migration. Our dataset contains 
information on the number of individuals coming from other countries. Unfortunately, the 
contents of this variable turned out to be flawed.   
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5.4. Econometric modelling and estimation of results 
Given the definition of our dependent variable (yearly number of entries in the 24 
Argentinean provinces considered), we rely on panel count data models to estimate the 
impact of entry determinants.53 Panel data models were preferred to cross-section 
estimates on the grounds of two empirical tests. First, likelihood ratio tests on the 
variance of the random effects always yielded statistically significant results, thus 
rejecting the validity of pooled estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Second, we 
computed the covariance matrix of the year vector of Pearson-residuals from the 
pooled Poisson regression model (see Hausman et al., 1984 for details). We found large 
values in the off-diagonal elements of the matrix in all the specifications, which 
supports the assumption of independence of the observations across the years studied 
and justifies the use of panel data models. 
It should be noted that there are no zeros in our dependent variable. That is, in each 
jurisdiction-year pair of our sample we have a strictly positive number of entries. This is 
why we concentrate on the estimation of Poisson and negative binomial models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). This contrasts with the typical outcome of studies of 
developed countries, which tends to be constructed from the inflated versions of these 
models to account for the “excess of zeros” (see e.g. Basile, 2004; List, 2001 and 
Manjón-Antolín and Arauzo-Carod, 2011). The size of our administrative units, much 
larger than the municipalities, counties and metropolitan areas studied in developed 
countries, lies behind this important difference.  
In particular, Table 5.3 shows the results from the Negative Binomial fixed effects 
model.54 Our choice is based on the results of a number of tests (see the bottom rows in 
Table 5.3). First, the Pearson goodness-of-fit test from a Poisson model with province 
dummy variables provides evidence of overdispersion in the data (Allison and 
Waterman, 2002).55 This means that the Poisson estimates are not efficient (and may 
even be inconsistent if the conditional expectation of the entry rate is not correctly 
specified, as shown by Hausman et al., 1984). Second, the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test 
rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between the covariates and the individual 
effect, which means that the random effects model yields inconsistent estimates. Lastly, 
negative binomial fixed effects estimates provide the best fit according to the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).   
 
                                                 
53 See e.g. Chappell et al. (1990); Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999); Barbosa et al. (2004); Barbosa (2007) 
and Fritsch and Falck (2007) for analogous applications in developed countries. Panel data 
methods not only allow to increase the number of observations, thus improving the efficiency of 
the estimates, but also to capture unobserved heterogeneity across provinces over time. Cross-
sectional studies are becoming less frequent in the analysis of entry, if any because panel datasets 
have become more available in recent years (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010).  
54 Coefficients’ estimates can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. We do not report marginal effects 
because of the difficulties in integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity in non-linear models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
55 Only the ratio between the individual effect and the overdispersion parameter is identified in the 
negative binomial model, which makes difficult to construct an equidispersion test (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998). 
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Table 5.3. Firm entry determinants. 
 
 [1] [2] [3] 
Employment variation 
0.0159*** 0.0159*** 0.0131** 
(0.0039) (0.0046) (0.0055) 
Unemployment rate 
0.0061 -0.0040 -0.0118 
(0.0087) (0.0092) (0.0113) 
Primary education 
-0.0008 -0.0002 0.0001 
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Secondary education 
0.0004 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
University education 
0.0011** 0.0004 0.0006 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Wages 
-0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HH index 
0.0101 0.0200** 0.0067 
(0.0074) (0.0084) (0.0108) 
SMEs 
0.0290*** 0.0350*** 0.0243* 
(0.0090) (0.0094) (0.0124) 
Exit ratet-1 
-0.0005*** -0.0003** -0.0003* 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Industrial tradition 
-0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0003*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Density 
4.6742*** 4.0241** 0.8770 
(1.6046) (1.6658) (1.6838) 
Density2 
-0.4610*** -0.4169*** -0.4074* 
(0.1736) (0.1466) (0.2204) 
Incumbents 
-0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0013*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) 
Private/public 
0.0036 -0.0151 -0.0110 
(0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0186) 
Migrants 
-0.0004 -0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Poverty 
 -0.0474*** -0.0566*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0134) 
Poverty2 
 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Non-registered/registered 
 1.8110*** 1.6745*** 
 (0.4911) (0.5898) 
Non-registered/registered2 
 -0.9865*** -0.8862*** 
 (0.2336) (0.3010) 
Idle capacity 
 -0.0114* -0.0152** 
 (0.0067) (0.0072) 
Idle capacity2 
 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Idle capacity x rich provinces dummy 
 0.0024 0.0359 
 (0.0231) (0.0248) 
Idle capacity2 x rich provinces dummy 
 0.0006 -0.0004 
 (0.0011) (0.0012) 
Density x rich provinces dummy 
  3.2532** 
  (1.5672) 
Incumbents x rich provinces dummy 
  0.0009** 
  (0.0004) 
AIC 978.61 973.34 977.54 
LR test of joint significance 170.81*** 245.36*** 217.21*** 
Hausman 25.78** 32.77*** 29.04*** 
Pearson’GoF test 182.39*** 131.18*** 117.23*** 
Observations: 144. Note: NB fixed effects estimates are reported. Standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate 
the statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Year dummy 
variables included in all the specifications.  
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Let us first consider results from the specification that contains variables which are 
widely used in studies on developed countries. These are reported in the first column of 
Table 5.3. The first thing to point out is that, as previously hypothesised, many of the 
determinants considered are not statistically significant. To be precise, our proxies for 
the labour market, education, input prices and cultural attitudes have practically no 
explanatory power. Only demand, agglomeration economies, and industrial structure 
and tradition show statistically significant coefficients. From these results we can 
conclude that entries follow the evolution of economic activity (i.e., they are 
procyclical) and are positively affected by the number of graduates, the share of SMEs 
and agglomeration economies (although the negative sign of the squared density and 
the number of incumbents point to the existence of disagglomeration effects). On the 
other hand, past incumbents and exits deter entry, which suggests that macroeconomic 
instability hampers the boosting effect of past incumbents on current firm formation 
and the rate of exit actually reflects negative expectations about the evolution of 
economic activity.  
We now go on to consider the results obtained when the covariates that are 
characteristic of developing countries are added: poverty, the informal economy and 
idle capacity. They are reported in the second column of Table 5.3. Interestingly, these 
additional variables and their squared terms are all statistically significant (except for 
the square of the idle capacity). Furthermore, the coefficient estimates and the 
statistical significance of the rest of the covariates remain essentially unaltered with 
respect to those reported in the first column of Table 5.3 (except the university 
education and the number of incumbents are not statistically significant and the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is). Therefore, this evidence is largely supportive of the 
arguments put forward in Section 5.2: while most of the determinants typically used in 
previous studies analysing developed countries are still relevant here, there is a need for 
additional explanatory variables that reflect the specificities of developing economies. 
In fact, our results show that including these variables improves the fit of the model in 
terms of AIC.  
In particular, the negative sign of the poverty variable is consistent with low-income 
people having less purchasing power and entrepreneurs having greater difficulty in 
finding appropriate resources in poor areas. Also, the positive effect of the squared term 
suggests that high levels of poverty spur the creation of (possibly small) firms. As for 
the impact of the informal economy, it seems that it is “too much of a good thing”. A 
small informal economy encourages entry, but it becomes a barrier when it grows too 
much. Lastly, the negative sign of idle capacity suggests that it is existing firms (which 
increase their number of employees) rather than new firms that satisfy a good deal of 
the demand for new goods. 
Our final specification seeks to analyse the impact of a core-periphery pattern in the 
agglomeration economies (see the last column in Table 5.3). Descriptive statistics show 
that there are huge differences in terms of the location of population and firms between 
“central” areas and “peripheral” areas (i.e., between the five richest provinces and the 
rest). Our estimates indicate that these differences have an impact on entry. In fact, the 
positive sign of the products of the dummy of the richest provinces and the density and 
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incumbent variables indicates that firms entering these provinces may have access to 
better resources and business opportunities. Notice also that including these differential 
effects of the agglomeration economies has practically no effect on the estimates of the 
other covariates. 
To conclude, it is worth noting that the previous conclusions are largely robust to 
alternative model specifications. Although some of the coefficients had different values 
and/or statistical significance with respect to those reported in Table 5.3, most of the 
previous results remain unaffected (these are available upon request) but the fit was 
generally worse. In particular, we explored the robustness of our conclusions to the use 
of alternative model specifications (random effects and fixed effects Poisson, as well as 
negative binomial with province dummies) and a different set of proxies (for the 
demand for goods, the agglomeration economies and the extent of poverty). Below we 
briefly discuss the results of these robustness exercises56.  
First, alternative model specifications provided essentially the same signs and statistical 
evidence. The main changes were the negative and statistically significant sign of 
secondary education and the lack of significance of the product of density and the 
dummy of the richest provinces. Second, including the rate of variation in 
unemployment instead of the rate of variation in employment in all formal firms as a 
proxy for the evolution of the economic activity barely changes the results. However, 
this variable showed a negative but not statistically significant coefficient (in the 
negative binomial fixed effects specification). Third, we looked into including the ratio 
between the population in the main urban areas of the province (aglomerados) and the 
total population of the province instead of the density of the province and its square. 
Since our units of observation are extremely large (see footnote 40), this agglomeration 
measure may better reflect the uneven distribution of firms and individuals within large 
provinces (with large stretches of available land with no industrial activity) and the 
concentration of services in urban areas (Puga, 1998; Henderson, 2000). Estimates 
showed that this variable often had a negative impact on entry, thus indicating that 
jurisdictions with a bigger urban ratio are less attractive than jurisdictions with a 
smaller urban ratio. However, we faced severe converge problems in many of the 
specifications considered. Lastly, we explored the use of a variable constructed with a 
different threshold to proxy for the extent of poverty (83 USD rather than 38 USD, 
which corresponds to the value of the total basic basket per adult in 2003 and includes 
the basic food basket plus the value of basic household expenditures such as housing, 
dressing, transportation and education). Again, estimates remained essentially 
unaltered. However, the square of this alternative variable was not statistically 
significant.  
                                                 
56 We also computed the cross-sectional correlation between the explanatory variables and found 
that it was generally low, except for density and its square, idle capacity and its square, and exit 
and the industrial tradition, which showed values above 0.9. However, it is hard to asses the 
potential impacts of these correlations in nonlinear models. Our results from the robustness 
exercises suggest that in our case this collinearity should not be a major concern.  
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5.5. Conclusions 
This chapter analyses the regional determinants of firm entry in a developing economy. 
This is a novelty in the context of an empirical literature that largely focuses on 
evidence from Europe, North America or Japan. In particular, we provide estimates 
from panel count data models using annual provincial data on new manufacturing 
firms with employees registered in the Argentinean Social Security files during the 
period 2003 to 2008. This is the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term 
and spatially disaggregated data source currently available for firm demography studies 
in Argentina.   
We compare the results obtained using a well-established list of economic and 
demographic characteristics that explains entry decisions of new firms in the developed 
economies with those obtained by adding variables that proxy for the specificities of 
developing countries. We find that most of the determinants used in previous studies 
analysing developed countries remain relevant when we add variables proxying for the 
extent of poverty, the size of the informal economy and the existence of idle capacity. 
Furthermore, we find that the entry process shows significant differences in the richest 
provinces. In particular, we find evidence of centre-periphery differences in the impact 
of agglomeration economies but not in idle capacity.  
In terms of policy implications, our results stress the risk of rubber-stamp policies that 
simply follow recipes that work well in developed countries. In other words, policy 
makers should take into account country specificities when designing entry-promoting 
policies in developing economies. In the Argentinean case, for example, the negative 
effect that poverty has on entries is unlikely to be reversed by policies simply aiming at 
promoting new business creation, for reducing the rate of poverty probably requires a 
long-term policy of investment in human capital.  
Any further extension of this study will be mainly driven by the limitations of our data 
set and empirical strategy. First, a more disaggregated unit of observation should be 
used. Given the lack of data on smaller geographical units (municipalities, counties 
and/or metropolitan areas), exploring a sectorial breakdown will not only reduce the 
degree of heterogeneity but also incorporate industry-specific variables. Second, the 
uneven distribution of the economic activity across the country should be dealt with. 
We have used dummies to control for the huge concentration around the capital and 
the surrounding regions, which is typical of a developing country. However, this 
phenomenon may require a more sophisticated approach.  
We conclude by noting that the data used to analyse firm entry in developed and 
developing countries differs considerably. In particular, there are differences in the 
reliability (e.g. data is based on estimates rather on measures), representativeness (e.g. 
data is provided only for small, core areas of each administrative unit) and spatial 
aggregation (e.g. data is only available for large and heterogeneous areas). Addressing 
these shortcomings is critical if solid and comparative evidence is to be provided on the 
determinants of firm entry in developing countries. Thus, we leave for future research 
the question of whether the reported results from Argentina hold for other developing 
countries. 
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6.1. Introduction 
The new economic geography (Krugman, 1991; Venables, 2005) and the endogenous 
growth theories (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) have both stressed the role of the spatial 
distribution of the economic activity in increasing development opportunities. In this 
respect, the empirical evidence shows that firms’ dynamics may enhance regional job 
growth (Ghani et al., 2011), increase the commercialization of innovations (Audretsch 
et al., 2006), accelerate structural change (Gries and Naudé, 2010), and contribute to 
the discovery of the competitive advantages of a nation (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). 
It is therefore important to understand what determines the entry and exit of firms in 
the developing countries.  
A number of previous studies have addressed these issues. However, most of them have 
focused on the entry process. This is the case of Lay (2003) and Wang (2006) for 
Taiwan, and Günalp and Cilasun (2006) and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey, all 
them analysing industry level data. Also, within the regional science literature we can 
mention the studies of Naudé et al. (2008) for South Africa and Santarelli and Tran 
(2012) for Vietnam. As for the studies concerned with the aggregate determinants of 
exit, to our knowledge these only include the aforementioned of Lay (2003) for Taiwan 
and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey.57 This means that to date there are no 
empirical studies on the determinants of regional firm exit in developing countries. This 
study aims to fill this gap by analysing the determinants of the (annual) number of exits 
in the Argentinean provinces between 2003 and 2008.58 
                                                 
57 There is also a number of studies using firm level data, such as e.g. Frazer (2005) for Ghana, 
Eslava et al. (2006) for Colombia, and López (2006), Alvarez and Görg (2009) and Alvarez and 
Vergara (2010; 2013) for Chile.  
58 Previous studies of firm exit on Argentina are merely descriptive (Bartelsman et al., 2004; 
MTEySS, 2007; Katz and Bernat, 2011; Calá and Rotondo, 2012). Among them, Calá and 
Rotondo (2012) is the only one following a regional perspective. 
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Of the developing countries, Argentina has a number of features that are worth noting. 
First, it is a country with important regional differences in terms of wages, labour skills, 
growth rates and natural resources. Ultimately, regional development levels differ 
considerably across the country. Second, firms and people are highly concentrated 
around the main cities, particularly the capital. Third, Argentina covers a vast territory 
that is organised in large administrative units. Interestingly, many other developing 
countries (e.g. South Africa, Brazil, Russia, Mexico and Vietnam) share these features 
to some extent. This means that although it may not be possible to generalise our 
results to all developing countries, they are likely to hold for a number of them.   
Our main finding is that the spatial distribution of exits exhibits a core-periphery 
structure that is mostly driven by the effects of entrants, incumbents and the informal 
economy. First, the so-called revolving door effect (Audretsch, 1995a) by which past 
entrants push firms out of the markets, is less intense in the central regions. Second, 
peripheral regions with a strong industrial structure (proxied by the number of past 
incumbents) and/or economic activity (proxied by the number of current incumbents) 
suffer fewer exits than their counterparts in the central regions. Third, the informal 
economy has a non-linear impact on exit. The effect is initially negative, i.e., there are 
fewer exits the larger the informal economy is. However, it becomes positive when the 
size of the informal economy grows. Then the informal economy increases the number 
of exits, and the more so in the peripheral regions. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the relevant 
literature. It also discusses our model specification. Section 6.3 describes the data set. 
Section 6.4 discusses the econometric models and the main results. Section 6.5 
concludes.  
 
6.2. Literature review 
6.2.1. Firm exit in developed countries 
The industrial organization approach to the analysis of firm exit stems from the fact 
that exits occur when the (expected) profit falls below some threshold (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985; Klepper, 1996; Das and Das, 1996). Thus, we expect 
that differences in exit rates among industries are closely related to differences in the 
proportion of firms with losses. Also, the higher the rate of industry growth, the lower 
will be the number of exits, since more firms are expected to cover their costs and 
realize profits. Lastly, the exit threshold depends on the extent of exit barriers so that 
exit rates are negatively related to the ratio of sunk to variable costs (Caves and Porter, 
1976; Mac Donald, 1986; Frank, 1988). 
In the regional science literature, however, the emphasis lies on the characteristics of 
the region where the firm is located (Baldwin et al., 2000).59 In particular, the significant 
                                                 
59 We use the terms “region” and “area” to refer to any geographical unit within a country. They 
are therefore not necessarily linked to administrative units (e.g., regions, provinces, etc.). 
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variations in the regional exit patterns are mainly explained by differences in the 
regional labour markets, the regional industrial composition, and the spatial 
concentration of economic activities and individuals. As for the differences in the 
labour market, the literature has concentrated on the effects of unemployment. On the 
one hand, an increase in unemployment may have a negative impact on exit because 
self-employed individuals face fewer job opportunities and are thus less prone to exit 
(Carree and Thurik, 1996; Lin et al., 2001; Nyström, 2007a, 2007b; Carree et al., 2008; 
Santarelli et al., 2009). On the other hand, the unemployment is a proxy for the level of 
activity of the economy and an increase in unemployment may thus result in an 
increase in the number of exits (Buzzelli, 2005; Brixy and Grotz, 2007; Fertala, 2008). 
As for the differences in the industrial composition, the lower the complexity and 
diversity of the local industrial structure, the lower the ability to reallocate resources to 
new activities when a negative shock occurs (Kosacoff and Ramos, 1999). Thus, exit is 
more likely in less diversified environments. Lastly, since firms need to be close to 
other firms and workers to benefit from agglomeration economies and market-oriented 
firms benefit from the physical proximity to consumers, non-concentrated areas will 
tend to have more exits (Keeble and Walker, 1994; Littunen et al., 1998). However, 
disagglomeration economies may increase the production costs and lead to further exit. 
This is because a higher density pushes up input prices by increasing competition for 
the scare resources (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Huisman and van Wissen, 2004; Fritsch 
et al., 2006).60 
 At the aggregate level, exits have been shown to increase during downturns (Audretsch 
and Mahmood, 1995; see, however, Boeri and Bellman, 1995). In particular, the level 
of regional demand may be relevant for services and local-market driven manufacturing 
activities. Also, we expect low real interest rates to discourage firm exit (Kendall et al., 
2010). These effects are particularly important for small firms, which are generally 
more likely to exit due to cost disadvantages that make them less able to compete 
efficiently and survive (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998; Esteve et al., 2004; Box, 2008; 
Carreira and Teixeira, 2011). Thus, the liability of smallness implies that exits should be 
higher in regions with a large proportion of small firms. This is closely related to the 
revolving door phenomenon by which many firms exit only a few years after creation 
(Audretsch, 1995b). The displacement effect of the new entrants has been empirically 
documented in developed countries both at the industry and regional levels (Arauzo-
Carod et al., 2007; Manjón-Antolín, 2010).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
However, most of the studies considered in this section use NUTS-II levels (i.e., regional level) 
and only a few smaller units (e.g., counties, as in the case of Love, 1996). 
60  Exits may be higher in densely populated areas ―see e.g. Buss and Lin (1990), Forsyth (2005) 
and Huiban (2011) for empirical evidence. The reasons for this are several. First, competition in 
both goods and factors markets can be higher (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Bresnahan and Reiss, 
1991). Second, the chances of finding a job, finding an entrepreneurial opportunity and/or selling 
the firms’ assets to another venture can also be higher (Huiban, 2011). Third, as discussed below, 
since large urban areas attract more entry, the higher share of young firms may lead to higher 
exits. 
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6.2.2. Firm exit in developing countries 
We have just shown that there is an extensive empirical literature on regional firm exit. 
In contrast, the evidence from developing countries is scarce. We can mention the 
works of Lay (2003) and Ozturk and Kilic (2012), who analyse the determinants of 
sectorial exit in Taiwan and Turkey, respectively, and the works of Frazer (2005), 
Eslava et al., (2006), López (2006), Alvarez and Görg (2009) and Alvarez and Vergara 
(2010; 2013), who seek to explain firm exit using size, age and productivity as the main 
covariates. To our knowledge, this is the first work on the determinants of regional firm 
exit.   
In particular, we consider a set of determinants that are meant to replicate those 
typically used in studies on developed economies (e.g., agglomeration economies). 
However, we also acknowledge that there are factors that, while potentially important 
in developing countries, are generally not considered by studies on developed countries 
(e.g., the informal economy). This specification is rather ad-hoc, but it is important to 
stress that there is no well-established theory that provides guidelines on what are the 
determinants of exit in a developing country and on whether their expected effects are 
(dis)similar to the expected effects in a developed country. With this in mind, we argue 
that macroeconomic and financial factors can have a different impact on exit in 
developing and developed countries, whereas structural factors can have a different 
impact within the regions of a developing country (centre vs. peripheral regions). 
First, developing economies are generally characterised by macroeconomic instability 
and intense cyclical variations (Stiglitz, 1998; Ocampo et al., 2009; Bértola and 
Ocampo, 2012), so that we can expect higher vulnerability to external (and internal) 
shocks. This means that after each crisis a great number of firms enter the growing 
markets, of which an important share will exit in the following years (more the sooner 
the declines starts), thus producing a “revolving door” phenomenon that can be more 
intense than the one typically observed in developed countries. In addition, the fact that 
the economic cycles are more pronounced in developing countries strengths the 
anticyclicality of exits. We can also expect that, because of the worse credit conditions 
in developing countries, high real interest rates will discourage firm exit less than in 
developed countries (Kendall et al., 2010). Lastly, developing countries show marked 
differences in critical economic indicators among their regions, to the extent that some 
regions can have levels of capitalization, technology, productivity, organization and 
human capital requirements similar to their counterparts in advanced countries 
(Sunkel, 1978). A direct implication of this structural heterogeneity (Cassiolato et al., 
2009) is that firm exit determinants may differ across the regions of a country.61  
 
                                                 
61 This structural heterogeneity has accentuated in recent years: while there are now many more 
“world-class” firms in developing countries, there is also a growing proportion of employment 
concentrated in low-productivity informal-sector activities (ECLAC, 2002).  
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6.3. The data 
6.3.1. Exit 
Exit data comes from the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory (EBDO) 
of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Argentina. More specifically, the 
database includes information about the number of entries, exits and incumbents based 
on all manufacturing (formal and private) firms with at least one employee registered 
with the Social Security. This means that our data set does not contain information on 
either public or informal employment. Moreover, the EBDO handles changes in firm 
codes that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In general, a firm is considered 
closed when it does not declare employees in the last 12 months. However, spurious 
exits caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s workforce from firms that “exit” 
to become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the database. Lastly, we 
restrict the analysis to firms that declare that the major part of their workforce is located 
in the assigned jurisdiction. This means that branch offices or subsidiaries located in 
other jurisdictions are excluded from our data set. All in all, this is the most up-to-date, 
comprehensive, reasonably long-term and spatially disaggregated data source currently 
available for firm demography studies in Argentina.   
Data is available for the 23 Argentinean provinces and the Capital Federal city. These 
are our units of observation. However, the Buenos Aires Province is actually divided 
into Gran Buenos Aires and the rest of the province. Also, we dropped the province of 
Río Negro because of missing data in most of the explanatory variables we considered. 
This is why although there are 25 jurisdictions in the database, we ultimately provide 
results from only 24. Thus, our dependent variables are the number of annual exits in 
each jurisdiction during the period 2003 to 2008. We start our analysis in 2003 to avoid 
the structural break caused by the economic and political crisis of the end of 2001 that 
led to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in January 2002. Including these years 
of turmoil would completely distort results. We finish our analysis in 2008 because this 
was the last available year in the EBDO dataset when this investigation was initiated. 
Table 6.1 shows the evolution of entries, exits and incumbents over the period of 
analysis. 
 
Table 6.1. Number of entries, exits and incumbents in Argentina (2003 – 2008) 
Year Entry Exit Incumbents 
2003 4,986 2,330 42,754 
2004 5,994 2,326 45,234 
2005 5,486 2,929 48,317 
2006 6,264 3,623 49,987 
2007 5,886 4,358 51,796 
2008 5,389 5,103 52,417 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
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Exits followed an increasing path after the first two years of stability (2003-2004). 
According to the MTEySS (2007), this was largely driven by the new ventures after the 
deep economic recession of 2000-2001 (deferred projects along with strictly new 
ventures encouraged by better macroeconomic conditions). Thus, while entries in 2003-
2005 doubled the entries in 2000-2002, exits increased at an average rate of 20% since 
2005. Additionally, the slowdown in the net entry in 2008 is explained by the 
international financial crisis, the gradual appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
some internal conflicts (Katz and Bernat, 2011).  
Figure 6.1 shows that the spatial distribution of these exits is not homogeneous, since 
most concentrate on the richest five regions. Namely, the Capital Federal city and the 
provinces of Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires province, Santa Fe and 
Córdoba. More precisely, these regions roughly cover 22% of the surface of the country 
but concentrate about 80% of the workers, incumbent firms and exiting firms.  
The existence of a different pattern of exit in the central and peripheral regions is 
emphasized in Figure 6.2, where we plot the evolution of the number of exits in both 
sets of provinces. Notice that not only the levels of the variable differ, but also the slope 
of the curve. Exits follow an increasing path in both sets of provinces, but at a higher 
rate in the richest provinces. The combined result is that the number of exits in 
Argentina practically doubled during the period of analysis. Also, since the increase in 
the number of entries was smaller, the population of firms shrank (see Table 6.1). 
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Figure 6.1. Number of exits by province (2003-2008 mean) 
 
Source: author from EBDO data. “GBA” stands for Gran Buenos Aires and “Bs As Rest” for the 
rest of the Buenos Aires province. 
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Figure 6.2. Number of exits in central and peripheral regions (2003-2008) 
 
Source: author from EBDO data. Central regions include: Capital Federal city, 
Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of the Buenos Aires province, Córdoba and Santa Fe. 
Peripheral regions include: Catamarca, Chaco, Chubut, Corrientes, Entre Ríos, 
Formosa, Jujuy, La Pampa, La Rioja, Mendoza, Misiones, Neuquén, Río Negro, 
Salta, San Juan San Luis, Santa Cruz, Santiago del Estero, Tierra del Fuego and 
Tucumán. 
 
6.3.1. Explanatory variables  
We used data from the EBDO and the National Household Survey (NHS) to construct 
our vector of explanatory variables (the size of the provinces in km2 comes from the 
Military Geographical Institute). The distinction is important because the information 
contained in the EBDO database refers to the whole province, while the NHS is 
performed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) on samples of 
families in 31 urban areas (aglomerados). Nevertheless, we were obliged to use the NHS 
data because there is no statistical source providing yearly information on demographic 
and/or socioeconomic characteristics of the Argentinean provinces (population 
censuses, for example, are performed every 10 years). 
In particular, we were able to construct variables related to the evolution of economic 
activity, the labour market, the industrial structure, the existence of agglomeration 
economies and the number of entries. As discussed in the previous section, these are 
factors widely used in developed countries studies. We have also included among the 
covariates a measure of the informal economy, which is a structural singularity of the 
developing countries (Schneider, 2005), and the square of this variable to account for 
non-linear effects. Lastly, we have explored the existence of core-periphery differences 
by including the products of a dummy that identifies the richest provinces (the Capital 
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Federal city, Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires province, Santa Fe and 
Córdoba) with all the regional determinants previously mentioned.62  
Table 6.2 reports the definition, statistical sources and descriptive statistics of the 
explanatory variables used in this study. In addition, we have included a column with 
the expected sign of the associated coefficient. Next we briefly review the arguments 
and evidence supporting these expected signs.  
Business cycle. We use the rate of variation of the employment in all formal firms 
(alternatively, the rate of variation of the unemployment) to proxy for the evolution of 
the economic activity. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative 
(positive for the rate of variation of the unemployment), thus reflecting the 
procyclicality of exits.  
 
Labour. We use wages and the unemployment rate to assess the labour market impact 
on firm exit. Wages correspond to the average monthly wage of private registered 
workers, in nominal terms because official inflation rates in Argentina are not reliable 
since 2007. We expect a positive sign for this variable. As for the unemployment rate, 
we cannot say, a priori, what will be its impact on exit.  
 
Industrial structure. The industrial structure of the province is approximated using the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, which measures lack of diversity. We expect this variable 
to impact positively on exit, since firms located in less diversified environments are 
more vulnerable to external shocks. We also control for the previous industrial 
activities carried out in a province using the average number of incumbents 7, 6 and 5 
years before (i.e. a 3-year centered moving average). We expect that past incumbents 
have developed a favourable business environment and supporting institutions that 
hamper the exit. However, changes in the conditions that determine profitability (the 
high macroeconomic volatility of developing countries affects the exchange rate, credit 
conditions, tax policy, etc.) and the lack of continuity in the industrial policies can 
mitigate this effect. 
 
Spatial concentration. We have included population density and its square, which have 
been widely used as proxies for agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, 
respectively. Both positive and negative signs are possible for the density coefficient, 
while a positive sign is expected for its squared. We have also included the number of 
incumbent firms as an additional measure of the agglomeration of economic activity. 
                                                 
62 Year dummy variables were also included to control for macroeconomic factors. These were 
preferred to macroeconomic variables such as e.g. the GDP growth because of the measurement 
problems involved in these aggregates. The GDP growth in local currency is inaccurate because 
official inflation figures are not reliable since 2007 and the GDP growth in U.S. dollars is 
similarly misleading because of the severe devaluation of the Argentinean peso in 2002 (more 
than 200%) and the consequent gradual appreciation. Notice also that we have not included 
measures of credit access in our set of explanatory variables. Actually, we explored the use of the 
amount of loans granted i) to manufacturing, ii) per firm and iii) per employee. However, these 
variables were statistically non-significant and results did not differ substantially from the ones 
reported in Table 6.3. We consequently decided not to include these variables in our final 
specifications. 
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Entry rates. We use the (lagged) number of entries to account for the interdependence 
between entries and exits. We expect this variable to show a positive coefficient.  
 
Informal economy. We use the ratio of non-registered workers to registered workers as 
a proxy for the regional productive structure (e.g. the seasonality and/or low 
productivity of certain activities may facilitate the growth of the informal sector) 
and/or the lack of government controls over informal economy. The impact of this 
variable on exit is ambiguous. A positive sign may arise if formal firms compete for the 
same resources than informal firms and/or formal firms become informal when facing 
difficulties. However, a negative sign is expected if formal firms buy inputs to the 
informal sector, thus lowering costs and/or increasing flexibility.  
 
Table 6.2. Explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Source Expected 
sign 
Mean St. 
Dev. 
Min. Max 
Employment 
variation 
Rate of variation in 
employment in all 
formal firms Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
- 
9.22 5.20 -6.97 22.75 
Wages 
Average monthly 
wage of private 
registered workers in 
manufacturing 
+ 
1,891.40 864.87 676.17 5,414.11 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment rate  
Own 
calculations  
from NHS* 
+/- 
8.19 3.81 1.01 18.20 
Entryt-2 
Number of entries in 
the previous year (2 
lags) 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
+ 
190.85 342.43 3.00 1,609.00 
Entryt-1 
Number of entries in 
the previous year  (1 
lag) 
+ 
212.04 368.99 3.00 1,609.00 
HH Index 
Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index 
+ 
24.36 12.00 8.06 62.90 
Industrial 
Tradition 
Incumbent firms 7 
years ago (3-years 
moving average) 
- 
1,916.31 3,396.97 91.00 14,550.00 
Density 
ln(Population/Area)  
(in thousands) 
Own 
calculations 
from  
Military 
Geographical 
Institute and 
INDEC 
+/- 
2.63 2.06 -0.18 9.53 
Density2 Density2 + 
11.14 20.38 0.01 90.78 
Incumbents 
Number of incumbent 
firms in the current 
year 
Own 
calculations 
from EBDO 
+ 
1,999.11 3,472.29 88.00 15,107.00 
Informal 
Economy 
Non registered 
workers over 
registered workers 
Own 
calculations  
from NHS* 
+/- 
0.81 0.31 0.16 1.51 
        
* Data refer to 3rd quarter of every year, except for 2007 (4th quarter). 
 
Source: author 
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6.4. Econometric modelling and estimation results 
Given the definition of our dependent variable, we rely on panel count data models to 
estimate the impact of exit determinants (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Ilmakunnas and 
Topi, 1999). Panel data models were preferred to cross-section estimates on the 
grounds of two empirical tests. First, likelihood ratio tests on the variance of the 
individual effects always yield statistically significant results, thus rejecting the validity 
of pooled estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Second, we tested the assumption 
that observations are indeed independent across the considered years by computing the 
covariance matrix of the year vector of Pearson-residuals from the pooled Poisson 
regression model (see Hausman et al., 1984 for details). We found large values in the off 
diagonal elements of the matrix in all the specifications, which supports the 
independence assumption that sustains panel data models.  
It is also interesting to note that there are no zeros in the dependent variable. That is, in 
each jurisdiction-year pair of our sample we have a strictly positive number of exits. 
This is why we concentrate on the estimation of Poisson and Negative Binomial 
models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). In particular, in Table 6.3 we report results from 
the Poisson fixed effects model.63  Our choice is based on the results from a number of 
tests (see the bottom rows of Table 6.3). First, the ratio of the Pearson goodness-of-fit 
statistic to the degrees of freedom of a Poisson model with province dummy variables is 
close to one. As Allison and Waterman (2002) argue, this indicates that there is no 
overdispersion in the data. Second, the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between the covariates and the individual effect, which 
means that the random effects model yields inconsistent estimates. Lastly, Poisson 
fixed effects estimates provide the best fit according to the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC).   
Let us first consider results from the specification that contains variables which are 
widely used in studies on developed countries. These are reported in the first column of 
Table 6.3. What is most striking about these estimates is its lack of statistical 
significance. In particular, only the level of wages and the measure of disagglomeration 
economies show statistically significant coefficients. Also, these findings hold when we 
include our proxy for the informal economy. These results are reported in the second 
column of Table 6.3. The fit of the model is now better and our measure of the 
informal economy and its square are both statistically significant. However, the rest of 
the coefficients and their significance remain practically unaltered. 
We now go on to consider the results obtained when the cross-products of the regional 
variables are included. These results are reported in the third (without including the 
cross-products with the informal economy measures) and fourth (including these cross-
products) column of Table 6.3. The first thing to point out is that, compared to our 
previous specifications, a number of variables are now statistically significant. Namely, 
the rate of unemployment, the number of lagged entries, the density measure, the 
                                                 
63 Coefficients estimates in Table 6.3 can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. We do not report 
marginal effects because of the difficulties in integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity in non-
linear models (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
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industrial tradition and the number of incumbents. In particular, the negative impact of 
the rate of unemployment can be due to the lower cost of the workforce (not that so in 
the central provinces) and/or reflect the small chances of finding a job by entrepreneurs 
closing down their business (whereas the positive impact in the central provinces may 
reflect that these chances are higher, as pointed out in footnote 60). Also, the negative 
and positive coefficient of the density and its square is consistent with the existence of 
(dis)agglomeration economies. On the other hand, wages are no longer significant. The 
fit of the model, however, improves. 
Moreover, the cross-products terms reveal that the spatial distribution of exits exhibits a 
core-periphery structure whose main explanatory factors are the number of lagged 
entrants, the number of past and current incumbents, and the size of the informal 
economy (the unemployment rate and the HH index only matter when the informal 
economy is not considered). In particular, rich provinces seem to be more able to retain 
firms that are expelled from the markets by the new entrants. In other words, the so-
called “revolving door effect” is more intense in the other provinces. Also, there are 
fewer exits in provinces that have a stronger industrial tradition (proxied by the number 
of past incumbents) and more economic activity (proxied by the number of current 
incumbents). Further, these effects are particularly strong in the less rich provinces. 
Lastly, the existence of a small informal economy in the province prevents exit. This 
may be related to the lower costs and/or higher flexibility that are inherent to the 
informal hiring. However, the informal economy hasten the exit when it grows beyond 
a certain level, whereby it starts competing for resources also exploited by formal firms.  
We conclude by noting that our results are robust to alternative specifications of the 
model. In particular, we dropped the number of two-years lagged entries (i.e., we 
estimated the model including only the entries lagged one year), replaced the rate of 
variation of the employment in all formal firms by the variation of the unemployment 
rate, and/or density and its square by the ratio between the population in the main 
urban areas of the province (aglomerados) and the total population of the province. 
Estimates from these alternative specifications (available upon request) show that 
despite some of the coefficients vary its value and/or statistical significance with 
respect to those reported in Table 6.3, most of the conclusions still hold.  
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Table 6.3. Determinants of firm exit 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Employment variation 
-0.0073 -0.0053 -0.0081 -0.0073 
(0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
Wages 
0.0002*** 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0080 -0.0058 -0.0310** -0.0279* 
(0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0150) (0.0152) 
Entry t-2 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0028** 0.0028** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Entry t-1 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0039*** 0.0039*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
HH Index 
-0.0002 0.0049 -0.0084 -0.0047 
(0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0154) (0.0155) 
Industrial Tradition 
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0015* -0.0018** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Density 
-3.9590 -3.5190 -5.7524* -7.2910** 
(2.4706) (2.4777) (3.4532) (3.5629) 
Density2 
0.5278** 0.6170*** 1.4321*** 1.6811*** 
(0.2106) (0.2131) (0.4572) (0.4758) 
Incumbents 
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0043*** -0.0046*** 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Informal Economy 
  -1.1788** -1.0399** -1.6164** 
  (0.4645) (0.5104) (0.7036) 
Informal Economy2 
  0.6774*** 0.8469*** 1.1888*** 
  (0.2381) (0.2545) (0.3304) 
Employment variation × 
Centre 
    0.0062 0.0030 
    (0.0122) (0.0124) 
Wages × Centre 
    0.0002 0.0001 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Unemployment rate × Centre 
    0.0315* 0.0230 
    (0.0189) (0.0194) 
Entry t-2 × Centre 
    -0.0026** -0.0035*** 
    (0.0012) (0.0013) 
Entry t-1 × Centre 
    -0.0035*** -0.0026** 
    (0.0013) (0.0012) 
HH Index × Centre 
    -0.0948** -0.0283 
    (0.0456) (0.0613) 
Industrial Tradition × Centre 
    0.0015* 0.0017** 
    (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Density × Centre 
    -4.8424 0.9861 
    (10.1453) (10.5126) 
Density2 × Centre 
    -0.1779 -0.8311 
    (0.7013) (0.7696) 
Incumbents × Centre 
    0.0039*** 0.0041*** 
    (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Informal Economy × Centre 
      1.5760 
      (1.0540) 
Informal Economy2 × Centre 
      -1.1534* 
      (0.5886) 
          
AIC 773.06 768.69 767.27 766.95 
LR Test of Joint Significance 1797.82*** 1805.78*** 1827.64*** 1829.63*** 
Hausman 16.24* 36.99*** 51.22*** 42.01*** 
Pearson’GoF Test 108.19 99.87 78.47 74.35 
Observations: 144. Note: Poisson Fixed Effects estimates are reported. Standard errors in 
brackets. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** 
p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Year dummy variables are included in all the specifications.  
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6.5. Conclusions  
There is an extensive empirical literature on firm exit. However, little is known about 
the determinants of firm exit in developing countries. This study aims to fill this gap in 
the literature by analysing the impact of regional factors on the yearly number of exits 
in the Argentinean provinces using panel count data models. We find that while past 
entrants increase current exits mostly in the peripheral regions, current and past 
incumbents cause an analogous displacement effect but mostly in the central regions. 
We also find that there is a U-shaped relationship between exits and the informal 
economy, particularly in the peripheral regions. 
In general, these findings can be useful for policy makers seeking to avoid the exit of 
firms in certain areas. But they can also be helpful in the implementation and 
evaluation of related policies. To illustrate, entry promoting policies can be used as an 
instrument to boost economic activity in the more depressed areas. However, our 
results indicate that such policies may ultimately cause more exits. This negative side 
effect should thus be taken into account when assessing the welfare implications of 
these policies. Also, one may be concerned that the informal economy hampers the 
economic development of the (lagged) regions. However, our results indicate that, with 
regard to the exits, only when the size of the informal economy is substantial are these 
concerns justified. Moderate levels of informality, on the other hand, should not be a 
major concern.  
As for the future extensions of this work, we can name at least two. First, we will 
explore the use a more disaggregated unit of observation. Given the lack of reliable 
data on smaller geographical units (municipalities, counties and/or metropolitan 
areas), using a sectorial breakdown will not only allow us to incorporate industry-
specific variables but to reduce the degree of heterogeneity in the regional units. We 
will also explore the differences between exit rates of firms of different size. This can be 
seen as a way to incorporate one of the main firm-level factors that determines exit.  
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Chapter 7 
Regional and Sectorial Determinants 
Of  Firm Entry And Exit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
There is an extensive literature on the regional determinants of entry and exit of 
manufacturing firms64. This interest is explained not only by the direct impact that new 
firms have in terms of employment and production, but also by their indirect effects on 
market efficiency, firms´ productivity, innovation and, ultimately, economic growth 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005). However, this research ignores the fact that the 
regional determinants of new firm formation vary among manufacturing industries. 
Thus, following the seminal work of Audretsch and Fritsch (1999), a number of studies 
have taken into account both regional and sectorial dimensions to adequately assess the 
impact of regional characteristics on firm dynamics65. These studies confirm that 
regional factors determining new firm formation do differ between manufacturing 
industries (Carree et al., 2011), and that certain regional conditions may stimulate new 
firm formation in some industries but deter start-ups in others. As a result, certain 
policy instruments may encourage start-ups but not necessarily in the types of 
industries desired by policy makers (Audretsch and Fritsch, 1999). 
Remarkably, studies on the regional and sectorial determinants of firm entry and exit 
are limited to developed countries. This contrasts with the relevance of developing 
countries for the worldwide economy (Wilson and Purushothaman, 2006). More 
precisely, developing countries’ studies either focus on industry (Lay, 2003; Wang, 
2006; Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Ozturk and Kilic, 2012) or in regional (Naudé et al., 
2008; Santarelli and Tran, 2012; Calá et al., 2014a; 2014b) determinants. Thus, this 
                                                 
64 As far as we know, it includes Audretsch and Fritsch (1994) in Germany; Armington and Acs 
(2002), Reynolds (1994) and Sutaria and Hicks (2004) in the U.S.; Berglund and Brännäs (2001) 
and Davidsson et al. (1994) in Sweden; Carree et al. (2008), Garofoli (1994) and Santarelli et al. 
(2009) in Italy; Fotopoulos and Spence (1999) in Greece, Keeble and Walker (1994) in the UK; 
Hart and Gudgin (1994) in Ireland; Spilling (1996) in Norway; Tamásy and Le Heron (2008) in 
New Zealand and Reynolds et al. (1994) in several European countries. 
65 These studies are Arauzo-Carod et al. (2007) for Spain; Carree et al. (2011) for Italy; Fotopoulos 
and Spence (1998) for Greece; Fritsch and Falck (2007) for Germany; Nurmi (2006) for Finland 
and Nyström (2007a) for Sweden. 
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seems to be the first attempt to quantify regional determinants of firm entry and exit in 
different manufacturing industries of a developing country. 
In particular, this chapter aims to analyze the regional determinants of firm entry and 
exit in Argentina distinguishing three groups of manufacturing activities: low, medium 
and high tech. First, we analyse both sector- and region-specific factors to determine 
whether regional determinants of entry and exit differ between the industrial sectors 
considered. This is highly relevant in developing countries because the potential for 
growth and development is not homogeneous across industries (Kaldor, 1967; 
Cornwall, 1977; ECLAC, 2007) and geographical areas (Audretsch and Fritsch, 2002).  
Second, we analyse whether factors that typically determine firm dynamics in 
developed countries are of similar importance in a developing economy. 
The analysis shows that both region- and sector- specific determinants explain firm 
dynamics, but the impact is not homogeneous across different groups of industries. In 
particular, our previous findings for the whole Argentina (Chapters 5 and 6) apply only 
to low tech entries and exits. This is quite reasonable given the weight of these 
industries in the whole manufacturing activity. On the other hand, firm dynamics in 
high tech activities is mostly explained by different factors. We also find that variables 
that proxy for the singularities of Argentina as a developing country, such as the level 
of poverty or the level of idle capacity, are significant, but only in low tech activities. 
Finally, our results suggest that there is a core-periphery pattern that is relevant for all 
groups of industries. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we start with a brief 
review of the empirical literature on the regional determinants of firm entry and exit in 
both developed and developing economies. Then we address why some regional factors 
may have a different impact in developed and developing countries. The third section 
of this chapter includes an overview of firm dynamics in Argentina during the period of 
interest and describes the data set. The fourth section discusses the econometric model 
and the main results. The main conclusions of this chapter are summarized in the last 
section. 
 
 
7.2. Determinants of firm entry and exit: theory and evidence 
7.2.1. Developed countries 
The significant variations in the regional entry and exit patterns have been explained in 
the literature by differences in some regional characteristics (see footnote 64): a) labour 
markets, b) industrial structure and c) spatial concentration of economic activities and 
individuals66. Notably, in many variables both negative and positive effects are 
expected from a theoretical point of view.  
                                                 
66 There are also a number of factors that, while important in explaining firm dynamics, are not 
easy to be included into empirical analyses. This is the case of cultural attitudes towards 
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As for the differences in the labour market, the literature has concentrated on the effects 
of unemployment, wages and the educational level of the workforce. Firstly, the 
incidence of unemployment on firm dynamics is ambiguous. According to the “push 
hypothesis”, there is a positive impact of unemployment on firm entry to the extent 
that the unemployed can start a new firm. Similarly, when unemployment increases, 
self-employed individuals face fewer job opportunities and are thus less prone to exit 
(Carree and Thurik, 1996; Nyström, 2007a, 2007b; Carree et al., 2008; Santarelli et al., 
2009). On the other hand, according to the “pull hypothesis” an increase in 
unemployment may have a negative impact on entry because the unemployed lack 
entrepreneurial abilities and capital. Likewise, since unemployment is a proxy for the 
level of activity of the economy, an increase in the unemployment rate may result in an 
increase in the number of exits (Brixy and Grotz, 2007). Secondly, a rise in the cost of 
labour discourages the entry of new firms and favours exits (Santarelli et al., 2009). 
Thirdly, the availability of qualified labour may foster the entry of new firms in 
industries that require these skills (Spilling, 1996). Besides, people with a high level of 
human capital may be better in discovering and exploiting business opportunities 
(Fritsch and Falck, 2007), but at the same time they are more likely to have well paid 
jobs (Nyström, 2007a), so they are not necessarily more prone to start new firms.  
As for the industrial structure, previous studies have focused on the level of industrial 
diversification, the industrial tradition, the share of small and medium-size enterprises 
(SMEs), and the relationship between entries and exits. A more diversified 
environment promotes the entry of new firms, as well as their survival. This is because 
the chances of reallocating resources to new activities when a negative shock occurs are 
higher in more complex and diversified environments (Kosacoff and Ramos, 1999)67. 
Besides, the industrial tradition may boost current entrepreneurial activities (Rocha and 
Sternberg, 2005), as well as deter firm closures, since it is likely that past incumbents 
have developed a favourable business environment and supporting institutions. The 
share of SMEs is expected to increase regional turbulence, since it fosters both entry 
and exit. On the one hand, entry costs are lower in areas with a dense network of 
SMEs because these firms pay lower wages (thus reducing the opportunity cost of self-
employment) and serve as role models for new entrepreneurs (Audretsch, 1995b; 
Ashcroft et al., 1991). On the other hand, as small firms are more likely to exit due to 
cost disadvantages, exits should be higher in regions with a large proportion of small 
firms (Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998; Carreira and Teixeira, 2011)68. This is closely 
related to the relationship between entries and exits. Entrances may influence exits by 
increasing the pressure of competition in the market (the so called displacement effect) 
and, at the same time, firms that abandon the market leave behind niches of unsatisfied 
consumers that encourage new companies to enter (the replacement effect). In particular, 
                                                                                                                                               
entrepreneurship (Shapero, 1983) and the role of the government, through public spending on 
infrastructure or public policies (Reynolds et al., 1994). 
67 However, the concentration of  the workforce in a few sectors has also been used as a measure of  
regional specialization, which is expected to increase the start up rate (Reynolds et al., 1994). 
68 An alternative view is that small firms can overcome inherent size disadvantages by occupying 
strategic niches (Agarwal and Audretsch, 1999). 
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according to the revolving door phenomenon many (small) firms exit only a few years 
after creation (Audretsch, 1995a). 
In addition, concentrated areas will tend to have more entries and less exits because 
firms benefit from local external economies, such as specialized suppliers, thick labour 
market and technological spillovers, as well as the physical proximity to consumers 
(Armington and Acs, 2002; Fotopoulos and Spence, 1999; Keeble and Walker, 1994; 
Littunen et al., 1998; Reynolds et al., 1994). On the other hand, disagglomeration 
economies may hamper entry and lead to further exit. This is because a higher density 
pushes up input prices by increasing competition for the scare resources.69  
However, the impact of these regional characteristics is likely to differ between 
industries. For example, according to the product life cycle theory (Vernon, 1966) new 
innovative firms in the early stages take more advantage from agglomeration 
economies, since dense urban areas provide better access to capital, skilled labour, 
infrastructure, information and interaction opportunities with other firms. As the 
product matures, new firms compete on the base of lower prices, so they need to lower 
their input costs. Besides, the impact of regional factors such as the income level or the 
unemployment may depend on the elasticity of demand or the level of capital intensity, 
respectively (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999). Ignoring this kind of differences among 
industries may be the cause of the mixed and partly contradictory results found in the 
literature (Audrestch and Fritsch, 1999; Fritsch and Falck, 2007). 
Only a handful of studies have addressed this limitation (see footnote 65), by 
considering –in addition to regional variables- some industry-specific factors. In 
particular, these studies include barriers to entry and exit to find that the relative 
importance of location-specific factors is greater in industries with low barriers 
(Arauzo-Carod et al., 2007; Fotopoulos and Spence, 1998; Fritsch and Falck, 2007; 
Nurmi, 2006). They also consider the incentives to enter or exit the market to show that 
while for some industries it is more important the demand for the products of that 
industry, other activities depend more on the evolution of the overall (regional or 
national) demand. Also, the impact of the number of incumbents in the same industry 
is ambiguous (Carree et al., 2011). On the one hand, they may foster the attraction of 
similar ventures that benefit from positive externalities (the so called localization 
economies); on the other hand, they may exert a competition effect, which prevents entry 
and increases exit. Finally, these studies allow to identify more easily the displacement 
and replacement effects, as they use a more disaggregate unit of observation (Arauzo-
Carod et al., 2007; Carree et al., 2011). 
 
                                                 
69 Exits may also be higher in densely populated areas ―see e.g. Buss and Lin (1990), Forsyth 
(2005) and Huiban (2011) for empirical evidence. The reasons for this are several. First, higher 
competition in both goods and factors markets (Agarwal and Gort, 1996; Bresnahan and Reiss, 
1991). Second, higher chances of  finding a job, finding another entrepreneurial opportunity 
and/or selling the firms’ assets to another venture (Huiban, 2011). Third, as discussed below, 
since large urban areas attract more entry, a large share of  young firms may lead to higher exits. 
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7.2.2. Developing countries 
The empirical evidence on what determines firm entry and exit in developing countries 
is very limited. In particular, Lay (2003) and Wang (2006) for Taiwan and Günalp and 
Cilasun (2006) and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey, analyze the entry of new firms 
using industry level data. Calá et al. (2014a), Naudé et al. (2008) and Santarelli and 
Tran (2012) use regional level data for Argentina, South Africa and Vietnam 
respectively. As for the studies concerned with the determinants of exit, these include 
Lay (2003) for Taiwan and Ozturk and Kilic (2012) for Turkey (at the industry level) 
and Calá et al. (2014b) for Argentina (at the regional level).70  
Interestingly, there are several features of developing economies that may affect firm 
dynamics and its determinants, which highlights the need for specific empirical 
research about this topic (Bruton et al., 2008). First, developing countries are generally 
characterised by macroeconomic instability and intense cyclical variations (Stiglitz, 
1998; Ocampo et al., 2009; Bértola and Ocampo, 2012), so that we can expect higher 
vulnerability to macroeconomic shocks. This means that after each crisis a great 
number of firms enter the growing markets, of which an important share will exit in the 
following years, thus producing a “revolving door” phenomenon that can be more 
intense than the one typically observed in developed countries. In addition, after an 
economic crisis existing firms exploiting their idle capacity may be more important 
than new firms in satisfying the demand for new goods (Calá et al., 2014a).  
Moreover, the macroeconomic volatility may mitigate the effect of variables such as the 
unemployment rate or the industrial tradition. On the one hand, unemployment may 
have no significant effect if the survival rate of start-ups is low and their growth is slow 
(Naudé et al., 2008). On the other hand, changes in the conditions that determine 
profitability (exchange rate, credit conditions, tax policy, etc.) and the lack of 
continuity in the industrial policies may prevent the consolidation of national firms 
from which new entrepreneurs can emerge (Calá et al., 2014a).  
A less developed industrial structure and less saturated markets may affect the 
relationship between entries and exits. For example, evidence rejecting the replacement 
effect has been found for Turkey and Taiwan (Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Lay, 2003). 
Besides, exits may actually reflect negative expectations about the evolution of 
economic activity, deterring entry71 (Calá et al., 2014a). Similarly, agglomeration does 
not always have a positive association with start-up rates since increased competition 
and higher barriers to entry may act as disincentives for entrepreneurial activity in core 
regions (Naudé et al., 2008). 
Further, the informal sector is usually higher in developing countries (Schneider, 2005). 
At the regional level, the relationship between the size of the shadow economy and the 
entry rate may be either positive or negative. It will be positive if there are 
                                                 
70 There are also several studies that explain firm exit using firm level variables, such as size, age and 
productivity (Frazer, 2005 for Ghana, Eslava et al., 2006 for Colombia and López, 2006; Álvarez 
and Görg, 2009 and Álvarez and Vergara, 2010; 2013 for Chile). 
71 Evidence on the displacement effect is found for Argentina, Turkey and Taiwan (Calá et al., 
2014b; Günalp and Cilasun, 2006; Lay, 2003). 
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complementarities via sub-contracting activities or if the informal sector encourages 
entry by acting as a “stepping stone” (Bennett, 2010). That is, entrepreneurs may first 
enter the informal sector to “test the water” before deciding whether or not to enter the 
formal sector. Besides, informality may encourage start-ups since informal jobs are 
usually instable and insecure and, consequently, push people towards entrepreneurship. 
However, the relation will be negative if informal companies compete with formal 
firms on the basis of lower prices and non-differentiated goods. As for the exits, a 
positive sign may arise if formal firms compete for the same resources than informal 
firms and/or formal firms become informal when facing difficulties. Yet a negative sign 
is expected if formal firms buy inputs to the informal sector, thus lowering costs and/or 
increasing flexibility.  
Another distinctive characteristic of the developing economies is the high level of 
poverty and income disparity, both among individuals and regions. This may hamper 
the emergence of new (formal) ventures, since the demand for goods and services is 
smaller, unstable and less diverse. Poverty also impacts on the supply of entrepreneurs, 
since the share of people with access to information, business networks and financial 
resources is limited (Casson, 1982; Hamilton and Harper, 1994; Kantis et al., 2005)72. 
In particular, long-term unemployed individuals may not have the ability, the financial 
resources and/or the social capital needed to start a new business (Fritsch and Falck, 
2007). 
Lastly, developing countries show marked differences in critical economic indicators 
among their regions, to the extent that some areas can have levels of capitalization, 
technology, productivity, organization and human capital requirements similar to their 
counterparts in advanced countries (Sunkel, 1978). A direct implication of this 
“structural heterogeneity” (Cassiolato et al., 2009) is that firm entry/exit determinants 
may differ across the regions of a country. For example, in peripheral areas there are 
usually not enough related firms to create the conditions required for external 
economies in some sectors, so that positive agglomeration effects are expected to arise 
only in central areas. In addition, as many innovations are generated abroad and 
transferred to multinational companies located in the main cities, knowledge 
generation is usually circumscribed to these areas73. Previous studies on aggregated 
entry and exit in Argentina find that the spatial distribution of entries and exits exhibit 
a core-periphery pattern (Calá et al., 2014a; 2014b). In particular, agglomeration 
economies are stronger in central provinces, meaning that new entrants may have 
access to better resources and business opportunities in these regions. Besides, the 
“revolving door effect” is less intense in central provinces, while the displacement effect 
caused by past and current incumbents is stronger. 
In summary, there are very few empirical studies on developing countries analysing 
regional determinants of firm entry and exit. The regional dimension is not enough 
however, for these countries (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, India and Vietnam) are 
characterised by big regional units with heterogeneous industrial structures. Thus, 
                                                 
72 See Calá et al. (2014a) for empirical evidence on Argentina. 
73 Aghion et al. (2005) show, both theoretically and empirically, that innovation will be increasingly 
concentrated in regions that are initially better positioned. 
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studies that only take into account the regional dimension do not explain a 
considerable amount of the variability in entries and exits. For example, exits in 
previous periods at the regional level may reflect a declining demand and consequently 
prevent firm entry, but exits in the same sector may generate a displacement effect. 
Similarly, if firms’ needs depend on the level of technological intensity, agglomeration 
economies may be more relevant in high tech industries, while input costs are more 
important in low tech industries.  
This study is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to explain firm entry and exit in a 
developing country using both regional- and sectoral- specific variables. We seek to test 
whether regional characteristics affect differently firm entry and exit in 
low/medium/high tech industries as well as to determine which regional variables are 
more important in order to promote entry and/or discourage exit in those industries. 
We also aim to test whether the determinants of firm dynamics in developed countries 
are of similar importance for each one of the aforementioned groups of industries.  
Next we describe the empirical strategy we will follow to achieve these goals. 
 
7.2.3. Empirical strategy 
We estimate different equations for the number of entries (and exits) in three groups of 
manufacturing industries: a) low tech; b) medium tech; c) high tech. The general 
formulation of these equations is: 
 
ENTRYijt = f(REGIONit; INDUSTRYijt; MACROt)    [1] 
EXITijt = f(REGIONit; INDUSTRYijt; MACROt)      [2] 
 
where REGIONit denotes a group of region-specific factors that vary among years and 
provinces (such as unemployment, regional demand, density or industrial structure); 
INDUSTRYijt refers to sector-specific determinants that vary among provinces, years 
and group of industries (such as the number of incumbents or exiting firms in the 
sector) and MACROt refers to factors at the national level that may affect firm 
dynamics, which vary only by year.  
Additionally, in order to test if the determinants of firm dynamics in developed 
countries are of similar importance here, we take as the starting point a set of 
determinants that are generally found to explain regional entry and exit in those 
economies, both at the sectoral and regional level. This provides our first test on the 
differences between developed and developing countries (see e.g. Fritsch et. al., 2006 
and Ghani et al., 2014 for similar strategies). In light of the differences in the patterns of 
firm dynamics between developed and developing countries described in 7.2.2., we 
expect that (most) variables that explain firm entry and exit in advanced countries have 
either weak statistical significance or show the opposite sign to that typically found in 
these countries. 
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Next we add factors, such as the size of the informal economy or the level of poverty, 
that are potentially important in developing countries (and are never considered in 
studies on developed countries). Finally, we explore the existence of a core-periphery 
structure by including the products of a dummy that identifies the richest provinces 
with variables that are expected to have different effects in central and non central 
regions. This is our second test on the differences between developed and developing 
countries. On the one hand, we expect that variables that incorporate some of the 
specificities of developing countries have substantial explanatory power. On the other 
hand, we expect cross products to have a different effect on entry and a negative effect 
on exit, since (entering) firms in the core and the periphery face quite different 
conditions, so that the positive effects of agglomeration are expected to arise only in the 
“central” areas. 
 
7.3. Data 
7.3.1. Entry and exit 
Entry and exit data come from the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory 
(EBDO) of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Argentina. The database 
includes information about the number of entries, exits and incumbents based on all 
manufacturing (formal and private) firms with at least one employee registered with the 
Social Security. This means that our data set does not contain information on either 
public or informal employment. Moreover, the EBDO handles changes in firm codes 
that do not reflect true market entries and exits. In general, a firm is considered closed 
when it does not declare employees in the last twelve months. However, spurious exits 
caused by the displacement of the whole firm’s workforce from firms that “exit” to 
become “new” firms are identified and excluded from the database. Lastly, we restrict 
the analysis to manufacturing firms that declare that the major part of their workforce 
is located in the assigned jurisdiction (about 90% of the total firms in 2008). This means 
that branch offices or subsidiaries located in other jurisdictions are excluded from our 
data set. All in all, this is the most up-to-date, comprehensive, reasonably long-term 
and spatially disaggregated data source currently available for firm demography studies 
in Argentina.   
Data is available for the 23 Argentinean provinces and the Capital Federal city. 
However, the Buenos Aires Province is actually divided into Gran Buenos Aires and 
the rest of the province. Also, we dropped the province of Río Negro because of 
missing data in most of the explanatory variables we considered. This is why although 
there are 25 jurisdictions in the database, we ultimately provide results from only 24. 
Additionally, manufacturing is divided into 23 two-digit industries which are grouped 
into three groups (high-, medium- and low-tech) according to their level of 
technological intensity by using the taxonomy suggested by Katz and Stumpo (2001) 
and adapted to a two-digit disaggregation by Katz and Bernat (2011)74.  
                                                 
74 See Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. This classification has been adopted by the ECLAC and it is largely 
used in Latinamerican studies (UN and ECLAC, 2007). It is based on the resource which is 
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Our dependent variable is the number of annual entries and exits in each jurisdiction 
and group of industries (low- medium- and high-tech) during the period 2003 to 2008. 
We start our analysis in 2003 to avoid the structural break caused by the economic and 
political crisis of the end of 2001 that led to the devaluation of the Argentinean peso in 
January 2002. Including these years of turmoil would completely distort results. We 
finish our analysis in 2008 because this was the last available year in the EBDO dataset 
when this investigation was initiated. Table 7.1 shows the evolution of entries, exits 
and incumbents over the period of analysis. 
 
Table 7.1. Number of entries, exits and incumbents in Argentina (2003 – 2008) 
Year Entry Exit Incumbents 
2003 4,986 2,330 42,754 
2004 5,994 2,326 45,234 
2005 5,486 2,929 48,317 
2006 6,264 3,623 49,987 
2007 5,886 4,358 51,796 
2008 5,389 5,103 52,417 
 
Source: author from EBDO data 
 
The high values of entries in 2003-2005 are closely related to the recovery of the 
Argentinean economy after the severe crisis of 2001-2002. Table 7.1 shows that the 
high entry rates in 2003-2005 (around 11%) persisted the following years, although the 
increase was not so sharp because entry rates dropped in the last two years of our 
sample (to values of about 7%). As for the exits, after the first two years of stability 
(2003-2004), they followed the opposite trend, with an average yearly-variation rate of 
21%. According to the MTEySS (2007), this was largely driven by new ventures in the 
initial years after the crisis (deferred projects along with strictly new ventures 
encouraged by better macroeconomic conditions). Additionally, the slowdown in the 
net entry in 2008 is explained by the international financial crisis, the gradual 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and some internal conflicts (Katz and Bernat, 
2011).  
Table 7.2 shows that the spatial distribution of incumbents, entries and exits is not 
homogeneous, since most concentrate on the richest five regions (the Capital Federal 
city and the provinces of Gran Buenos Aires, the rest of Buenos Aires province, Santa 
Fe and Córdoba). More precisely, these regions roughly cover 22% of the surface of the 
country but concentrate about 80% of the workers, incumbents, new ventures and 
exiting firms. This uneven spatial distribution of the economic activity is quite 
characteristic of a developing economy (Scott and Storper, 2007). 
In addition, the composition of incumbents, entries and exits also differs. In central 
provinces, the relative importance of medium and high tech industries is higher than in 
peripheral regions (Table 7.2). This is related to the advantages that central provinces 
                                                                                                                                               
intensively used in the production of  goods: natural resources, labour or engineering. It slightly 
differs from the one defined by OCDE. 
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offer to these kind of activities: these five jurisdictions concentrate 75% of expenditures 
in science and technology, 77% of university degrees, 62% of universities and 85% of 
exports of manufactured products in 2003 (INDEC, 2005). In terms of Feldman (1994), 
the geographic concentration of the knowledge inputs forms a technological 
infrastructure that lowers the risks and costs of engaging in activities with higher levels 
of technological intensity.  
 
Table 7.2. Incumbent firms, entries and exits by group of manufacturing industries  
in central and peripheral regions (2003-2008) 
 
a. Incumbents by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Average 2003-2008  
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 6,534 22,102 74.8% 56.0% 
Medium tech 1,420 9,849 16.3% 24.9% 
High tech 776 7,548 8.9% 19.1% 
Total 8,730 39,500 100.0% 100.0% 
 
b. Firm entry by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Sum 2003-2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 5,071 16,805 76.4% 62.2% 
Medium tech 1,113 6,107 16.8% 22.6% 
High tech 454 4,098 6.8% 15.2% 
Total 6,638 27,010 100.0% 100.0% 
     
c. Firm exit by group of industries in central and peripheral regions. 
Sum 2003-2008 
  Periphery Centre Periphery Centre 
Low tech 3,088 10,754 78.3% 65.1% 
Medium tech 576 3,421 14.6% 20.7% 
High tech 279 2,336 7.1% 14.1% 
Total 3,943 16,511 100.0% 100.0% 
Note: figures are population data. 
 
Source: author (from EBDO data) 
 
7.3.2. Explanatory variables 
We use data from the EBDO and the National Household Survey (NHS) to construct 
our vector of explanatory variables (the size of the provinces in km2 comes from the 
Military Geographical Institute). The distinction is important because the information 
contained in the EBDO database refers to the whole province, while the NHS is 
performed by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INDEC) on samples of 
families in 31 urban areas. Nevertheless, we were obliged to use the NHS data because 
there is no statistical source providing yearly information on demographic and/or 
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socioeconomic characteristics of the Argentinean provinces (population censuses, for 
example, are performed every 10 years).  
In particular, we were able to construct two types of variables: a) region-specific 
variables related to the evolution of economic activity, the labour market, the level of 
education, the industrial structure and the existence of agglomeration economies; b) 
sector-specific variables that account for the economic conditions that the three groups 
of industries face in the different regions, such as market growth, barriers to entry and 
exit, industrial tradition, agglomeration effects and input prices. As discussed in the 
previous section, these factors are widely used in studies on developed countries. 
Moreover, we included year dummy variables to control for macroeconomic factors75. 
In a second step, we added variables related to the level of poverty, the informal 
economy and the idle capacity in an attempt to capture the economic and structural 
singularities of a developing country. We have also included the square of the level of 
poverty and informality to account for possible non-linear effects. Lastly, we have 
explored the existence of core-periphery differences by including the products of a 
dummy that identifies the richest provinces with the variables that account for the 
agglomeration effects and the relationship between entries and exits. 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 report the definition, statistical sources and descriptive statistics of 
the explanatory variables used in this study. It also contains two columns with the 
expected sign of the associated coefficient, both for entry and exit. Below, we briefly 
explain how these variables were constructed, as well as the expected sign.  
 
                                                 
75 These were preferred to macroeconomic variables such as e.g. the GDP growth because of  the 
measurement problems involved in these aggregates. The GDP growth in local currency is 
inaccurate because official inflation figures are not reliable since 2007 and the GDP growth in 
US dollars is similarly misleading because of  the severe devaluation of  the Argentinean peso in 
2002 (more than 200%) and the consequent gradual appreciation.  
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Table 7.3. Region-specific explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics 
Source: author 
Variable Definition 
Sector 
Source 
Expected sign 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Entry Exit 
Employment variation Rate of variation in employment in all formal firms  
Own calculations from 
EBDO 
+ - 9.22 5.20 -6.97 22.75 
Exit otherst-1 
Number of exits in the previous year in the other 
sectors 
Med-High 
+/-  
43.92 90.17 0 503 
Low-High 109.49 189.11 4 904 
Low-Med 118.08 202.77 4 934 
Entry otherst-1 
Number of entries in the previous year in the other 
sectors 
Med-High 
 +/- 
75.19 150.63 0 771 
Low-High 166.66 285.41 3 1,284 
Low-Med 182.23 311.02 3 1,373 
Incumbent others Number of incumbent firms in the other sectors 
Med-High 
+/- +/- 
813.67 1,685.90 6 8,134 
Low-High 1,531.76 2,545.41 86 10,075 
Low-Med 1,652.79 2,776.12 84 12,005 
HH index Hirschman-Herfindahl Index  - + 24.36 12.00 8.06 62.90 
SMEs 
Ratio of small and medium industrial firms to total 
industrial firms (formal) 
 
+ + 39.92 5.77 27.27 57.03 
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate   
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+/- +/- 8.19 3.81 1.01 18.20 
Primary education Active individuals with primary education (in 1,000)  +/- +/- 191.36 297.19 7.68 1,554.53 
Secondary education Active individuals with secondary education  (in 1,000)  +/- +/- 281.69 384.37 21.80 1,897.59 
University education 
Active individuals with university-level education (in 
1,000) 
 
+/- +/- 220.44 279.55 12.34 1,032.11 
Density Log (population/area)  (in thousands) 
 Own calculations from  
Military Geographical 
Institute  
and INDEC 
+ - 676.91 2,732.61 0.83 13,739.75 
Private-to-public Private employees/public employees  
Own calculations from 
NHS* 
+  3.32 1.64 1.22 9.14 
Migrants 
Migration from other provinces (number of individuals, 
in thousands) 
 
+  206.16 294.16 29.93 1,506.10 
Poverty % of households below the indigence line  -  8.87 6.15 0.40 29.80 
Non-
registered/registered 
Ratio of non-registered workers to registered workers 
 
+/- +/- 0.81 0.31 0.16 1.51 
* Data refer to 3rd quarter of  every year, except for 2007 (4th quarter). 
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Table 7.4. Sector-specific explanatory variables: definition, sources, expected signs and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Definition Sector Source 
Expected sign 
Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Entry Exit 
Incumbents Number of incumbent firms in the sector 
Low 
Own calculations 
from EBDO 
+ - 
1,185.44 1,867.28 80 7,096 
Med. 467.35 994.99 2 5,032 
High 346.32 703.33 4 3,102 
Exitt-1 
Number of exits in the sector in the 
previous year  
Low 
+  
91.82 153.83 3 763 
Med. 26.26 54.18 0 323 
High 17.67 36.81 0 195 
Entryt-1 
Number of entries in the sector in the 
previous year 
Low 
 + 
136.85 229.31 3 1,127 
Med. 45.38 92.65 0 479 
High 29.81 59.66 0 292 
Industrial 
tradition 
Incumbent firms in the sector 7 years ago 
(3-years moving average) 
Low 
+ - 
1,154.14 1,850.12 62.33 7,007.67 
Med. 436.40 950.07 2.67 4,641.33 
High 325.77 674.14 4 2,943.33 
Market growth 
/ Idle capacity 
Rate of variation in employment in 
incumbent firms of the sector 
Low 
+/- - 
6.64 6.97 -22.78 28.79 
Med. 11.88 32.13 -50 350 
High 18.71 62.51 -42.33 725 
Wages 
Nominal wages paid by registered firms in 
the sector 
Low 
. + 
1,532.05 595.47 545.04 3,397.12 
Med. 1,526.54 814.31 366.10 4,782.37 
High 1,944.09 998.10 260.93 6,141.69 
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a) Region-specific variables 
Business cycle. We use the rate of variation of the employment in all formal firms 
to proxy for the evolution of the economic activity. The coefficient of this variable 
is expected to be positive for entries and negative for exits, thus reflecting the 
procyclicality of both processes. We additionally include the (lagged) number of 
exits (and entries) as another proxy of the regional dynamism76.  
Labour. We use the regional unemployment rate to assess the labour market impact 
on firm dynamics. As we previously argued, we cannot say, a priori, what will be 
its impact.  
Education. We use the number of active population with primary, secondary and 
university-level education. We expect that higher educational levels impact mostly 
on high or medium tech activities. 
Spatial concentration. We use population density and its square as proxies for 
agglomeration and disagglomeration economies, respectively. It is expected that the 
density coefficient will be positive for entries, while both positive and negative signs 
are possible for exits. As for the squared, a negative (positive) sign is expected for 
entries (exits). We have also included the number of incumbent firms as an 
additional measure of the agglomeration of economic activity. 
Industrial structure. The industrial structure of the province is approximated using 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl (HH) Index and the share of SMEs. We expect that the 
HH index, which measures lack of diversity, to impact negatively (positively) on 
entry (exit). We also expect that the proportion of SMEs to impact positively on 
both entry and exit.  
Cultural attitudes. We account for the regional cultural differences that may 
enhance start ups by including the ratio private-to-public employees and the 
number of individuals coming from other provinces. We expect both variables to 
impact positively on entry. 
Poverty. We proxy the extent of poverty with the percentage of households below 
the indigence line. This threshold is given by the capacity to afford a basic food 
basket, which is estimated to be about 38 USD per adult in 2003. As we have 
previously argued, less entry is expected in poorer regions because the share of 
entrepreneurs with access to resources is small and the demand is lower and less 
diverse. However, the levels of competition among firms may be lower, so the 
impact of this variable on entries is ambiguous. 
Informal economy. We use the ratio of non-registered workers to total workers as a 
proxy for the regional productive structure (e.g. the seasonality and/or low 
productivity of certain activities may facilitate the growth of the informal sector) 
and/or the lack of government controls over informal economy. As we have 
explained, the impact of this variable on both entry and exit is ambiguous.  
                                                 
76 Note that the replacement/displacement effects are accounted for entries and exits in the same 
group of  industries. 
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b) Sector-specific variables 
Previous entry/exit. We use the (lagged) number of entries (and exits) in the same 
group of industries to account for the interdependence between both processes in 
the exit (entry) equation. We expect that past exit (entry) to impact positively on 
current entries (exits) because of the replacement (displacement) effect. However, 
its impact may be hampered if regional markets are not saturated and, 
consequently, competition among firms is scarce.  
Spatial concentration. We include the number of incumbents in each group of 
industries to proxy for the effects of localization economies and/or the level of 
competition among firms.  
Industrial tradition. We control for the previous industrial activities carried out in a 
sector using the average number of incumbents in the same sector 7, 6 and 5 years 
before (i.e. a 3-year centered moving average). Although we expect that past 
incumbents encourage entry and discourage exit, the high macroeconomic volatility 
of developing countries may mitigate this effect. Thus, the knowledge embedded in 
a region as a result of past dynamic localization economies may not have a clear 
effect due to changes in macroeconomic conditions such as the exchange rate, 
tariffs, credit access or tax policy, as well as the lack of continuity in the industrial 
policies. 
Wages. We use wages in each group of industries to assess the impact of labour cost 
on firm dynamics. They correspond to the average monthly wage of private 
registered workers, in nominal terms because official inflation rates in Argentina are 
not reliable since 200777. We expect a negative (positive) impact of this variable on 
entries (exits). However, its significance may be weak in developing countries 
because, due the limitations of the financial system, many entrepreneurs use their 
savings for the initial capital required (Wang, 2006). 
Market growth/Idle capacity. We use the rate of growth of the employees in each 
group of industries in order to account for the evolution of the sectoral demand. 
The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive for entries and negative for 
exits. However, the usage of idle capacity by incumbent firms may mitigate this 
effect. 
 
7.4. Econometric modeling and empirical results 
Given the definition of our dependent variable, we rely on panel count data models 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Panel data allow us to control for some characteristics of 
the provinces (observable or not) that do not change much across time, as for example, 
endowments of natural resources, institutional setting and entrepreneurial culture. 
                                                 
77 Wages in each group of  industries were constructed as a weighted average of  the nominal wages 
in each 2-digit industry, using as weights the share of  each 2-digit industry in the total number of  
incumbents in the group. 
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Besides, panel data give more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more 
degrees of freedom and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2005).  
Panel data models were preferred to cross-section estimates on the grounds of two 
empirical tests. First, likelihood ratio tests on the variance of the individual effects 
always yield statistically significant results, thus rejecting the validity of pooled 
estimates (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Second, we tested the assumption that 
observations are indeed independent across the considered years by computing the 
covariance matrix of the year vector of Pearson-residuals from the pooled Poisson 
regression model (see Hausman et al., 1984 for details). We found large values in the off 
diagonal elements of the matrix in all the specifications, which supports the 
independence assumption that sustains panel data models.  
In order to choose between Poisson and Negative Binomial models, we computed the 
ratio of the Pearson goodness-of-fit statistic to the degrees of freedom of a Poisson 
model with province dummy variables. As Allison and Waterman (2002) argue, if this 
ratio is close to one, there is no evidence of overdispersion in the data and Poisson 
estimates are efficient. Unfortunately Negative binomial models did not achieve 
convergence in the low tech entry model. We thus report results from the Poisson 
model —even though the value of the ratio proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) 
is slightly above one (1,42). Second, our choice between fixed effects and random 
effects is based on the Durbin-Hu-Hausman test. For most models we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of no correlation between the covariates and the individual effect, 
which means that the random effects model yields consistent estimates. However, 
when we reject that hypothesis, we use fixed effects model, since they always provide 
efficient estimates. 
We report these estimates in tables 7.5 (entry) and 7.6 (exit). In particular, in Columns 
[1] of these tables we report results from the specification that contains variables which 
are widely used in studies on developed countries, while columns [2] include variables 
that capture the core-periphery pattern found in Argentina (see Chapters 5 and 6) as 
well as the specificities of developing countries (poverty, the size of the informal sector 
and the idle capacity).  
Let us first consider results for firm entry (Table 7.5). The first thing to notice is that 
results for low tech activities, which approximately account for 65% of total entries 
over the period, are largely consistent with those found in previous studies for the 
whole manufacturing (Chapter 5). This means that the level of regional economic 
activity, the number of individuals with higher education and the share of SMEs 
impacts positively on entries. There are also significant agglomeration and 
disagglomeration effects driven by the concentration of population. Lastly, both the 
incumbents in the sector and the past incumbents show a negative effect on entry. The 
first effect may be related to more "saturated" markets whereas the second suggests that 
the positive effect of dynamic agglomeration economies may be hampered by unstable 
macroeconomic policies that encourage different sectors in a short-time period. 
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Table 7.5. Determinants of firm entry by group of industries 
    Low tech Medium tech High tech 
    [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] 
    NB FE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson RE 
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Employment variation 
0.0197*** 0.0270*** 0.0105 0.0063 -0.0161 0.0063 
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0140) 
Exit in other sectors t-1 
-0.0007 0.0091** 0.0005 -0.0075** -0.0009* 0.0035 
(0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0006) (0.0029) 
Unemployment rate 
0.0123 -0.0033 -0.0022 0.0037 -0.0162 0.0072 
(0.0104) (0.0094) (0.0170) (0.0178) (0.0204) (0.0163) 
Primary education 
-0.0005 0.0001 0.0008 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0009 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) 
Secondary education 
0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
University education 
0.0011** 0.0006 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0008 0.0000 
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
HH index 
0.0126 0.0064 -0.0037 -0.0059 -0.0092 -0.0177** 
(0.0087) (0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0074) 
SMEs 
0.0276*** 0.0040 0.0163 0.0045 -0.0026 -0.0342** 
(0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0236) (0.0152) 
Density 
4.4403*** 0.6550*** 0.8933** 1.0074*** 0.7769*** 0.9465*** 
(1.6456) (0.1831) (0.3543) (0.2302) (0.2460) (0.1472) 
Density2 
-0.3860** -0.1144*** -0.0588* -0.1649*** -0.1144*** -0.1822*** 
(0.1587) (0.0248) (0.0329) (0.0291) (0.0273) (0.0120) 
Incumbents in other sectors 
0.0001 0.0019 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0011*** 0.0025*** 
(0.0002) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0005) 
Private/Public 
-0.0315 -0.0114 -0.0049 0.0164 0.0951*** 0.0506* 
(0.0207) (0.0184) (0.0318) (0.0302) (0.0356) (0.0307) 
Migrants 
-0.0005 -0.0001 0.0013** 0.0014** -0.0001 -0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
S
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Exit in the sector t-1 
-0.0005 -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0353*** 0.0031 0.0152 
(0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0116) (0.0029) (0.0182) 
Incumbents in the sector 
-0.0008*** -0.0011 0.0005 -0.0057* -0.0032*** -0.0161*** 
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0033) (0.0009) (0.0055) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector 
-0.0006*** 0.0017*** 0.0001 0.0114*** 0.0031*** 0.0092** 
(0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0006) (0.0046) 
Wages in the sector 
-0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
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r 
d
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e
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p
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g
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s 
Non-registered/registered 
 0.9801***  -0.8592  -2.1970** 
 (0.3652)  (0.9524)  (0.9893) 
Non-registered/registered2 
 -0.3497***  0.2510  1.2528** 
 (0.1278)  (0.4881)  (0.5451) 
Poverty 
 -0.0365**  0.0017  -0.0266 
 (0.0148)  (0.0289)  (0.0365) 
Poverty2 
 0.0007*  -0.0005  -0.0001 
 (0.0004)  (0.0010)  (0.0012) 
Employment variation in 
the sector 
 -0.0128***  -0.0016  -0.0041 
 (0.0029)  (0.0023)  (0.0028) 
C
o
re
-p
er
ip
h
er
y
 p
a
tt
e
rn
 
Density x rich dummy 
 1.2746***  1.4873***  1.1186*** 
 (0.3090)  (0.3274)  (0.1660) 
Incumbents in other sectors 
x rich dummy 
 -0.0021  -0.0010  -0.0022*** 
 (0.0016)  (0.0009)  (0.0006) 
Incumbents in the sector x 
rich dummy 
 0.0009  0.0062*  0.0153*** 
 (0.0009)  (0.0033)  (0.0056) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector x rich dummy 
 -0.0019***  -0.0120***  -0.0082* 
 (0.0006)  (0.0036)  (0.0046) 
Exit in other sectors t-1 x rich 
dummy 
 -0.0100**  0.0077***  -0.0036 
 (0.0039)  (0.0030)  (0.0029) 
Exit in the sector t-1 x rich 
dummy 
 0.0019  -0.0377***  -0.0147 
 (0.0017)  (0.0117)  (0.0185) 
  AIC 884.57 1207.37 913.67 880.80 735.47 682.64 
  LR Test 172.37*** 448.47*** 98.57*** 273.46*** 205.53*** 5107.27*** 
  Hausman 142.67*** 10.82 (a) 0.93 8.80 27.74* 
  Pearson ratio 1,85 1,42 1,12 0,95 0,98 0,92 
 
Observations: 144. In high tech industry the number of observations is 138 in FE models.  Standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate the 
statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1.  
Year dummy variables are included in all the specifications. (a) Negative unreported statistic found.  
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Variables that proxy for the singularities of Argentina as a developing country are 
highly significant in low-tech industries. In particular, the negative sign of the poverty 
variable is consistent with lower purchasing power and less resources available for 
entrepreneurs in poor areas. Also, the positive effect of the squared term suggests that 
high levels of poverty spur the creation of (possibly small) firms with low entry barriers. 
The impact of the informal economy is also non linear. A small informal economy 
encourages entry by either pushing people towards entrepreneurship or providing the 
opportunity of sub-contracting activities. However, when the size of the informal sector 
grows too much, the competition with the informal firms may impede the entry of 
formal ventures78. In addition, as employment in the sector increases, less entries are 
expected, which suggests that the increased demand is satisfied through the usage of 
idle capacity rather than by new firm formation.  
The advantages derived from agglomeration effects seem to be particularly strong in 
central regions, where a higher population density encourages entry even more than in 
the periphery. In addition, past incumbents and the number of exits in other sectors 
have opposite effects in core and peripheral provinces. Past incumbents foster start ups 
only in non central regions, while the opposite is true for central provinces. As for the 
number of exits in other sectors, its negative sign in core regions reflects negative 
expectations about the evolution of economic activity, but in the periphery exerts a 
positive effect. 
Most of the determinants considered in developed countries are not statistically 
significant in medium tech industries. Only the density and the number of people 
coming from other provinces enhance start ups, while the density squared prevents 
them. Interestingly, there are many variables that show opposite effects in the core and 
the periphery, a detail that is missing in specifications that do not distinguish between 
both groups of provinces and thus overlap the positive/negative effects. In particular, in 
peripheral regions previous exit in the same sector exerts a replacement effect while it 
seems to proxy for the evolution of economic activity in the core. Similarly, past 
incumbents foster start ups in non central regions, while the opposite is true in central 
regions (this was also the case in low tech activities). The role of the expectations of 
regional economic activity, measured by the number of previous exit in other sectors, 
has also different effects in central and peripheral areas (again, as in low tech 
industries). Agglomeration effects are stronger in rich provinces and are driven by the 
concentration of both individuals and incumbent firms in the same sector. Incumbents, 
on the other hand, negatively impact entry in the periphery. Lastly, none of the 
variables accounting for the specificities of developing countries exert a significant 
impact. 
As for high-tech industries, there are also important (dis)agglomeration effects both for 
individuals and current and past incumbents. In these industries, however, 
agglomeration effects emerge from the concentration of firms in other sectors rather 
than firms in the same sector (which discourages entry). This points to the existence of 
                                                 
78 A higher informal sector may also reflect the lack of government controls in certain provinces, 
which may discourage entrepreneurs for founding a formal firm. 
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urbanization economies, which is consistent with empirical evidence for developed 
countries (Henderson et al., 1995). A higher share of private employment also impacts 
positively on entry in this sector, while negative expectations about the economic 
activity impacts negatively.  
The statistical significance of these agglomeration and employment variables remains 
largely unaffected in the model specification that accounts for the core-periphery 
pattern. However, many other factors are now relevant, such as the level of wages in 
the sector and the industrial diversity, which have a positive effect on this kind of start 
ups, and the share of SMEs, which has a negative impact. As in the other sectors 
considered, many variables have differential effects in core and peripheral areas. This is 
the case of the number of incumbents in the same or other sectors as well as the 
industrial tradition. Once again, agglomeration effects are more pronounced in core 
regions, and they are related to the concentration of both population and firms in the 
same sector. Notably, the importance of localization economies grows as the level of 
technological intensity increases. The core-periphery pattern is explained in this case by 
the incumbents in the same sector, the total number of incumbents and the industrial 
tradition. All these variables have opposite effects in central and non central regions. 
Still, a large number of incumbents in peripheral regions may result in higher levels of 
competition. 
As for the variables that are typical of developing countries´ studies, there is a 
significant impact of the size of the informal economy, which is opposite to the one 
found for low tech activities. This means that, as the informal economy grows, less 
entries in high tech activities are expected, but when it grows too much, the informal 
sector has a positive effect. The poverty level and the usage of idle capacity have no 
significant impact on high tech entries. 
Table 7.6 shows analogous results for firm exit. Once again, results for firm exit in low 
tech activities (which account for 68% of total exits) are consistent with those found in 
previous studies for aggregated exit (Chapter 6). In particular, previous entrants in the 
sector generate a replacement effect in peripheral regions but they prevent exit in the 
core. This suggests that the revolving door is more intense in poorer regions, and the 
(presumably) shorter survival is possibly related to the small market size in these lagged 
regions. Entries in the other sectors also have opposite effects in both groups of 
provinces: the effect is positive in the core and negative in the periphery, where 
previous entry may proxy for the expectations about the evolution of regional 
manufacturing activity. Likewise, the effect of the industrial tradition in the same sector 
is positive in the periphery and negative in the core. 
In addition, we find a negative effect of the degree of industrial concentration and the 
market growth on exit, as well as a positive impact of the educational level of the 
workforce. The latter may be related to a tougher competition in areas with higher 
levels of human capital. Notably, these determinants were not identified in previous 
studies on aggregate firm exit (Chapter 6). We presume that a narrow unit of 
observation reduces heterogeneity and allows to explain the phenomenon better. 
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Table 7.6. Determinants of firm exit by group of industries 
  Low tech Medium tech High tech 
  [1] [2] [1] [2] [1] [2] 
  Poisson RE Poisson RE Poisson FE Poisson FE Poisson RE Poisson RE 
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Employment variation 
-0.0084 0.0003 -0.0083 -0.0052 -0.0135 0.0063 
(0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0179) (0.0168) 
Unemployment rate 
-0.0172* -0.0034 -0.0247 -0.0187 0.0260 0.0300 
(0.0098) (0.0102) (0.0251) (0.0283) (0.0255) (0.0212) 
Primary education 
-0.0006** -0.0004 0.0020* 0.0015 -0.0016** -0.0015*** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Secondary education 
-0.0000 0.0009** -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0007 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0007) 
University education 
0.0007* 0.0007* -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0013* 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
HH index 
-0.0030 -0.0112** 0.0202 -0.0033 -0.0027 -0.0284*** 
(0.0066) (0.0055) (0.0247) (0.0406) (0.0128) (0.0099) 
SMEs 
-0.0070 -0.0072 0.0818*** 0.0923*** 0.0280 0.0036 
(0.0098) (0.0090) (0.0292) (0.0347) (0.0224) (0.0180) 
Entry in other sectors t-1 
0.0002 -0.0111*** 0.0004 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0009 
(0.0003) (0.0039) (0.0006) (0.0039) (0.0005) (0.0040) 
Density 
0.5842*** 0.5945*** -2.6954 -7.1567 0.5644** 0.3969** 
(0.1387) (0.1175) (7.1660) (8.2045) (0.2605) (0.1979) 
Density2 
-0.0727*** -0.1018*** 0.8084 0.5324 -0.0945*** -0.1346*** 
(0.0160) (0.0149) (0.7046) (1.0326) (0.0311) (0.0148) 
Incumbents in other 
sectors 
-0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0035 0.0011*** 0.0029*** 
(0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0041) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
S
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Entry in the sector t-1 
-0.0004** 0.0057*** -0.0014 0.0215 0.0017 0.0164 
(0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0137) (0.0021) (0.0213) 
Incumbents in the sector 
0.0006*** -0.0001 0.0009 -0.0259** -0.0030*** -0.0317*** 
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0111) (0.0010) (0.0072) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector 
0.0003*** 0.0012** 0.0000 -0.0145 0.0025*** 0.0237*** 
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0118) (0.0006) (0.0063) 
Wages in the sector 
-0.0000 0.0000 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
fo
r 
d
ev
el
o
p
in
g
 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Non-registered/registered 
  -0.7609**   0.0321   -0.6109 
  (0.3716)   (1.3403)   (1.0707) 
Non-
registered/registered2 
  0.2633**   0.3837   0.5845 
  (0.1307)   (0.6865)   (0.5986) 
Employment variation in 
the sector 
  -0.0076**   -0.0054   -0.0017 
  (0.0038)   (0.0041)   (0.0027) 
C
o
re
-p
er
ip
h
er
y
 p
a
tt
er
n
 
Density x rich dummy 
  0.9750***   8.4807   1.3593*** 
  (0.2539)   (9.0378)   (0.1866) 
Incumbents in other 
sectors x rich dummy 
  -0.0010   -0.0054   -0.0032*** 
  (0.0013)   (0.0042)   (0.0008) 
Incumbents in the sector 
x rich dummy 
  0.0001   0.0268**   0.0319*** 
  (0.0008)   (0.0113)   (0.0073) 
Industrial tradition in the 
sector x rich dummy 
  -0.0014***   0.0130   -0.0232*** 
  (0.0005)   (0.0118)   (0.0062) 
Entry in other sectors t-1 x 
rich dummy 
  0.0116***   -0.0001   -0.0006 
  (0.0039)   (0.0038)   (0.0040) 
Entry in the sector t-1 x 
rich dummy 
  -0.0057***   -0.0217   -0.0160 
  (0.0019)   (0.0138)   (0.0213) 
                
  AIC 1063.37 1041.07 511.04 515.48 641.38 608.10 
  LR Test 1350.86*** 1794.58*** 511.45*** 522.85*** 375.29*** 3421.43*** 
  Hausman 19.25* 20.51 35.22*** 110.87*** 14.70 19.30 
  Pearson ratio 1,25 1,07 0,86 0,83 0,88 0,86 
 
Observations: 144. Standard errors in brackets. Asterisks indicate the statistical significance of the coefficient: *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-
value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1. Year dummy variables are included in all the specifications.  
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Unlike results for the whole manufacturing, dense areas expel firms out of the market, 
although this effect is reversed in highly dense areas. This unexpected outcome may 
result from differences within a single province between dense areas specialized in 
services (especially public services) and less populated industrial regions, where 
manufacturing activity is more easily retained. In any case, this topic deserves further 
attention in future research. Notably, the disagglomeration effect is more pronounced 
in core regions, where population density fosters exit even more than in the rest of the 
country.  
Lastly, the informal economy impacts on low tech exit much in the same way as it does 
to the whole manufacturing. Although a small informal economy prevents exit, it 
fosters closures when it grows beyond a certain level. The initial negative effect may be 
related to the lower costs and/or the higher flexibility that are inherent to the informal 
hiring, while a positive impact is expected when formal firms have to compete for 
resources or market access with informal firms. Remarkably, these links between the 
formal and the informal sector seem to be more intense in low tech industries, while 
they are non significant in high and medium tech activities.  
As in the entry process, exits in medium tech sectors are far less systematic than in the 
other sectors79. There is a positive effect of nominal wages and the share of SMEs, 
which reflects the so called liability of smallness (Strotmann, 2007). When we incorporate 
variables typical for developing countries, however, we only find a competition effect 
driven by incumbents in the core. The opposite effect is found in the periphery, where 
localization economies seem to be more important.  
Exits in high tech industries are largely driven by agglomeration diseconomies that 
emerge from population density and the number of incumbent firms. However, there 
are marked differences between the core and the periphery. In the core group of 
provinces incumbents in the same sector push firms out of the market (competition 
effect), whereas in peripheral provinces those incumbents induce localization 
economies that prevents exit. At the same time, incumbents in other sectors retain 
firms in core provinces (which is the expected outcome of a dense industrial structure 
or the existence of urbanization economies), but they foster exit in non central regions. 
Industrial tradition in the sector is also relevant and it has the opposite impact in the 
core (negative) and the periphery (positive). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
79 The fact that medium-tech activities probably share certain characteristics with both low- and 
high-tech industries makes more difficult to identify entry and exit determinants in this group of  
industries. 
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7.5. Conclusions 
This chapter analyses the determinants of entry and exit in a developing country, taking 
Argentina as a particular case. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to explain 
regional firm dynamics in a developing economy using both regional- and sectoral- 
specific variables. 
Our results on firm entry and exit for low tech industries are largely consistent with 
previous findings for the whole Argentinean manufacturing, which is consistent with 
the weight of these industries in the overall activity. However, we also find that firm 
entry and exit in low and high tech industries is explained by different factors (except 
for the population density and the industrial tradition in the sector). These results 
suggest that policy measures aimed to foster start ups and prevent firm exit may only 
succeed if they take into account the industrial mix of each geographical area.  
In addition, we find evidence of a core-periphery pattern in which many variables have 
opposite effects in central and lagged regions. This means that the geographical effects 
on firm dynamics cannot be adequately assessed without distinguishing among these 
two groups of regions. This is particularly so for the industrial tradition, the number of 
incumbents in the same sector or in others, and the exit rate in the same or in other 
sectors. Again, these findings are of great relevance for policy makers in developing 
economies, since entrepreneurship policies for the whole country are usually based on 
results and experiences taken only from the central regions. 
The impact of the variables that proxy for the specificities of Argentina as a developing 
country is consistent with previous studies, but they are mainly significant for low tech 
activities. As for entries, there is a substitution effect between the usage of idle capacity 
and new firm formation, as well as a non linear impact of the poverty level on entries. 
The effect of the size of the informal sector is also non linear for both entry and exit. 
Interestingly, informality has opposite effects in low and high tech entries. The 
difference may be related to the lack of abilities that current informal employees have 
to create firms in high tech sectors and the weaker sub-contracting links between the 
informal sector and high tech industries. In any case, the way in which the poverty 
level or the degree of informality impact on firm dynamics is certainly very complex 
and deserves further attention in future research. 
All in all, the results that emerge from this sectoral decomposition are not only 
consistent with previous results on aggregated entry and exit, but also shed light into 
some specific issues. For example, in chapter 5 we found that incumbents discourage 
entry in peripheral regions but encourage them in core provinces. We have now shown 
that this positive impact is mainly related to incumbents belonging to the same sector in 
medium and high tech industries. We also found in chapter 5 that incumbents in the 
periphery prevent aggregated entry, while this is not true for high tech sectors and in 
particular with regard to the incumbents from other industries. Finally, we were not 
able to adequately assess the impact of previous exits before and this seemed to be due 
to the fact that aggregated exits reflect both the replacement effect and the expectations 
of regional economic activity. Here we show that the relation between previous exit 
and current entry is more complex, since a replacement effect is found in peripheral 
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medium tech industries and the effect of the remaining exits are different in central and 
non central regions.  
Similarly, in chapter 6 we found a displacement effect for the whole manufacturing exit 
that is driven by previous entrants in periphery and incumbents in the core. We show 
now that the (dissimilar) effect of previous entrants is only relevant for low tech 
activities, while the (dissimilar) impact of incumbents is valid only for medium and 
high tech industries. In addition, disagglomeration economies in the core emerge from 
population density in low tech activities, competition among firms in medium tech and 
both population and firm density in high tech.  
Future extensions of this study should explain the differential impact of certain 
variables in core and peripheral regions, identify the sources of the apparent congestion 
effects, and cope with the uneven distribution of the economic activity across the 
country and the huge concentration around its capital. Once these issues are sorted, we 
should also test for the equality of the effects of the explanatory variables over firms of 
different size. 
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Summary of the main results 
In this thesis we have empirically studied the role that regional factors play in 
explaining firm dynamics in developing countries, using Argentina as an illustrative 
example. This contrasts with the extant literature, which has been circumscribed almost 
exclusively to developed countries. The topic also has relevant policy implications, 
since governments in developing countries are very interested in promoting firm entry 
as a driver of economic growth. However, the design of public policies usually relies on 
empirical evidence from developed countries. Our findings suggest that such policies 
may not be appropriately designed. 
We begin with a discussion about why firm dynamics may have particular features in 
developing economies and focus our attention on the macroeconomic instability, the 
level of poverty, the size of the informal sector, the process of knowledge generation 
and some characteristics of the industrial structure. We also show that the empirical 
evidence on developing countries is scarce and, particularly at the regional level, 
evidence is not conclusive. This is a major motivation for this work. 
We then expose some general features of Argentina, which are also commonly found 
in other developing countries, and describe the period analyzed in this thesis, with a 
particular emphasis in the macroeconomic environment and the pattern of firm entry 
and exit. We also provide some explanations for the pattern of regional firm dynamics 
that are tested in the following chapters. In particular, we show that firm entry seems to 
be more intense in less developed regions, which may be related to the lower level of 
competition among firms; we also argue that disagglomeration economies may be 
relevant in explaining firm dynamics; and we finally argue that sectoral variables such 
as the barriers to entry or the sectoral growth may be relevant to explain entry at the 
regional level. In addition, we show that spatial structure in Argentina fits quite well 
with a core-periphery pattern, which means that firms face different conditions in these 
two regions, not only in terms of entry facilities but also in terms of survival and 
growth. Lastly, we explain why the usage of idle capacity may have acted as a 
substitution of firm entry after the economic and political crisis of 2001-2002.  
Chapters 5 to 7 identify the determinants of entry and exit in the Argentinean provinces 
during 2003-2008 by using panel count data models. We take as a starting point a set of 
determinants that are generally found to be statistically significant in studies on 
developed countries and add later some variables that might affect firm dynamics in 
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developing countries (e.g., the informal economy, the extent of poverty and the idle 
capacity). We also explore the existence of a core-periphery pattern by testing whether 
the same factors affect entry and exit in a similar way in central and peripheral 
provinces. In chapters 5 and 6 the unit of observation is the province, so that we focus 
on aggregate entry and exit. In chapter 7 we disaggregate the data by decomposing the 
manufacturing industries into three sectors: low-, medium- and high-tech. Next we 
briefly summarise the main empirical results. 
 
8.1.1. Firm entry 
In chapter 5 we show that entries in manufacturing follow the evolution of economic 
activity and are positively affected by the number of graduates, the share of SMEs and 
agglomeration economies. There are also significant disagglomeration effects when the 
agglomeration of firms and individuals is too high. In addition, some variables have 
effects that are opposed to what has been found in developed countries. In particular, 
the industrial tradition do not favour entry (which suggests that macroeconomic 
instability hampers the dynamic positive externalities of past incumbents) and previous 
exits deter entry (presumably because they actually reflects negative expectations about 
the evolution of economic activity rather than the replacement effect found in 
developed countries).  
Covariates that proxy for the specificities of developing countries exert a significant 
impact on entry, thus improving the fit of the model. In particular, poverty has initially 
a negative impact which is consistent with less regional purchasing power and less 
access to adequate resources. Higher levels of poverty, however, enhance the creation 
of (possibly small) firms. The impact of the informal economy is also non linear: a 
small informal economy encourages entry, but it becomes a barrier when it grows too 
much. Lastly, our results suggest that, after a crisis, it is the idle capacity of the existing 
firms rather than the production of new firms that satisfies a good deal of the demand. 
Finally, we provide evidence of a core-periphery pattern according to which the 
agglomeration effects that emerge from the concentration of firms and individuals are 
higher in the core regions. This is consistent with the idea that in peripheral areas there 
may be not enough related firms as to create the conditions required for external 
economies to exist.  
 
8.1.2. Firm exit 
In chapter 6 we show that aggregated exit depends on the rate of unemployment, the 
number of lagged entries, population density, the industrial tradition and the number of 
incumbents. However, most of these variables show opposite effects in the core and the 
periphery. Thus, the specification that does not distinguish between both groups of 
provinces overlaps positive and negative effects. In particular, our results show that 
past entrants increase current exits in peripheral regions, while current and past 
incumbents cause a displacement effect in central regions. This (presumably) shorter 
survival in the periphery may be addressed in future research by a thorough study on 
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regional firm survival or by analyzing firms that entry and die in the same year (not 
included in this thesis). 
In addition, the informal economy has a non-linear impact. The initial negative effect 
may be related to the chances of sub-contracting or buying inputs to the informal 
sector, thus lowering costs and/or increasing flexibility. The positive impact of higher 
levels of informality may result from the competition between formal and informal 
firms for the same resources and/or because formal firms become informal when facing 
difficulties. 
 
8.1.3. Firm entry and exit in low, medium and high tech industries 
In chapter 7 we show that both region- and sector-specific determinants explain firm 
dynamics. Also, the impact of these determinants is not homogeneous across different 
groups of industries. In particular, our previous findings for the whole manufacturing in 
Argentina (chapters 5 and 6) apply only to low-tech entries and exits. This seems 
reasonable given the weight of these industries in the whole manufacturing activity. On 
the other hand, firm dynamics in high-tech industries are explained by different factors. 
These results suggest that policy measures aimed to foster start ups or to prevent firm 
exit may only succeed in certain industries.  
We also find that variables that proxy for the singularities of Argentina as a developing 
country, such as the level of poverty and the level of idle capacity, are significant, albeit 
only in low-tech activities. To conclude, our results show that there is a centre-
periphery pattern that is relevant for all groups of industries. This means that models 
applied to developing countries must distinguish between core and peripheral regions 
in order to adequately assess the role of space on firm dynamics. In terms of policy, this 
finding suggests that entrepreneurship policies in developing countries should be based 
on studies and experiences taken from both central and lagged regions. 
 
8.2 Future research directions 
These results also provide hints about how to continue this line of research. To begin 
with, the impact of the size of the informal sector and the poverty level on firm 
dynamics in developing countries is complex and deserves further attention. In the 
Argentinean case, data on firm dynamics of the aglomerados will give more precise 
estimations, since both poverty and informality are measured within those areas. Also, 
the analysis of case studies may help to understand the role of informality and poverty 
in entry and exit. 
As for the idle capacity, its impact on entries will be better understood by extending the 
period of time to include part of the convertibility period. In addition, more accurate 
results can be reached if the analysis is limited to those sectors for which some 
measures of installed capacity utilization are available.  
This thesis shows that variables that proxy for the agglomeration economies have 
opposite effects in firm dynamics in central and lagged regions. This is an issue that 
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clearly deservers further attention, particularly to identify the sources of the apparent 
congestion effects as well to understand the dissimilar impact of the industrial tradition 
(e.g. in studies on smaller regional areas, such as cities, and taking into account a 
longer historical period). 
Likewise, an interesting extension of this thesis is to explore the differences between 
entry and exit rates of firms of different size. This is important because although the 
majority of new firms are small concerns, some of the positive effects of firm entry 
(such as those related to employment creation and prices) are mainly related to 
medium and large entries. Moreover, previous research in developed countries has 
shown that the perception of the entry and survival barriers and the exploitation of 
regional resources and opportunities are mediated by firms´ size. However, studies 
from developing countries are scarce. 
Finally, further extensions of this work may arise from the modeling of the dynamic 
structure of firm demography (i.e. dynamic panel data models), the consideration of 
services (and its comparison with manufacturing), and the analysis of the effect of the 
regional firm dynamics on some measures of economic performance, such as 
employment creation and regional innovation. 
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Appendix A 
Cross Country Empirical Studies 
Including Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
In this appendix we describe two groups of empirical studies that compare firm 
dynamics in developed and developing countries. The first group assesses the impact of 
business environment on entrepreneurship using cross-country data, and its results have 
laid the groundwork for policy advice of the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and donor agencies. Although the results are not fully consistent (Table A1), they 
show that entry is usually hampered by bureaucratic barriers (costs, procedures and 
time required to start a business) while better governance encourages firms to formally 
enter markets80. Only a few papers have taken into account the sectoral composition 
(see, for instance, Klapper et al., 2006; Aghion et al., 2007) and they find that entry 
regulations reduce firm creation and force new entrants to be larger, although these 
regulations are not strongly correlated with economic development in the sample.  
Table A1. Empirical studies using World Bank cross country data 
  
Klapper et al. (2010) 
Klapper and 
Love 
(2011b) 
Klapper et 
al. (2006) 
Aghion et al. 
(2007) 
Naudé (2009) 
Panel data (GLS) (country 
data) 
OLS          
(country 
data) 
Tobit and IV 
(country 
data) 
Diff-in-diff     
(firm level 
data) 
Panel data (RE 
GLS) (country 
data) 
76 countries WB Group 
Entrepreneurship Survey 
(WBGES) 
95 countries 
(WBGES) 
23 countries 
(Amadeus 
database) 
16 countries 
(WB 
Distributed 
micro-data) 
60 countries 
(GEM) 
  
Entry 
rate 
Entry 
density 
Business 
density 
Entry 
density Entry rate Entry rate 
Opportunity 
entrepreneurship 
Entry costs and 
procedures ns - - - - weak ns 
Rigidity of 
employment ns ns ns ns - -  
Governance + ns + +     ns 
Access to credit ns + ns ns + + + 
GDP per capita ns + + +     ns 
Tax rate       -      
ns: non significant 
Source: author  
                                                 
80 Governance indicators (Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption) are based the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Project (Kaufmann et al., 2006). These indicators have been criticized by 
many authors (see Kaufmann et al., 2007 for a synthesis of the critics and the authors´ reply). 
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On this subject, Naudé (2009) argues that the evidence on the relationship between 
these business environment indicators and entrepreneurship is ambiguous, and contains 
methodological weaknesses. He shows that the determinants of opportunity and 
necessity entrepreneurship are different, and that governance and start-up costs do not 
impact significantly on opportunity entrepreneurship, which is the one that drives 
economic growth. Thus, he concludes that entrepreneurship in emerging countries can 
be more effectively enhanced by proactive policy measures. 
Financial development mostly has a positive impact on firm entry, although this can 
depends on the size of entering firms. Access to credit induces higher entry rates for 
small firms (especially in sectors which are more dependent on external finance), 
slightly lowers entry rates for large firms, and has a positive overall impact (Aghion et 
al., 2007). And finally, evidence about the impact of employment rigidity on firm entry 
is less consistent, but it is usually negative, especially in labour intensive industries. 
The second group of studies uses GEM data to assess the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and the level of economic development. For example, Wennekers et 
al. (2005) find a U-shaped relationship between nascent entrepreneurship and economic 
development, measured either by per capita income or by an index for innovative 
capacity. The initial negative relationship is explained by a higher exploitation of scale 
economies in early stages of development, rising real wages and better labour 
conditions that increase the opportunity cost of self-employment, and a technological 
regime based on creative accumulation, which discourages firm entry. The subsequent 
reversal of the negative relationship is due to a technological regime based on creative 
destruction that reduces the importance of scale economies, a higher consumer demand 
for variety and a larger share of service sector in GDP, which is the most dynamic in 
terms of entry. When opportunity-based and necessity-based entrepreneurs are 
distinguished, a U-shaped relationship fits better for the former, while a negative 
relationship or a logarithmic specification is better for the latter (Wennekers et al., 2005; 
Acs and Amorós, 2008). Population growth and tax revenues also have a positive effect 
on entrepreneurship, while a generous social security system discourages start-ups since 
it raises the opportunity cost. Amorós and Cristi (2008) perform a similar analysis using 
panel data and find similar results. Additionally, they show that six selected Latin-
American countries are in the descending part of the U-shaped curve, which is 
consistent with the efficiency-driven stage. Interestingly, the dispersion around the U-
curve in its descending part is higher than the dispersion in the ascending part, which 
suggests that a country’s characteristics should be taken into account in order to better 
understand firm dynamics in developing countries.  
This line of research has been criticized for a number of reasons: it uses nascent 
entrepreneurship (instead of start-ups), and does not disaggregate by sector; it assumes 
that the effect of independent variables is uniform across all countries; it fails to 
effectively identify opportunity entrepreneurship, as many respondents state that they 
are pursuing an opportunity when they are really starting a business because they have 
no better option (Acs et al., 2008); and data mining (Naudé, 2010).  
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Some alternative measures of entrepreneurship, which enable developed and 
developing countries to be compared, lead to different results.81 For instance, Acs et al. 
(2008) show that the World Bank entry rate has a linear relationship with economic 
development, while the Complex Global Entrepreneurship Context Index has a 
positive, S-shaped relationship with development. That is, entrepreneurship increases 
with income in the factor-driven stage but not in the efficiency-driven stage, as 
necessity entrepreneurship decreases and innovation comes from the outside. In the 
innovation-driven stage entrepreneurship increases again as new innovative start-ups 
arise in higher income countries. In any case, the policy implications between a U and 
an L shape seem to be more important for high income countries. 
 
 
  
                                                 
81 For OECD countries Carree et al. (2002) find a U-shaped relation between economic 
development and business ownership, but when the time series is longer, the U-shaped 
relationship does not provide a better statistical fit than an L-shaped one (Carree et al., 2007). 
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Appendix B 
Definitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entry: The year of birth of a company is identified from its entry into the SIPA register 
of employers and its employees declaration to the social security system. It is defined 
with reference to the same quarter last year. Firm situation in current quarter is 
compared to its situation in the same quarter last year, so that the entry of single firm is 
registered four times a year (once a quarter), i.e., if the entry occurred in February 
2007, it will appear as entry since it did not exist in 1st quarter 2006, and it will appear 
as entry in 2nd quarter 2007 since it did not exist in 2st quarter 2006, and so on, until 1st 
quarter 2008, when it is registered as a Continuer, since it existed the same quarter last 
year. For that reason, and according to suggestion of the EBDO staff, only data of 4th 
quarter of each year are used.  
Exit: It is defined with reference to the same quarter last year. A firm is considered 
closed when it does not declare employees in the last six months. Once through that 
period, the decline is attributed at the quarter in which it stopped declaring employees. 
The stratification of exits by size is made according to the employment the firm 
declared in this period 
Continuers: They are defined with reference to the same quarter last. There may be 
Continuers with zero employees if a firm does not declare employees for two quarters 
and then declare again.  
False entry: New companies that come from the change of name of an existing firm.  
False exit: Companies that are de-registrated as a result of a change in ownership or 
name. Ideally, they should match false entries, but in general they do not, because of 
the mergers. For that reason, it is recommended to take either the average of both 
categories or only one of them to add firms to incumbents. 
Mergers: Companies that absorb other ones in the period.  
One year: Firms that entry and die in the same year. One year firms and False exit are 
deleted from the analysis. 
Incumbents: Continuers + Mergers + False entry. 
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Appendix C  
Aglomerados By Province 
 
 
 
Table C1. Aglomerados by province. Estimated values and coefficient of variation (in brackets) for 
semi-annual values. 
Province Aglomerado Population 2008 Upper bound Lower bound 
Capital Federal city Buenos Aires City 2.981.217 140000 (10.2) 160000 (9.6) 
Greater Buenos Aires 
(GBA)  GBA Departments 9.880.294 160000 (10.1) 180000 (9.5) 
Buenos Aires Rest 
Bahía Blanca - Cerri 305.561 25000 (10.3) 27500 (9.9) 
Gran La Plata 732.375 30000 (10.7) 35000 (9.9) 
Mar del Plata - Batán 608.112 30000 (10.3) 35000 (9.5) 
San Nicolás - V. 
Constitución (a) 177.886   
Catamarca Greater Catamarca 197.903 12000 (10.4) 14000  (9.7) 
Córdoba 
  
Greater Córdoba 1.382.266 40000 (10.1) 45000 (9.5) 
Río Cuarto 161.760 12000 (10.7) 14000 (9.9) 
Corrientes  Corrientes 348.326 18000 (10.2) 19000 (9.9) 
Chaco Greater Resistencia 379.519 15000 (11.3) 20000 (9.8) 
Chubut 
Comodoro Rivadavia- 
Rada Tilly 141.194 10000 (10.1) 12000 (9.3) 
Rawson-Trelew (b) 125.955   
Entre Ríos  
Greater Paraná 270.144 15000 (10.1) 16000 (9.7) 
Concordia 148.840 12000 (10.5) 14000 (9.7) 
Formosa Formosa 231.564 12000 (10.5) 14000  (9.7) 
Jujuy S.S. de Jujuy - Palpalá 300.239 18000 (10.4) 20000  (9.8) 
La Pampa Santa Rosa – Toay 117.287 10000 (10.4) 11000  (9.9) 
La Rioja La Rioja 174.434 10000 (10.2) 12000  (9.3) 
Mendoza Greater Mendoza 888.602 25000 (10.5) 30000 (9.6) 
Misiones Posadas 289.736 18000 (10.0) 18000 (10.0) 
Neuquén Neuquén – Plottier 257.339 22500 (10.1) 25000  (9.5) 
Rio Negro 
Viedma-Carmen de 
Patagones (b) 74.378   
Salta Salta 520.773 16000 (10.5) 18000  (9.9) 
San Juan Gran San Juan 456.836 20000 (10.2) 22500  (9.6) 
San Luis San Luis - El Chorrillo 194.606 12000 (10.1) 14000  (9.4) 
Santa Cruz Río Gallegos 88.727 6000 (10.6) 7000  (9.8) 
Santa Fe 
Greater Rosario 1.246.386 35000 (10.4) 40000 (9.7) 
Greater Santa Fe  496.388 30000 (10.3) 32500 (9.9) 
Santiago del Estero 
Sgo. del Estero - La 
Banda 359.859 15000 (10.2) 16000  (9.9) 
Tierra del Fuego Ushuaia - Río Grande 116.708 9000 (10.1) 10000  (9.6) 
Tucumán 
G.S.M.de Tucumán - 
Tafí Viejo 796.117 22500 (10.1) 25000 (9.6) 
Note: (a) not included since it refers to two different cities of different provinces and is available from 
2006 
(b)  included from 2006. Tables of sampling error are provided for aglomerados surveyed in 2003. 
Source: author based on tables of sampling error. INDEC (2003b) 
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In this thesis we analyze the geographic characteristics that explain firm entry and exit 
into a specific province from the viewpoint of the territory82. Thus, the unit of analysis 
is the province, and region-specific factors determine the number of entries or exits 
observed therein. Thus, all territories are included in the analyses, even those ones with 
no entries. Since the dependent variable can take only nonnegative integer values, and 
the same cross section units (provinces) are observed over several periods, we rely on 
panel count data models (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).  
Panel data allow us to control for some characteristics of the provinces (observable or 
not) that do not change much across time, as for example, endowments of natural 
resources, institutional setting and entrepreneurial culture. This implies that the bias 
derived from the non-observable heterogeneity can be controlled. Besides, panel data 
give more variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency (Baltagi, 2005).  
As for count data models, they not only are consistent with the nature of our dependent 
variable (firms created or firms closed over a certain period), but also are compatible 
with a profit maximization framework, in which more or less entries (and exits) are 
created by “immobile” entrepreneurs in response to local conditions. Next, we briefly 
describe Poisson regression models for cross section and panel data, as well as 
alternative models that become appropriate when assumptions behind the Poisson 
model do not hold, in particular, Negative Binomial models. In Appendix E we briefly 
argue the theoretical basement for count data models. 
 
A4.1. Poisson regression model for panel data 
The simplest regression model for (cross section) count data is the Poisson regression 
model. It specifies that the count yi, given xi, is Poisson distributed with density 
                                                 
82 Alternatively, regional entries and exits may be explained from the viewpoint of  the agent that 
makes the choice. In this case, the unit of  analysis is the firm and discrete choice models provide 
the appropriate econometric framework (Arauzo et al., 2010).  
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                       [1] 
and the following conditional mean:  
                             [2] 
Note that its exponential form ensures that it is always positive. This gives the log 
likelihood function: 
                                
 
        [3] 
which is maximized by the maximum likelihood estimator. The first order condition is:  
                   
 
           [4] 
Poisson estimations are consistent even if the data are not Poisson distributed, provided 
the conditional mean is correctly specified. The coefficients β can be interpreted as 
semielasticities, while the marginal effects depend on both the parameter β and the 
particular value of x at which the marginal effect is evaluated (Cameron and Trivedi, 
1998 and 2009; Long, 1997). 
In panel data, the pooled Poisson estimator may be used if there are no unobserved 
individual specific effects. It treats the data as one long cross-section, with yit having 
conditional mean            . However, as the error is likely to be correlated over time 
for a given individual, cluster-robust standard errors are usually estimated in order to 
take care of both overdispersion and serial correlation. 
In turn, if there are such specific effects, the Poisson individual-effects model is 
appropriated. It assumes that the conditional mean of yit is given by: 
 
                                                  [5] 
where xit are regressors, αi are random individual-specific effects (provinces-specific 
effects, in our case) and γi = ln(αi). Despite the individual effects are multiplicative 
rather than additive (see, however, Allison and Waterman 2002), they can be 
interpreted as a shift in the intercept. Poisson panel estimators have the same 
robustness properties as in cross-section data and the coefficients β can still be 
interpreted as semielasticities.  
As in linear panel data, we first must identify whether unobserved individual specific 
effects exist83. If it is the case, the residuals for a given province might all be of the same 
sign indicating the way in which the province deviates from the "average province" 
(Hausman et al., 1984). This implies that the standardized residuals from the Poisson 
estimation must indicate the presence of serial correlation.  
Hausman et al. (1984) propose a test for the independence assumption based on the 
computation of the covariance matrix of the standardized Poisson residuals (by 
                                                 
83 In panel data analysis data are assumed to be independent over individuals for a given year but 
are permitted to be correlated over time for a given individual.  
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province). Also, likelihood ratio tests on the variance of the individual effects can be 
computed. 
As in linear panel data, two different models for the αi are the fixed-effects and the 
random-effects models84. In the Fixed Effects (FE) model, αi is possibly correlated with 
xit, which allows a limited form of endogeneity. In short panels, consistent estimation 
of β requires to eliminate αi by, for example, using a quasi differencing procedure that 
consist of subtracting from yit the average over all time periods, appropriately rescaled 
by λit/   . Thus, the first order condition of Poisson FE estimator is: 
          
   
   
 
   
 
            [6] 
This quasi difference is used to eliminate the FE and consequently, only the coefficients 
of time-varying regressors are identified. That is, coefficients of time-invariant 
regressors are absorbed into αi. As only within variation is used, it leads to loss of 
precision, in particular for regressors that vary little over time. 
Additionally, time-specific effects can be included to form a two-way FE error-
component model. This can be estimated using conditional maximum likelihood where 
the regressors xit include time dummies (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  
The RE model assumes a distribution for αi. The standard Poisson RE estimator 
assumes that αi is gamma distributed with a mean of 1 and a variance of η
85. The first 
order conditions are: 
             
      
       
 
   
 
              [7] 
 
Fixed versus random effects 
The RE assumption that individual effects are iid implies that individual effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors. If, instead, the unobserved individual effects are 
correlated with individual specific observables, the RE estimator is inconsistent. The 
FE model does not make such assumption, since αi could be determined by individual-
specific time-invariant regressors. Many econometric studies prefer FE estimators 
because of this potential problem.  
If the RE model is correctly specified, both FE and RE are consistent, while if the RE 
are correlated with regressors, the RE is inconsistent. As the RE estimator is fully 
efficient, the difference between the two estimators can be used to perform a Hausman 
test (TH): 
TH =                                    
       [8] 
 
                                                 
84 As Cameron and Trivedi (2009) point out, the term "fixed effect" is misleading because in both 
types of  models individual-level effects are random. 
85 An alternative Poisson RE estimator assumes that γi = lnαi is normally distributed with a mean of 
0 and a variance of σ2α. 
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If TH < χ
2
α (dim(β)) then at significance level α we do not reject the null hypothesis that 
the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with regressors, leading to the rejection 
of the RE model (Hausman et al., 1984). 
 
A4.2. Negative binomial models for panel data 
Poisson estimators assume that the conditional mean equals conditional variance, a 
property known as “equidispersion”. That is, E(Y) = Var(Y) = μ. Thus, valid statistical 
inference requires correct specification of both the conditional mean and variance. If 
the mean is correct, but there is overdispersion, the estimates of the Poisson model are 
consistent, but inefficient (Long, 1997). However, count data are often overdispersed, 
that is, the (conditional) variance exceeds the (conditional) mean. In turn, the Negative 
binomial estimators (NB) explicitly handle overdispersion by including an additional 
parameter, ν, and by replacing μ by μ ν. This improves efficiency and leads to a default 
estimate of the variance-covariance matrix (VCE) that is closer to the cluster-robust 
estimate of VCE. Thus, while the expected value of y for the NB distribution is the 
same for the Poisson distribution, the conditional variance differs. In cross section 
analysis: 
E (y І μ,δ) = μ          [9] 
Var (y І μ,δ)=μ (1+δμ)        [10] 
Where δ is known as the dispersion parameter, since increasing δ increases the 
conditional variance of y. Another variant of the NB model uses a linear variance 
function: Var (yІμ,δ)=(1+δ) μ. Cameron and Trivedi (2009), name these alternative 
models as NB2 and NB1 respectively. 
The NB model is more general than the Poisson model, because it handles 
overdispersion and it reduces to the Poisson model as δ  0. Thus, the existence of 
overdispersion can be assessed by testing the statistical significance of δ (Long, 1997). 
There are also other tests based on the residuals from the Poisson model that do not 
require estimation of the NB (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990). 
However, in panel data, Allison and Waterman (2002) propose the following 
procedure to test for overdispersion. First, estimate a Poisson model with individual 
dummy variables to estimate the fixed effects. Then, compute the ratio of the deviance 
to the degrees of freedom and the ratio of the Pearson goodness-of-fit chi-squared to the 
degrees of freedom. For a good fit, these measures should be close to 186. 
Nonetheless, in view of the larger complexity of NB models, Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009: 627) suggest that it may be more robust to use Poisson panel estimators with 
cluster-robust standard errors than NB models, as the former models rely on weaker 
distributional assumptions (only the correct specification of the mean is required).  
                                                 
86 Only the ratio between the individual effect and the overdispersion parameter is identified in the 
negative binomial model, which makes difficult to construct an equidispersion test (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 1998). 
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One interesting property of count data models is that they are consistent with a profit 
maximization framework, in which the optimal location is chosen subject to certain 
restrictions. Thus, results can be interpreted as reduced-form results derived from a 
structural model of firm location decision (Becker and Henderson, 2000; Guimarães et 
al., 2004; Jofre Monseny et al., 2011). In particular, Becker and Henderson (2000) 
adapted the stock model in Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995) in order to explain 
the birth process at the regional level87. It is assumed that for each separate industry, at 
a point in time, there is a supply of entrepreneurs in each province who might enter this 
industry (as opposed to entering other local industries or not starting a new plant). This 
supply relationship relates the number of births in the industry j, the province i and the 
time t (the count event) with some variables which may be considered as its 
determinants: expected net present value per plant (NPV), province size (population or 
total employment), unemployment rate, sociodemographic characteristics, etc.: 
 
Sijt = f(NPVijt, SIZEit, UNEMPit, SOCIOit,…)      [1] 
 
Figure E1 shows the positive relationship between the NPV and number of local 
entrepreneurs that entry into a specific industry. The curve may shift outward as the 
other determinants change, for example, when population increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 Other models that explain the equilibrium number of firms in a region by using a set of regional 
and sectoral determinants (Carree et al., 2011) are more restrictive, as they assume an specific form 
of cost and demand curves, as well as an specific kind of interdependence among firms (Cournot 
competition). 
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Figure E1. Supply of births (Supply of entrepreneurship) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author based on Becker and Henderson (2000) 
 
There is also a corresponding demand curve, which shows the opportunities for new 
plants. This curve represents how NPV per plant change locally with additional entries 
in the industry in the province, and may be upward or downward sloping, in the 
presence of external scale economies or competition in local output markets, 
respectively (Figure E2). This curve shifts up/out as province size increases 
(representing increases in local product demand), or province regulation weakens. 
 
Dijt = f(NPVijt, SIZEit, REGUL.it, …)       [2] 
 
 
Figure E2. Demand of births 
 
A) Competition in output markets   B) Industry external scale economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author based on Becker and Henderson (2000) 
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The number of new firms created over the period of time t in the province i is given by 
the intersection of the demand and supply curve, which gives a reduced-form 
equation88: 
Bit = B(Yit, fi + eit)         [3] 
 
where Bjt is births in province i in time t; Yit is a vector of province characteristics, as 
well as year dummies, fi is a province fixed effect of unmeasured time-invariant features 
of the province affecting births in the industry (which may be potentially related to the 
observable province characteristics); and eit is a contemporaneous i.i.d. error term
89. 
                                                 
88 As this model relies on the existence of a latent pool of geographically immobile entrepreneurs, it 
reflects better the situation of local single-plant firms, as it is our case. In turn, a conditional logit 
framework may be more adequate for multiplant firms that scan the country´s geography to 
choose the best location (Becker and Henderson, 2000). 
89 eit may be spatially correlated, and in this case the entry of new plants in a particular province is 
partially driven by the (average) characteristics of the surrounding provinces. However, this is not 
the case for Argentina (see Appendix D), where the large size of provinces reduces the spatial 
effects. As usual in spatial analysis, we tried to detect spatial correlation among provinces. Given 
data constraints, we used a simple neighbour criterion, concretely, a contiguity spatial neighbour 
matrix (i.e., two provinces are neighbours only if they share a common border), but no spatial 
correlation was detected. We assume that lack of significance is due to the extended size of 
Argentinean provinces that reduces such spatial effects. 
